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INTERNATIONAL DAY OF UN PEACEKEEPERS, 29 MAY 2021

Father of The Nation



"I want to reiterate our full confidence on the human being winning impossible and overcoming difficulties."

*Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
in the United Nations, General Assembly
29th session on 25 September, 1974*

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EDITORIAL

This year Bangladesh is celebrating the birth centenary of Father of the Nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibar Rahman and fifty years of independence. Imbued by the spirit of Father of the Nation and conforming with the foreign policy of Bangladesh "Friendship to all and malice towards none", Bangladesh is highly committed towards establishing global peace and security. In legacy of that, journey of Bangladesh in Peacekeeping operations sailed in August 1988 by Bangladesh Army. Subsequently, Bangladesh Police started peacekeeping operations in 1989. Later, Bangladesh Navy and Bangladesh Air Force also joined peacekeeping operations in 1993. At present, with the status of a leading 'Troop and Police Contributing Country' (T/PCC) to UN Peacekeeping, Bangladesh is commemorating her 33 years of dedication, glory and sacrifice in peacekeeping operations with the theme "The road to a lasting peace: Leveraging the power of youth for peace and security." Bangladesh has earned the credentials of a 'Role Model' in global peacekeeping by sheer professionalism, impartiality, integrity and humane attitude in their approach. This pride came at a cost significantly marked by the sacred sacrifice of 159 lives and 240 incidents of major injuries, suffered by the Bangladeshi peacekeepers for the greater cause of world peace.


Every year, the 29th May is observed as "International Day of UN Peacekeepers" in around the globe. To mark the contribution of our peacekeepers and pay tribute to our deceased/injured peacekeepers, the Armed Forces Division (AFD) is presenting the 7th issue of "United Nations Peacekeepers Journal" in coordination with Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Bangladesh Police. Articles of the journal primarily focused on the contributions of Bangladeshi Peacekeepers deployed in various United Nations Missions. Some of the articles reflect the achievements of our peacekeepers including ways to manage present and future challenges in multi-dimensional mission environment. Gender mainstreaming and women in blue helmet have also been highlighted in this issue. Most of the articles are the expressions of authors' inner mind coined from personal experiences and review of narrative from books. We believe this issue will help unleashing untold happenings of peacekeeping operations and enrich our perception in this realm.

Finally, we would like to thank the Board of Editors for their relentless support and assistance to scrutinize the articles and manage publishing the journal in time. We convey our sincere gratitude to all the authors for their innovative and thought-provoking contribution despite their busy schedule. We are happy for receiving a good number of articles this time. However, all couldn't be housed due to the paucity of space. Nevertheless, we hope that future issues will be more resourceful and innovative to cover new horizon of UN peacekeeping to meet the expectations of our esteemed readers. We are hopeful about receiving similar response, support and cooperation from all concerned in future too.

COMPLETED PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS **AROUND THE WORLD**

Ser	Country	Name of Mission	G/Total
1	Afganistan Afganistan-Pakistan	UNAMA UNSM/UNGOMAP	11
2	Angola	UNAVEM & UNAVEM III	635
3	Bosnia	UNMIBH	177
4	Burundi	BINUB	6
5	Cambodia	UNAMIC / UNTAC/UNMLT	1301
6	Congo	MONUC, MONUSCO	35002
7	Croatia/East Slovenia	UNTAES	76
8	East Timor	UNAMET / UNTAET / UNMISSET	2718
9	Ethiopia / Eritrea	UNMEE	1108
10	Georgia	UNOMIG	131
11	Haiti	UNMIH / MNF/MINUSTAH	5382
12	Iraq	UNGCI/UNMOVIC	124
13	Iran	UNIIMOG	31
14	Ivory Coast	MINUCI/ONUCI/UNOCI	32850
15	Kosovo	UNMIK	539
16	Kuwait	UNIKOM	8457
17	Liberia	UNOMIL/UNMIL	23575
18	Macedonia	UNPREDEP	7
19	Mozambique	ONUMOZ	2622
20	Namibia	UNTAG	85
21	Rwanda	UNAMIR	1022
22	Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL/ UNIOSIL	11981
23	Somalia	UNOSOM-I –II/AMISOM	1973
24	Sudan	UNMIS	9023
25	South Sudan	UNMISS	7948
26	Tajikistan	UNMOT	40
27	Uganda / Rwanda	UNOMUR	20
28	Western Sahara	MINURSO	361
29	Yugoslavia (Former)	UNPROFOR / UNMOP	1584
30	CAR & Chad	MINURCAT	59
31	Darfur	UNAMID	8990
32	Lebanon	UNIFIL	2607
33	West Africa	UNOWA	2
34	UNSOA (Nairobi)	UNSOA	1
35	Syria	UNSMIS	18
36	Mali	MINUSMA	10004
37	CAR	MINUSCA	6135
38	Somalia	UNSOM	6
39	Office of the African Union	UNOAU	1
40	Sudan	UNISFA	2
41	UNHQ	UNDPKO	49
42	Cyprus	UNFICYP	4
43	Yemen	UNMHA	2
TOTAL			1,76,669

CURRENT DEPLOYMENT OF BANGLADESHI PEACEKEEPERS
AROUND THE GLOBE



Total Deployment : 6742

Forcewise Total Completed Deployment

Ser	Bangladesh Army	Bangladesh Navy	Bangladesh Air Force	Bangladesh Police	Total
1	1,42,790	6,012	7,551	20,316	1,76,669

Supreme Sacrifices for World Peace

(From April 1989 to April 2021)

Ser	Bangladesh Army	Bangladesh Navy	Bangladesh Air Force	Bangladesh Police	Total
1	124	04	09	22	159

Summary of Injured Peacekeepers

(From April 1989 to April 2021)


Ser	Bangladesh Army	Bangladesh Navy	Bangladesh Air Force	Bangladesh Police	Total
1	222	01	05	12	240

Participation of Female Peacekeepers in UN Mission

Ser	Forces	Participated	Currently Deployed
1	Army	429	119
2	Navy	22	05
3	Air Force	110	10
4	Police	1,473	150
Grand Total		2,034	284

CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN OPERATIONS

(Report Date : 31 March 2021)



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From Taboo to Absolute Necessity-The Evolution of UN Intelligence: Experience from the UN Mission in DRC (MONUSCO)

Brigadier General Abu Hena Mohammad Razi Hasan, SUP, SPP, psc

Introduction

Basing on the principles of consent of the parties, impartiality, non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, United Nations Peacekeeping Missions have evolved into one of the most effective tools for managing complex inter-state and intra-state crisis. With the change in the nature of the conflicts, current peace operations are deployed in an environment which is asymmetric in true sense. Besides security issues, ethnicity, religion, economics, access to mining, disarmament of ex-combatant, arms smuggling, severe human right violation, politics, etc dominate the current UN operational environment. In short, the UN missions have become multi-lateral and multi-dynamic involving variety of stakeholders.

Under threatening and volatile environment of the host countries peacekeeping roles such as protecting humanitarian aid, disarming factions, monitoring fragile cease-fires, preventive deployment and negotiating agreements among armed actors call for good and timely intelligence. However, despite enormous capacity of UN to plan and implement exponential growth of UN missions, UN remains weak in the critical area of information assessment, or what is commonly known as intelligence.¹ Traditionally, UN shies away from conducting 'intelligence operations' as it contradicts the transparent and impartial character of the UN. However, the changed dynamics and increased complexity of peace operations, compounded by uncertain security threats to UN personnel, make a stronger UN intelligence capability increasingly necessary both at the headquarters and in the field.

A closer look at the existing structure and capabilities of UN in terms of intelligence/ information analysis highlights that absence of standardized protocol, specified collection methods, absence of structured analyzing capability and lack of experts in this field are main drawbacks in this regard. The multinational characteristics of UN itself raise the problem of intelligence sharing. Under similar circumstances, to compensate the shortfalls of traditional intelligence in such multi-national environment NATO has developed the concept of 'Knowledge Development'. Over the years, UN Peacekeeping Missions such as MONUSCO has developed limited capability to deal with intelligence. Bangladesh Rapidly Deployable Battalion (BANRDB) deployed at MONUSCO has been undertaking information management activities following unique methods and procedures.

The paper will first make an endeavour to examine the necessity of developing intelligence capability for UN keeping in mind the limitation of


traditional approach to intelligence by UN. It will then examine an alternative perspective of intelligence developed by NATO known as 'Knowledge Development'. The paper will then propose various dynamics of UN intelligence. At the end, the experience of BANRDB with respect to intelligence handling at MONUSCO will be highlighted which would be followed by the difficulties faced by them and recommendation for future.

Evolution of Contemporary UN Peace Operations

UN Peacekeeping Operation has undergone unprecedented transformation in terms of breadth of mandate, scale and duration of operations. Over last three decades, more and more UN Peace Operations have been deployed in countries under Chapter VII of the UN Charter where consent was limited and security, therefore, became a critical issue. The word 'peacekeeping' did no more reflect the reality as the UN increasingly got involved in operations where there was no peace to keep.² The peacekeeping environment became less and less permissive where extremist groups and non-state actors are operating asymmetrically. The conflicts of 2000s were more of intra-state in nature involving security, ethnicity, economics, power struggle, regional influence, land accusation, access to mining, regional dynamics, etc issues. Parties involved in these conflicts often consider the UN as a party to the conflict itself. Thus, to 'keep' and 'build' peace, a growing number of United Nations Peace Operations have become multi-dimensional in nature, composed of a variety of components.

One of the fundamental changes in the characteristics of UN Peace Operations is the sudden increase in the fatality of the peacekeepers. A closer look at the peacekeeping fatalities over last 68 years reveals three phases of significant increase as shown in the figure. The third phase is the most significant which began in 2011, became critical in 2013 and continues into

Figure 1: Evolution of UN Peacekeeping Mechanism



Source: Major Gisle Fagerland, 'UN Peace Operations and Intelligence', Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College, 2017, p 24

2017. The third phase accounts for 20.6% of the total fatalities since 1948, accounting for a higher proportion than both of the first two phases³ (Figure 1). The blue helmets were no more providing adequate protection to the peacekeepers.

Why UN does not do 'Intelligence'?

The word 'Intelligence' was traditionally considered as taboo in UN environment. The non-transparent, unethical and covert character of traditional intelligence is viewed as contradicting to the non-threatening, transparent, multilateral and impartial image of the UN. The term 'intelligence' is often related to the existence of 'enemy' or 'rivals', which does not commensurate with the stature of the UN. United Nation's preference for the term 'information' rather than intelligence, indicative of the sensitiveness and the notion that intelligence is an unethical means for pursuing a moral cause is pervasive.⁴ The legal binding of UN with host country restricts her to be involved in any kind of covert intelligence gathering activities. Especially the humanitarian actors within the UN-system, like UNHCR and UNICEF, are strong defenders of this vision and do not subscribe to the idea of conducting any intelligence activities by the UN.

Another problem of 'Peacekeeping Intelligence' is the difference of defining the concept of intelligence by the member states and their understanding about the ownership of such intelligence. The reluctance of many states to hand over information to the UN, caused mainly by frequent 'leaks' within the organization significantly impacts UN intelligence capability. National caveats and constraints of sharing intelligence also act as potential barrier in this regard.


Evolution of Intelligence at UN

With the gradual shift of the nature of UN missions, its inadequacy in the field of intelligence was becoming vivid. The apparently failed missions at the Balkans, Rwanda and Somalia displayed the fact that UN missions could not always be impartial and non-threatening. Member states are gradually accepting that fact that under volatile UN operational environment and threat to peacekeepers, UN requires better situational awareness. The UN also needs stronger capacity to analyze and understand the political dynamics of the operational environment and make decisions accordingly.

The requirement of enhanced intelligence capability for the UN was outlined in Brahimi Report which urged that UN forces "be afforded the field intelligence and other capabilities needed to mount an effective defence against violent challengers" has not been sufficiently implemented.⁵ In June 2015, the report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) acknowledged the debate over intelligence in peace operations. The same was highlighted in the 'Santos Cruz Report' which emphasized collection

of tactical intelligence by peacekeeping missions to prevent casualties. With the change of the role of UN from 'Conflict Prevention' to 'Peacekeeping' into 'Peace Enforcement', the need for intelligence is becoming vivid (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Growing need of Necessity of Intelligence at UN



Source: Peacekeeping: A civilian perspective? (Internet)

Intelligence in the Current Operational Environment of UN

The Necessity of Intelligence at UN: Efficient implementation of Security Council peacekeeping mandates is the ultimate objective of UN intelligence. In order to accomplish any political objective, the UN need to have more knowledge of the parties intentions and activities than the parties themselves. UN intelligence is intended to support a common operational picture, provide early warning of imminent threats and identify risks and opportunities.⁶ In doing so, it also aims to achieve following:

Figure 3: Necessity of UN Intelligence



Source: Author's self-construct

Limitations of Traditional Approach to Intelligence at UN: The diversity and long reach of UN underline a multi-dimensional and UN specific approach to intelligence. Traditional concept of 'Intelligence' faces a number of limitations and challenges mainly due to transparent nature, impartial position of UN and its multi-dimensional/ multi-national characteristics:

- a. The collection of intelligence by UN through communication interception, covert operation and informant network will have legal limitation/implication with host country.
- b. Use of informant network is controversial for the UN as this would put the source, who is most likely a host country citizen, at jeopardy.
- c. Four kinds of actors have interest in sharing UN intelligence: member states, parallel forces, humanitarian actors, and friendly forces of host countries. Each of these actors faces different challenges in sharing intelligence.⁷
- d. Humanitarian Actors are more likely to distance themselves from the UN conducting aggressive intelligence operations as it would adversely compromise their principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.
- e. The presence of national staff in mission is an asset and at the same time could be a potential liability in terms of intelligence leakage.
- f. Intelligence procedures, reporting forms, and language used across the spectrum of UN missions are diverse in nature by itself a limitation.
- g. Lack of coordination, inadequate personnel, varying levels of training and lack of interoperability among troops from different countries act as another big limitation for UN Intelligence.
- h. National constraints/ caveats may restrain member states from sharing intelligence with others.
- j. The 'turf war' between various entities of UN Peacekeeping missions such as Political Affairs, Human Rights, Mine Action, Civil Affairs, etc make them reluctant to share intelligence with military components.
- k. Usual UN information sharing mostly takes place upwards, not sidewise or downwards.

UN Specific Approach to Intelligence: The diversity and long reach of the UN underlines a multi-dimensional and UN specific approach to intelligence. 'UN Intelligence' is the processing and analysis of information—a multidimensional situational analysis—with the set political imperative of contributing to or implementing a peace process.⁸ UN intelligence includes a broad range of information sources except the covert ones, partners, and objectives. It emphasizes the use of open sources of information, multilateral

sharing at all levels and, the use of intelligence to ensure force protection. UN intelligence needs to strike a careful balance between the principal of 'need to share' and 'need to know' - between adequately sharing and effectively securing information. UN intelligence is also different from traditional situational awareness. It is directed by a more centralized, top-down process whereas traditional situational awareness is a more bottom-up decentralized process.

NATO 'Knowledge development' Concept- A Different Perspective on Intelligence


In order to understand specific characteristic of UN intelligence we can look at the 'intelligence system' prevailing among similar multi-national organizations. Faced with similar challenges as the UN in obtaining the shared situational awareness necessary to conduct effective multinational operations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) developed the concept of "Knowledge development". The objective of this concept was to develop a shared understanding of the environment for all actors engaged on the ground while overcoming limitations to sharing intelligence with a broader audience.⁹ Traditional 'intelligence' is shared basing on the principle of "need to know" - shared only with those for whom this knowledge would be essential and relies upon secrecy, whereas "knowledge development" revolves around the principle of "need to share" and take a holistic approach to enable decision makers understand their complex operational environment.

NATO's perception of Intelligence was inherited from Cold War era which describes it as a military function that deals with the assessment of a specific enemy, terrain, and weather. This perception strongly contributed to maintain a limited view of what intelligence is truly about. However, the experience gained by NATO in the operations conducted in the Balkans and Afghanistan showed that the military alone was not sufficient to prevent or resolve crises. It also highlighting the need for greater collaboration between the various stakeholders involved in a conflict. The difficulty in understanding the "problem" in Afghanistan led NATO to rethink its operational environment analysis procedure. In Afghanistan and the Balkans, the intelligence community was ignorant about local dynamics, powerbrokers, economics and ways to influence them. The military neglected various development projects carried out by several organizations and was not correctly engaged with the population. This led to poor decision making and coalition causalities.

Under these circumstances, NATO developed and implemented a 'Knowledge Development' concept to support the planning, implementation, and assessment of operations, which provides a broad overview of all operational dimensions. Unlike Intelligence, the 'Knowledge Development' process considers that acting effectively implies knowing the capabilities of the main actors and how they interact with and influence each other. The key idea is to describe the operational environment in terms of a system of systems,

analyzing the relevant relationships between the identified actors and assessing probable mechanisms of influence between the elements within the system.¹⁰ Knowledge Development enhances Intelligence, transforming it into “Intelligence Plus”. This process consists of five phases, as shown in Figure 4.


Figure 4: Different Phases of Knowledge Development



Source: Nelson José Mendes Rêgo, Intelligence in NATO, April 2018

The comparison between Intelligence Cycle and Knowledge Development is given below:

Figure 5: Comparison between Intelligence Cycle and Knowledge Development Process



Source: Author's self-construct


UN intelligence should be a compromise between 'knowledge development' and 'intelligence'. UN intelligence needs to include a broad range of information sources, partners, and objectives. It should emphasize collection of information mostly from 'open source' and sharing of intelligence at all levels between all relevant stakeholders. The use of UN intelligence would be solely for the purpose of force protection and mandate implementation. UN "Peacekeeping Intelligence," therefore, "amounts, in practice, to the use of standard analytical methodologies applied to information from all sources except covert ones."¹¹ One of the biggest challenges for intelligence in UN peace operations is striking the right balance between 'need-to-share' and 'need-to-know' principles - between adequately sharing and effectively securing information. This requires that peacekeeping intelligence should be shared with mission personnel provided the information is required for them to carry out their official duties.

Dynamics of UN Intelligence

Characteristics: UN intelligence is the processing and analysis of information- a multidimensional situational analysis- with the set political imperative of contributing to or implementing a peace process.¹² An UN intelligence system would use processes and structures that favor common assessment, sharing, and integration of information. UN intelligence needs to have following characteristics:

- a. Strict compliance to Security Council mandates, Charter of the United Nations, International Human Rights standards and obligations.
- b. Conducted exclusively in support of the effective and efficient implementation of missions' mandates, including protection of peacekeepers.
- c. Fully autonomous from and independent of any national intelligence systems.
- d. Maintained with a certain degree of confidentiality.
- e. Targeted to a specific audience.
- f. Correct balance between 'need-to-share' and 'need-to-know' must be maintained.
- g. Situated within a particular decision-making process.
- h. Should be collected using overt means.
- j. A standardized tool to manage and analyze information need to be used.
- k. National constraint on sharing intelligence to be considered.

Figure 6: Characteristics of UN Intelligence



Source: Author's self-construct

Levels and Processing of UN Intelligence: So far, the UN has tended to over focus on collecting information without giving enough attention to processing, exploiting, analyzing, and sharing it.¹³ The dynamics of UN intelligence need to be understood by breaking it down to various levels: Strategic, Operational and Tactical.


a. **Strategic Intelligence:** Prior to the deployment of UN Peacekeepers, Strategic intelligence is needed to generate overall political picture prevailing in the conflict zone. The intelligence available at this level is mostly political in nature and is justified as the UN is seeking to produce a desired political outcome. At this level information is processed by the UN Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC) and Assessment Team at Office of Military Affairs (OMA).

b. **Operational Intelligence:** Operational intelligence is required by planners at the Department of Peace Operations, Field Mission Headquarters, Force Commanders and UN relief agencies. This is needed to plan the most effective deployment of both civilian and military resources in the field. This also helps to develop understanding about threat posed by conflicting parties not only to themselves but to UN peacekeepers as well. At this level JMACs is the main structure for collecting and analyzing information to provide medium and long-term analysis in support of decision making.¹⁴

c. **Tactical Intelligence:** Tactical intelligence is required by the field commanders for the planning and execution of tactical operations.

Rudimentary analysis is available at this level. Each component of field mission attempts to generate tactical intelligence mostly basing on daily reports.


Figure 7: Level and Processing of Intelligence at the UN



Source: 'Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations: Toward an Organizational Doctrine', International Peace Institute, 2016

Types and Sources of Intelligence for UN: The sources of information available to the UN are diverse in nature. The principal sources of intelligence open to the UN, however, are essentially 'above board'.¹⁵ This does not mean that UN will rely on the information provided by the parties to the conflict, but the methods of collecting intelligence are overt. The sources of UN information collection can be broadly divided into three groups - Open Source Intelligence, Human Intelligence, and Imagery Intelligence (figure 8).

Figure 8: Types and Sources of UN Intelligence




Source: Author's self-construct

UN Intelligence – MONUSCO Experience

The core mandate of protecting the civilians in DRC is implemented through a concept of 'Protection through the Projection' which is implemented through Rapidly Deployable Battalions (RDB). The main element of 'Protection through Projection' concept is to dislocate the static force posture by reducing a number of static bases and centralizing assets and troops into fewer, larger bases.¹⁶ From these fewer bases, a greater proportion of the Force can be projected onto the ground as number of small detachments called as Standing Combat Deployments (SCDs).

The UN Infantry Battalion Manual lists 'situational awareness' as one of the military's primary tasks. Battalions are required to "proactively acquire" and analyze information about conditions in the Area of Responsibilities (AoR) and ensure that such information is disseminated within the battalion, to the sector headquarters, and to other relevant stakeholders.¹⁷ In order to retain the capability of generating intelligence for timely intervention, MONUSCO BANRDB has realigned its intelligence collection and analyzing mechanism.

Figure 9: Core Concept of 'Protection through Projection'



Source: Author's self-construct

BANRDB Intelligence Collection:

- a. BANRDB has permanent presence in the form of Company Operating Base (COB) in key locations or vicinity of most threatened locality. Each MONUSCO Force base, such as COB, has at least one Community Liaison Assistant (CLA) attached with it. They monitor the Community Alert Network

(CAN) system. Long range patrols or domination patrols from these bases visit population centers, engage with community leaders and talk to local population. In addition to building confidence, these measures also help gather intelligence.

b. SCDs are deployed at the far flung areas of DRC basing either on intelligence alert or request of MONUSCO civilian sections. The SCDs are accompanied by CLAs and Language Assistants (LAs).

c. Patrols from SCDs dominate surrounding area, establish contact with local population and put in place an informal information collection network. They gather information by their interaction with local civilians, notables (Key Leader Engagement-KLE), religious leaders, NGOs, etc. In the context of DRC, women play an important role in the household. Interactions of BANRDB patrols with the village women are one of the largest sources of information.

d. Each MONUSCO base either COB or SCD has a DRC Military liaison officer (FARDC LO) embedded with it. They provide and verify information received from other sources.

e. In addition to the human intelligence, BANRDB troops also employ mini-UAVs to gather imagery information of surrounding hotspots. This imagery information, and information received from human source are processed at RDB HQ to produce actionable intelligence. The inclusion of mini-UAVs in the inventory of BANRDB has enhanced its intelligence collection capacity to a large extent.

f. MONUSCO Force HQ employs tactical UAVs with 200 KM range to gather tactical and operational intelligence. However, these UAVs can be flown at the request of Sector HQ to verify the information received for some other sources.

Figure 10: Bangladeshi Peacekeepers Operating a Tactical drone at DRC




Source: BANRDB Daily Situation Report, 23 February 2020

Information Processing/ Analyzing at BANRDB:

- a. Information collected by patrols and UAVs of SCDs are sent to COBs. COBs have its own source for information collection such as Long-Range Patrols (LRPs), KLE, DRC military officers, chiefs of localities, patrols and military observers.
- b. After necessary processing at COB, the information is forwarded to RDB HQ who maintains database of incidents, threats, demography, etc of various locations within AoR. After processing and validating the information from multiple sources, RDB HQ shares the intelligence with Sector HQ.
- c. Sector HQ has a G2 branch to deal with intelligence issues. There are a number of joint committees at Sector level composed of civilian, military, UN police and Humanitarian Actors such as Civil Military Coordination Committee (CMCC) and Tactical Operation Center (TOC) where information are shared and vetted. Once these are verified, the final intelligence is shared with the Senior Management Team (SMT) at sector level which comprises component heads of civilian, police and military component.

Figure 11: Sources and Processing of information at RDBs



Source: Author's self-construct from personal experience

Difficulties Faced by BANRDB to Deal with Intelligence and Ways Forward

Following aspects can enhance the intelligence collection and processing capacity of future BANRDBs:

- a. Remaining within the parameters of UN mandate, BANRDB needs to develop own mechanism for collecting and processing tactical intelligence. A dedicated 'Intelligence / Information Analysis Cell' for BANRDB may

be authorized in the TO&E. This cell will take care of the combat intelligence of the operating environment.

b. A systematic approach needs to be undertaken to build a threat database of the AoR which will be handed over to the next battalion. A customized intelligence software may be developed to create database of the AoR and access/ process information quickly and efficiently.

c. BANRDB UAV section is composed of 15 peacekeepers. These personnel are trained to fly UAV, but are not qualified to analyze data received from UAV. UAV Cell personnel may be trained to interpret imagery information.

d. Imagery data received from mini-UAVs of BANRDB are analyzed manually. It is difficult to extract maximum information using eyes only. Automation or software interpretation of imagery data would be advantageous.

e. Huge volume of data arrives at RDB HQ regularly, many of which are not well captured. Intelligence personnel need adequate training on how to gather, sort, record, sift through this information and produce actionable intelligence.

f. So far mini-UAVs have proven to be the most beneficial of BANRDB. However, this UAV can only be operated at daytime. More robust UAVs with night viewing capabilities may be deployed with RDBs.

g. All peacekeepers need to be trained to extract intelligence smartly during their interaction with locals. They need to be trained to utilize all possible sources. Exercises on intelligence extraction may be carried out during pre-deployment training.

h. Due to language barrier BANRDB patrols were completely dependent on LAs during their interaction with locals. This inhibited open interaction with the local population and understand the correct perspective. To overcome this, at least, the officers may be trained to develop elementary language skill of host country.

j. Slow reporting of the incidents is another major issue. The intelligence becomes valueless with the passage of time. System may be developed so that the incidents can be shared vertically and horizontally at the earliest. Automated Combat Intelligence Sharing system may be incorporated that would instantaneously share the data of operational environment to bases/ HQ. Appropriate sensors with the patrols and observation posts supplying audio and video data to the Command Post may be deployed with Battalions.

k. BANRDB may deploy stronger Female Engagement Teams. The

interaction of these female teams with the local female population during patrols improve information gathering and allow assessing the security situation. This also enables BANRDB to identify genuine need for quick-impact projects.

Conclusions

UN Peacekeeping Operation has undergone unprecedented transformation in terms of breadth of mandate, scale and duration of operations over last three decades. With the gradual shift of the nature of UN missions and continuously evolving threat towards the blue helmets, the inadequacy of UN in the field of intelligence was becoming vivid. The apparently failed missions at the Balkans, Rwanda and Somalia displayed the fact that UN missions could not always be impartial and non-threatening. Although, traditionally considered a taboo, a robust intelligence system both in UNHQ and field missions is becoming a demand of time. The Brahimi report, HIPPO report and Cruz report also acknowledged the necessity of effective intelligence system in peace operations. However, traditional concept of 'Intelligence' faces a number of limitations and challenges when applied in UN context. UN may look at 'Knowledge Development' concept of NATO which is an alternative to traditional intelligence in a multi-national context used to support the planning, implementation, and assessment of operations. Any UN intelligence system must make a balance between the principals of 'need-to-share' and 'need-to-know'.

The core mandate of MONUSCO in protecting the civilians in DRC is implemented through a concept of 'Protection through Projection' which is executed through RDB. In order to retain the capability of generating intelligence for timely intervention, MONUSCO BANRDB has realigned its intelligence collection and analyzing mechanism. In a BANRDB format, intelligence collection is done by its COBs, SCDs, patrols, military liaison officers, CLAs, UAVs, etc. Collected information is processed at COBs, RDB HQ and shared/ fused at Sector HQ with other MONUSCO partners. BANRDB faces a number of difficulties in conducting intelligence operations. A separate 'Intelligence / Information Analysis Cell' for BANRDB, provisioning of intelligence software for building up threat database and analyzing data, training of intelligence and UAV Cell personnel, use of more robust UAVs with night viewing capabilities, adequate language skill of host country, deploying effective Female Engagement Teams, etc will enhance the capability of BANRDB in the field of intelligence.

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Brief Biography



Brigadier General Abu Hena Mohammad Razi Hasan, SUP, SPP, psc was commissioned with 33 BMA Long Course on 29 November 1995. He attended number of courses at home and abroad. He has attained Bachelor of Science degree in Computer Science and Engineering from Military Institute of Science and Technology. He is a graduate from Defence Services Command and Staff College, Mirpur and Joint Services Command and Staff College, United Kingdom. He has completed Master of Arts in Defence Studies under King's College, London and Master of Science in Military Studies under Bangladesh University of Professionals. His career saw a mix of staff, instructional and command appointments. He has served as Brigade Major at 16 Infantry Brigade, Chief Coordinator of National Identity (ID) Card Project and as Colonel Staff, Operations and Plan Directorate, Armed Forces Division. Brigadier General Razi served at ACC&S as an instructor. He was also a Directing Staff at the Defence Services Command and Staff College, Mirpur. He commanded an armour regiment. He was deployed as Military Observer in South Sudan (UNMIS) and also as Chief of Staff at Headquarters Northern Sector, MONUSCO at DRC. Currently, Brigadier General Razi is Commanding 21 Infantry Brigade.

The Blue Helmet-Counterterrorism Convergence: Confusions and Contradictions

Professor ASM Ali Ashraf, Ph.D.

Introduction


The Blue Helmets of the United Nations (UN) peacekeepers symbolize the three core principles of consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self defense and defense of the mandate.¹ Due to these longstanding principles the UN troops are seen as more legitimate and more credible actors on the ground compared to their peers from ad hoc coalitions and regional organizations, especially when the latter group of actors are involved in counterterrorism operations. For all practical reasons, peacekeeping operations are seen as activities to be carried out with impartiality, whereas counterterrorism operations involve activities which emphasize taking sides against terrorists, insurgents, and spoilers of a peace process.

There is a debate in the UN peacekeeping literature on whether the Blue Helmets are gradually embracing a counterterrorism posture either by directly participating in the use of force against terrorist groups or by supporting national governments, ad hoc coalitions and regional organizations in carrying out offensive operations against rebel and terrorist groups. For traditionalists, the UN troops should avoid direct participation in counterterrorism operations.² For reformists, the mandates of several most recent robust peacekeeping and stabilization missions have led to a convergence of peacekeeping and counterterrorism.³ Of the 22 missions currently deployed by the UN (Figure-1), the mission in Mali is widely considered to be a stark example of this convergence thesis but the list can be longer enough to include UN missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR).

This article contributes to the debate in peacekeeping literature by offering a process-tracing analysis. It employs the '3-I Framework' to investigate which institutions, ideas, and interests are driving the Blue Helmet-counterterrorism convergence or a lack thereof. It makes extensive review of official documents and open source literature to study the UN's approach to counterterrorism in general and UN peacekeeping forces' role on the ground in areas of operation affected by terrorists.

The 3-I Framework provides a theoretical checklist for understanding a policy development process.⁴ By surveying the institutions, ideas, and interests, one can make an evidence-based analysis of how certain policies are adopted or transformed. Institutions refer to both formal rules and regulations and

Figure1: Current UN Peace Operations, 2021



Source: The United Nations

informal practices. Ideas can come from scientific studies, individual views of practitioners or scholarly and public opinion. Interests can be calculated by looking at the costs and benefits of certain policy positions. In the context of peacekeeping and counterterrorism, the geopolitical and geo-economic interests of troops contributing nations and the organizational interest of the UN and regional agencies will be of prime concern.

Convergence, Confusions and Contradictions

The convergence between peacekeeping and counterterrorism is not straightforward. Instead it is confusing at least and contradictory at best. How is the convergence evolving, and what are the causes of confusions and contradictions? This article will make an attempt to address these questions.

For Karlsrud and other proponents of the convergence theory, the linkage between peacekeeping and counterterrorism is evident both at the policy and operational levels.⁵ At a policy level in the UN Headquarters, the convergence emerged as a key agenda in September 2015, when U.S. President Barack Obama chaired two high-profile summits: one on peacekeeping and the other on countering violent extremism. Participants in these two distinct platforms were concerned with the effectiveness of UN peace operations and the urgency to deal with violent extremism. While the two summit agendas appear to be mutually exclusive, there were many overlapping discussions concerning the mandates of UN troops in the face of increased terrorist attacks, and the need for more robust force posture for self defense and counterterrorism. Such policy dialogues stemmed partly from the urgency to reform UN's peace agenda and partly from more practical and field-level operational experience of the UN troops deployed in Mali, DRC, and CAR.

Mali is widely known to be the 'deadliest' peace mission for the UN, and hence the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) offers the most illustrative case study on the nexus between peacekeeping and counterterrorism. MINUSMA was deployed in a pre-existing context of Islamist militancy that was dealt initially by the French and later by the West African forces. In fact, the French contingent in Mali has been deployed since 2013 in a purely counterterrorism mission. Following terrorist uprisings in Mali in 2012, the French government launched Operation Serval in 2013, which aimed to capture or kill terrorists in northern Mali. After a year, France launched Operation Barkhane with a more ambitious and much broader goal of supporting the G5 Sahel countries including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Since 2017, the G5 Sahel Joint Force has been running offensive operations targeting the complex threats of terrorism, transnational crime, and human trafficking. According to an official document, France has deployed up to 5,100 military personnel including 75 cooperating officers in the Sahel.⁶ By 2019, the French troops in the region carried out 750 training or combat support activities. The French military capabilities include Mirage F1 CR Reconnaissance aircrafts, Rafale fighter jets, Harfang drones, Mistral-class amphibious assault ship Dixmude, and troops from the French Special Operations Forces.

MINUSMA was initially mandated by the UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013) to support the transitional authority of Mali and to carry out a range of security and stability operations.⁷ Resolution 2164 (2014) expanded this mandate to include 'stabilization,' 'protection of civilians', 'reestablishment of State authority', and 'rebuilding the security sector.'⁸ In carrying out its mandate, the MINUSMA deployed a novel intelligence entity, All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) in 2014. ASIFU was initially aimed at improving operational intelligence collection. As time progressed it focused more on tactical

intelligence and less on operational intelligence. Hence, the larger conflict drivers including ethnic cleavage and governance deficits remained understudied. Instead, more tactical issues related to the military operations got more priority.⁹ The need for intelligence reform led to the merger of the ASIFU with the intelligence cell of the Force commander, renaming it to Military All Source Information Cell (MASIC).¹⁰

In the Malian context, the peacekeeping-counterterrorism convergence has occurred in three distinct, yet 'confusing' processes. First, the MINUSMA troops do not take any direct actions against terrorist groups operating in the country but provide crucial support to the French and African G-5 Sahel Joint Force to stabilize the country for the protection of civilians. The indirect counterterrorism role of MINUSMA is clearly evident. In the face of mounting terrorist attacks, MINUSMA troops have prepared a targeting list for individuals and groups who posed a threat to the mission,¹¹ and have shared intelligence with the French mission, Operation Barkhane.¹² The linkage between the Blue Helmets and the task of counterterrorism has become more confusing as Germany and the Netherlands, "while being part of MINUSMA" have signed bilateral deals with France to provide transportation service to the French counterterrorism forces involved in Operation Barkhane.¹³ Such bilateral deals further complicate, and contradict, the division of labor that exists between the French and the UN troops, who are co-located in the Kidal and Tessalit camps but are not officially expected to meddle into each other's business. Although the French troops would carry out raids targeting terrorist hideouts and the UN troops would mostly be concerned with humanitarian activities, reprisal attacks by terrorist groups often target the UN compounds, convoys, and patrol teams necessitating MINUSMA troops to use force by in self-defense and in defense of the mandate (Author's interviews with BANBAT troops, 2021).

Second, the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) of the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) have both explored partnership with the MINUSMA to strengthen the law enforcement capacity of the Malian government. In 2014, MINUSMA established a Transnational and Organized Crime and Counterterrorism Unit that provided mentoring and training to Malian police service.¹⁴ The OROLSI has sought to export the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) model into the counterterrorism domain by introducing the concept of disarmament and demobilization of violent extremists.¹⁵ A senior UN official hailed such knowledge sharing practices claiming: "We know that the links between transnational organized crime, terrorism, and political instability run deep ... MINUSMA Police are leaving behind skills, equipment and knowledge that will help Malian law enforcement agencies over the long term. This is what peacekeeping is meant to do so."¹⁶

The DRC is another theater where the UN has progressively adopted a robust force projection posture akin to counterterrorism strategy.¹⁷ In 2013, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) created a specialized Force Intervention Brigade as an “exceptional basis” with an authorized troop ceiling of 19,815. The intervention brigade “would consist of three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, special forces and reconnaissance company with headquarters in Goma.”¹⁸ A brief account of the conflict dynamics is pertinent here to understand the adoption of robust force posture by the UN in DRC. The UN peacekeepers have been present in DRC since 1999, when the UN Mission in DRC (MONUC) was first deployed. For about 11 years, the MONUC had the mandates to carry out political, military, rule of law, and capacity building activities. With increasing hostility from domestic armed rebel groups and intervention by neighboring countries, the UN Security Council renamed MONUC by establishing the MONUSCO in 2010. The UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013) stipulated the broader mandates of the MONUSCO: protection of civilians; neutralizing armed groups through the Intervention Brigade; monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo; and provision to support to national and international judicial process.¹⁹ The MONUSCO Intervention Brigade effectively assumed a counterterrorism role by disrupting the violent armed groups 23 March Movement (M23), the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). It has often partnered with the Congolese Army FARDC to use heavy weapons including attack and transport helicopters to neutralize the terrorists and spoilers.²⁰

The third case focuses on the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). It was deployed in April 2014 and succeeded the African Union International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA). The mandate of MINUSCA has been broadened to include support to political transition, humanitarian assistance, rule of law, DDR, and repatriation.²¹ Adopting a robust peacekeeping model, MINUSCA engaged violent armed groups in several areas of operation. Gilder refers to the February 2017 Operation Bepka that was aimed to stabilize the Bambari town by driving out the armed rebel groups. When the rebel groups attempted to resurface, the MINUSCA troops used armed helicopters, along with other military capabilities, to confront the rebels. Subsequently, MINUSCA troops jointly worked with the Central African Republic military forces to deal with the criminal gangs in Bangui.²² In 2018 and 2019 the Rapid Reaction Force of the Portuguese contingent of MINUSCA carried out several offensive operations against hostile armed groups which targeted unarmed civilians and the UN troops.²³

In summary, the UN peace missions in Mali, DRC, and CAR have all been glaring examples of robust peacekeeping operations, but there are

considerable variations in the threat landscape in these three countries. Islamist militants pose the gravest threat in Mali, where ethnic rebels and spoilers of peace agreements are the major sources of insecurity in DRC and CAR. Hence, the peacekeeping-counterterrorism convergence is thought to be more an issue of concern for the MINUSMA than for the MONUSCO and the MINUSCA.

Explaining the Convergence Dilemma

There is a vibrant debate among academics and policymakers on whether the convergence between peacekeeping and counterterrorism is driving the UN in a right direction. This section will analyze the major institutions, ideas, and interests that have shaped the convergence dilemma and the associated debate.

Institutions:

The confusions and contradictions surrounding the peacekeeping-counterterrorism convergence has evolved in the context of the UN's 'hybrid' and fifth generation peace operations.²⁴ Such operations involve the deployment of military troops and police personnel. Depending on the situation, such as the one in Mali, they have also necessitated the co-location of various actors including a UN mission, a regional organization or a coalition of the willing, and a western player. The DPO has the mandate to manage, plan, deploy and support such operations in collaboration with the Department of Field Support (DFS). DPO activities cover a wide range of missions including those engaged in peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Fink notes that although "counterterrorism is not a core function of DPKO [now DPO], its peacekeeping operations make an important contribution to international efforts to address terrorism."²⁵ The inclusion of the DPO in the UN's CTITF creates a UN HQ-level effort to converge peacekeeping and counterterrorism. Fink observes: "peacekeeping missions in some regions are shaped to a greater extent by a convergence in international efforts to prevent and resolve conflict, and prevent and combat terrorism, at least in the short to medium term."²⁶

The UN's Policy Working Group (PWG) on terrorism has also taken an institutional position that appears to support the peacekeepers' role in countering violent extremism. The 2002 report of PWG notes: "Measures should be taken to ensure that the mandates of peacekeeping operations are sensitive to terrorism-related issues, providing, for instance, that civilian police officers received appropriate training on measures to identify and counter terrorist groups."²⁷ It should be noted that the PWG calls for training up the civilian police personnel, rather than the use of UN peace mission's military personnel to take actions against terrorist groups. The fact that UN troops on the ground, especially in Mali, are targets of terrorist attacks, the extent to which MINUSMA can maintain this dictum is doubtful.

The DPKO has also initiated a collaborative effort leveraging its partnership with UN and regional agencies. The 2009 West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) is a glaring example. It mobilized the resources of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Department of Political Affairs, UN Office for West Africa, and Interpol to strengthen the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to combat transnational crimes through capacity building and intelligence sharing. The WACI has played a key role in seizing drugs and prosecuting and convicting criminals in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau.²⁸

Although the DPKO has historically taken a broader approach to link peacekeeping and counterterrorism as stated above, the expert panels are divided on this issue. For instance, the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) clearly opposed the UN peacekeepers crossing the red line and adopting a counterterrorism posture. Initiated by UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon, HIPPO experts were skeptical on a militarized counterterrorism approach of UN missions. In its 2015 report, HIPPO recommended that:

UN missions should not be mandated to conduct counter-terrorism operations; and where a UN mission operates in parallel with counter-terrorism forces, the respective role of each presence must be clearly delineated. The Security Council should ensure that upon exit of such forces, the UN is not required to assume residual tasks beyond its capability.²⁹

The HIPPO Report emphasizes the role of politics over military strategy. It observes: “lasting peace is achieved not through military and technical engagements, but through political solutions.” Taking a Clausewitzian position, HIPPO concludes that “politics must drive the design and implementation of peace operations.”³⁰ Although the HIPPO Report rejects the UN peacekeepers’ possibility of taking sides in a conflict and engage in counterterrorism operations, it is not entirely against the use of force. Rather, it refers to the classical UN doctrine on the use of force only in self-defense or for the protection of civilians and the dissuasion of spoilers, as per the mandates.³¹

But the Cruz Report has provided an intellectual blueprint for a more robust force projection capacity, doctrine, mandate, and mindset to minimize the risks for and improving the security of UN peacekeepers.³² Prior to that, the Brahimi Report also spoke in favor credible mandates and robust posture.³³ Among the troop contributing countries, there are strong advocates of the Brahimi Report and Cruz Report’s emphasis on robust peacekeeping, and they see a progressive role in counterterrorism to complement robust peacekeeping doctrine. For instance, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway represent this reformist cohort of troop contributors, who see strong capability and robust mandate to be crucial for making the UN peacekeeping relevant in dealing with the evolving threats of terrorism, organized crime, and insurgency.

Institutionally, these countries are either members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or have participated in the U.S.-led coalition warfare in Afghanistan targeting Al Qaeda and the Taliban militias. They have been eager to transfer some of the knowledge and expertise of counterterrorism acquired in the Afghan theater to the complex peacebuilding missions in Africa.³⁴

The African Union (AU) troop contributing countries have also been supportive of a counterterrorism posture for the UN peace operations. They have constantly criticized the UN's slow response and inadequate force posture and see ad hoc counterterrorism coalitions like the G5 Sahel Joint Force as an effective solution to the threats of terrorism in Mali and the Sahel sub-region. The AU and G5 Sahel countries complement the US security policy which places an emphasis on the use of military force in the fight against global terrorism. This is precisely why the US has deployed 7,000 troops in joint operations against Islamist militant groups in the continent. Another 2,000 U.S. troops are running training programs in 40 African countries.³⁵ For U.S. policy makers, the UN peace operations would complement the global war on terrorism by sharing the burdens of combating complex threats of violent extremism.³⁶

Ideas:

At the strategic, UNHQ level, the idea for a UN peace mission's role against violent extremism derives from the PWG on United Nations and Terrorism, which was initiated by former Secretary General Kofi Annan. In 2002, the PWG observed:

Terrorism is often related to armed conflict. While the prevention and resolution of armed conflict should not primarily be conceived of as anti-terrorist activities, they can assist such activities by narrowing the space in which terrorists operate.³⁷

The idea of robust peacekeeping is also consistent with the UN's growing penchant for counterterrorism. Robust peacekeeping is defined as "the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict."³⁸ Robust peacekeeping mandates were first given to the UN mission in Sierra Leone in 1999, and later to the missions in DRC and Haiti in 2005. In each of these cases, a robust military posture is legitimized on the ground of protection of civilians. It was further advanced by making the UN a party to the conflict in the mandate for MONUSCO in 2013. MONUSCO was mandated to neutralize rebel groups.³⁹

One should note that robust peacekeeping is sharply different from traditional peacekeeping.⁴⁰ While consent of the main conflicting parties is required for the use of force in the case of traditional peacekeeping, there is no

such bar in the use of force for a robust peacekeeping. It is pertinent to discuss some of the mission-specific ideas. The dominant idea for MINUSMA is that the UN troops are authorized to support the implementation of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, signed between the Malian government and the Coordinated Movement of the Azawad (CMA) rebel groups' coalition. MINUSMA is mandated to restore the authority of the Malian government in northern Mali, implement DDR program, and promote reconciliation among the conflicting parties. For critics, MINUSMA lacks a clear mandate for a counterterrorism role, but paradoxically, terrorist attacks have constrained MINUSMA's capacity to run its operations.⁴¹

The reasons for HIPPO to take a decisive stance against the UN peacekeepers' counterterrorism role are clear. It argues that:

UN peacekeeping missions, due to their composition and character, are not suited to engage in military counter-terrorism operations. They lack the specific equipment, intelligence, logistics, capabilities and specialized military preparation required, among other aspects. Such operations should be undertaken by the host government or by a capable regional force or an ad hoc coalition authorized by the Security Council.⁴²

In line with the HIPPO report, several scholars have suggested the idea for the UN to adopt a minimal counterterrorism role for MINUSMA. The idea that regional actors are better suited for such a role has dominated this view. But the changing nature of the conflict geography from northern to central and southern Mali creates the possibility for the MINUSMA to confront a new urgency to tackle terrorists and spoilers.⁴³ This is precisely what has happened in Mali in recent years. The G-5 Sahel Joint Force is taking a counterterrorist role against Islamist militants who target the Malian security forces and the UN troops. The conflict has spread from Northern Mali to Central Mali, where the violent extremist group Katiba Macina is very active. Katiba is part of al Qaeda-affiliated coalition Support Group of Islam and Muslims (GSIM). In the central Malian Mopti region, which used to have a 19th century Islamist governance, the Katiba group, drawn largely from the Fulani tribes, are now labelled as the major extremist group while the Malian government has tolerated the Dogon militia group which has executed the Ogossagou massacre in 2019. Against this backdrop of the changing geography of the conflict, there have been repeated calls for the MINUSMA to invest some human resources in Central Mali, where its role should focus on strengthening the capacity of the national and regional actors in neutralizing hostile rebels, Islamist militants, and other spoilers.

The idea of of burden-sharing can partly explain why the United States and its western allies including France, Canada, and the Nordic states are not paying attention to the HIPPO report, and rather increasingly adopting a robust force posture within their UN missions. As stated before, the United States has nearly 9,000 troops overstretched in the vast African continent. By encouraging

France, its European allies, and the Sahel countries to take a kinetic approach to the fight against Islamist terrorists, ethnic rebels, and spoilers, the United States can reduce the stress on its overstretched armed forces deployed in the vast continent.

Concerns over the influx of conflict-induced migrants have dragged some of Mali's neighbors in the Sahel region to get a direct involvement in the counterterrorism role in Mali. The perception that conflict escalation in Mali and the neighboring states would cause a huge influx of migrants and refugees in Europe has also influenced the western countries' attitude toward the use of force in peace operations. They see robust peacekeeping and hybrid operations against non-state armed groups to be critical in stemming the flow of refugees in Europe. For them, less conflict and more stability are a pre-requisite for sustainable development in Africa and around the world.⁴⁴

But skeptics are driven by a completely different set of ideas. Take for example, the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali who favored the UN's traditional peacekeeping role and against adopting an enforcement paradigm. In 1995, Ghali observed that: "the logic of peacekeeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peacekeeping is intended to facilitate."⁴⁵ Conflict resolution analysts often appear to agree with the ideas of Ghali. According to Charbonneau (2018), "UN counterterrorism partnerships should not be authorized via UN peacekeeping mandates ... If the Security Council wants to support African organizations in their counterterrorist operations (whether it should is another debate), it should reflect on creating other ways of funding and supporting such regional organizations and operations."

Interests:

The UN DPO (successor of DPKO), has a genuine interest in maintaining the longstanding principles of impartiality, consent, and non-use of force. But the UN also has an interest in making sure its peace operations are effective in protecting innocent civilians and capacity building of the host state. It is thus no surprising that peace operations have constantly evolved across a broad spectrum of activities labelled as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding.⁴⁶ There are sharp differences between these various generations of peacekeeping models. Conflict prevention is aimed at addressing the structural cause of a conflict and it involves a wide range of tools including the UN Secretary General's 'good offices', preventive deployment or confidence and security building measures.⁴⁷ Peacemaking aims at the resolution of an ongoing conflict by bringing together the conflicting parties into a negotiating table. The list of peacemakers may involve the UNSG, special envoy, regional actors, or a nongovernmental entity or prominent individuals. When a ceasefire or peace deal has been agreed, peacekeeping missions are deployed to keep the belligerents apart. But

contemporary peacekeeping has involved the deployment of military, police, and civilians to create conditions for sustainable development and peace.

Until the peacekeeping stage, the UN emphasizes the non use of force as a basic principle of a peace operation. But there are situations in which there is “no peace to keep,” as former Secretary General Kofi Annan would argue.⁴⁸ It is in this context; the UN Security Council authorizes the use of force or other coercive measures either through a contingent of UN force or through the utilization of a regional organization for the use of force under UN authority. Such authorization comes under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.⁴⁹ In the broad spectrum of UN peace operations, the last tool is peacebuilding, which in essence is strengthening the national capacity of the host state institutions. Peacebuilding missions are also aimed at addressing the root causes of violent conflicts.

In 1998, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan argued in favor of an enforcement role of the UN. In Annan’s view, “Sometimes peace has to be made—or enforced— before it can be kept. The four pillars of the UN’s Global Counterterrorism Strategy⁵⁰ also provide a broad list of activities in which the UN peacekeepers have a comparative advantage and hence, their activities complement, if not directly contribute to, the counterterrorism operations in a host state. Table 1 shows a conceptual linkage between the UN Counterterrorism Strategy and the peacekeeping activities.

In the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) document, UN Secretary General António Guterres emphasizes the need for streamlining peacekeeping mandates, political solutions and a strong role for regional institutions. He also calls for better training and preparedness, and adequately resourcing peacekeeping mandates.⁵¹ More than seven decades of UN peace missions show that political solutions are often difficult and time-consuming, and there are differences in attitude between the Asian peacekeepers on one hand and the African and European peacekeepers on the other. For the first group, a traditional peacekeeping role better serves the UN’s interest and image. But for the latter group, the UN must adopt a counterterrorism role to deal with the evolving complexity of transnational organized crime and terrorism (Interview with BIPSOT experts, 2021).

Karlsrud shows that among the troop contributing countries, small and middle powers such as Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden, have shown an active interest in “turning UN peacekeeping towards counterterrorism.”⁵² In doing so, this cohort of countries has pursued a self-interested foreign and security policy. Some of them have sought to “strengthen their bids for non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council”, while others have sought “to enhance their status among great powers” and forge “cooperation with the US and key allies.”⁵³ In explaining the reasons behind the deployment of sophisticated intelligence and surveillance technologies and military equipment in Mali, Karlsrud notes that protection of

Table 1: UN CT Strategy and the linkage with Peacekeeping Activities

UN CT Strategy Pillar	UN Peacekeeping Spectrum/Counterterrorism Spectrum
Pillar I: Tackling conditions conducive to terrorism	<i>Peacebuilding-development spectrum</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Early peacebuilding activities • Addressing root causes of push factors of terrorism such as poor governance, marginalization, inequality, lack of opportunities • Addressing push factors such as collective grievances, victimization, distortion of religious beliefs, political ideologies, and social networks • Contribute to transformative peacebuilding agenda
Pillar II: Preventing and Combating terrorism	<i>Counterterrorism Spectrum</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence-led counterterrorism • Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities • Capture or kill militants or make network nodes irrelevant • Intelligence collection through the interrogation of individuals arrested and collection of materials seized or intercepted • Intelligence analysis and dissemination
Pillar III: Building Countries' Capacity to Combat Terrorism	<i>Peacebuilding-development spectrum</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Later peacebuilding activities related to SSR • Conduct ISR activities • Launch kinetic operations • Carry out security sector reform activities such as training and mentoring CT actors before and during CT operations; supporting detentions, deradicalization, rehabilitation and reinsertion programs • Reintegration of former rebels into national security forces <i>Counterterrorism Spectrum</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training and mentoring Afghan and Iraqi forces by U.S. and coalition countries
Pillar IV: Ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law while countering terrorism	Compliance with HR standards <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Avoid collateral damage in CT operations • Set timeline and standards for detention and interrogation • Respect privacy of individuals regarding surveillance of digital communication

Source: Adapted from Karlsrud (2017)

civilians was not the only goal, the western countries wanted “to protect their own forces or extract wounded personnel.”⁵⁴

The AU and ECOWAS have shown an interest to ensure that African security concerns are well addressed in the design and implementation of UN peace operations. The rise of Al Shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and a host of Al Qaeda-affiliated groups including AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO in Mali have posed grave threats by executing deadly terrorist attacks in the Sahel sub-region. In the Malian context, when the Islamist extremists took control over the northern part of the country, there were valid concerns over the violent extremists expanding their influence in the neighboring countries of Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. A joint response of the Sahel countries was hence a logical outcome. But, lack of funding and logistical resources crippled the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), which was eventually transformed into MINUSMA.⁵⁵

While an African initiative was pending, and the UN was far from mobilizing its resources, France took the leadership in sending a contingent in Mali. Why? It was purely a calculation of geopolitical and geo-economic interests.⁵⁶ Mali and Niger have a huge stock of uranium that feed nearly three quarter of the French nuclear power industry. France also has huge business interests in Algeria and Morocco but continued instability in Mali would mean a direct economic threat to French interests in the region. As China and the United States were gradually expanding their economic and military presence in the African continent, France saw the counterterrorism and security operations in Mali and the Sahel region as crucial to create its own sphere of influence. Restoring its relations with the former colonies in the Sahel region lent it an opportunity to do so.

Concluding Remarks

This article has explored the extent to which the UN peacekeepers are embracing a counterterrorism role in complex humanitarian emergencies, also defined as asymmetric conflicts and unconventional wars. It finds that the UN mission in Mali, MINUSMA, is a test case of how peacekeeping and counterterrorism can possibly converge. Evidence suggests the convergence is not direct; rather indirect, confusing, and contradictory. Various UN agencies and expert panels have called for clarity in the peacekeeping mandates and doctrinal shift from traditional to robust peacekeeping. The stability operations in Mali fit into a robust peacekeeping model but the large majority of UN troop contributing countries in Mali have strongly remained opposed to a direct and offensive security posture against the Islamist extremist groups due to concerns over losing the impartiality principle and becoming a party to the conflict and thus violating international law. While the French troops in Mali do not confront such caveats, their nexus with the European MINUSMA troops, has shown diversity, rather than, homogeneity in a UN mission. The co-location of French and UN camps in some areas, the linkage between the UN's counterterrorism actors (e.g. CTITF), and some role of MINUSMA in training up the Malian counterterrorism policing unit provide evidence of indirect convergence of peacekeeping and counterterrorism activities. Such developments are unfolding in the context of confusing and contradictory messages from various expert panels such as the Brahimi Report (2000), HIPPO Report (2015) and Cruz Report (2017). The contradictions come from the language of the reports and their interpretations of the UN Charter, especially its Chapter VI and Chapter VII, which talk about the peaceful settlement of disputes and use of force, respectively. Despite such contradictions, it appears to be a reality that the UN peace operations are gradually embracing a counterterrorism role and peacekeeping activities are slowly aligned with the priorities of the UN Counter Terrorism Strategy (as shown in Table 1). Robust peace operations in the DRC and CAR reflect a similar trend, and one ponders how the ideas of effectiveness and relevance and the geopolitical interests of western troop contributing

nations will push for a further doctrinal and paradigm shift in UN peacekeeping in the days to come. Major troop contributing nations like Bangladesh should have a clear understanding of such changing trends in order to tailor the pre-deployment training, design mission capability, and ensure the effectiveness of operations carried out by personnel on the ground.

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Brief Biography



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Applying Access to Information (A2I) Concept in the UN Peacekeeping Mission for Digital Rights and Online Protection of the Children

Lieutenant Colonel Md Ashraful Islam, psc

Introduction

For every child, digitization is a two-way transformation media that may reflect the best and amplify the worst of human nature. Every day, digital technology is offering new statistics of technological blessings and also scaring with a new pattern of harmful evidence from it. The online world is an enabler to empower children with access to information, orient to academic resources, and connect meaningfully to friends and the outside world. Therefore, to survive in the race of advancement; none would prefer to stay away from the online world. May it bring better or worse, access to the online world is an irreversible fact for the present and future inhabitants of the world . Two children born in two families with one facilitated and another away from the digital world would likely represent completely separate flocks of generation. But the truth is, being one-third of the total internet users, still, about 346 million children in the world are out of digital connectivity . Especially in the Africa region, around 60 percent of children are not online, compared to 4 percent in Europe. This disparity of digital divide amongst children is even worse in the African region where United Nations (UN) peacekeepers are deployed. On the contrary, very soon, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) is adopting General Comment on children's digital rights to balance their online opportunities and protect them from the digital world's risk.

Being the highest UN troops contributing country in the world with its vast experience, Bangladesh conducted several UN peacekeeping operations under different mandates. Again, Bangladesh Army has experience in working on the connectivity part of the 'Access to Information' (A2I) project. Applying the concept of 'A2I' in the UN deployment area, Bangladeshi Peacekeepers can open a new noble horizon to create a digital environment for the children to educate, communicate and entertain. This new productive venture, if pursued aptly, will take the peacekeeping contribution of the Bangladeshi Peacekeepers to a new elevation in the world community.

This paper will first analyze how the digital divide amongst children creates an uneven learning environment in the world. Afterwards, the article will determine how the Signal Contingent of Bangladeshi Peacekeepers can implement the A2I project concept in the UN deployment area to create a digital learning opportunity without discrimination. Finally, this paper will propose some practical guidelines for policymakers, mentors, and parents to protect children from online harm and offer them a world of peace, equality, and harmony.

Overview of Children's Right in Digital Environment

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) first came into the global spotlight with the 'Convention' for the children's rights in 1989 (UNCRC, 1989). In 1992, The Convention uncovered 54 articles specifying almost every aspect of children's right with four special articles as the "General Principles": (1) Non-discrimination (article 2); (2) Best interest of the child (article 3); (3) Right to life survival and development (article 6), and (4) Right to be heard (article 12). In connection to the general rights, children's

Table 1: The UNCRC articles most relevant in the digital environment

Provision	Protection	Participation
Article 4: State responsibilities for implementation of rights	Article 16: Right to privacy	Article 13: Freedom of expression
Article 5: Parental guidance	Article 17e: <i>Protection from injurious material</i>	Article 14: Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Article 8: Preservation of identity	Article 19: Protection from all forms of violence	Article 15: Freedom of association
Article 17a-d: <i>Provision of information and material of social and cultural benefit by mass media, children's books and linguistic needs of minorities</i>	Article 32: Child labour / economic exploitation	Article 17 intro: <i>Access to media</i>
Article 18: Parental responsibilities; state assistance	Article 34: Sexual exploitation	Article 23 para. 1: <i>Children with disabilities: participation in community</i>
Article 23 para. 2 and 3: <i>Children with disabilities: special care and assistance</i>	Article 35: Abduction, sale and trafficking	Article 31 para. 1: <i>Leisure, play and culture: participation in cultural life and arts</i>
Article 28: Right to education	Article 36: Other forms of exploitation	
Article 29: Goals of education	Article 37: Torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment	
Article 30: Children of minorities/indigenous groups		
Article 31 para. 2: <i>Leisure, play and culture: appropriate and equal opportunities for cultural, artistic, recreational and leisure activity</i>		
Article 39: Rehabilitation of child victims		


Source: Policy Guidance on Empowering, Protecting and Supporting Children in the Digital Environment", Council of Europe- November 2018

digital rights came into focus once the online world started its driving role to develop children. In March 2019, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) developed a concept note on the children's rights concerning the digital environment. Meanwhile, the Committee consulted the experiences, opinions, and expectations for a safer internet from children worldwide when drafting the General Comments. Later, in August 2020, CRC presented the draft, and on 4 February 2021, they adopted General Comment 25 as the authentic reference for the Children's digital rights. Soon, CRC will officially publish and announce this fundamental note on the children's digital rights to the world for immediate implementation. The motto of Children's Right in the digital environment will be "Together for a better Internet". However, following UNCRC (2014) articles most relevant for the Children's right in the digital environment are already in vogue on which international organizations and local administration can start functioning:

Based on the adopted strategies for the 'Digital Rights of the Children', the foremost prerequisite for digital rights is to ensure affordable, accessible, and reliable access to digital devices and connectivity. There must be specific regulation in the policymaking framework with an action plan to prevent and remedy discrimination so that every child has the same access and possibilities. But the reality is when higher policymaking bodies like UN, UNCRC, UNICEF, etc are working on the formulation, and further illustration for the children's digital right, a larger segment in the world is far away to even connect to the digital world. Therefore, it is more important to understand the existing digital divide prevailing in the world from statistical and empirical analysis.

The Uneven Digital Divide in the World

Statistical Analysis on Digital Access of the Children: The inequality of digital connectivity globally is far beyond the reach of voice for Children's digital rights. Globally, 1.3 billion children aged between 3 to 17 years, which is two-third of the world, have no internet access. Even, 760 million children aged between 15 to 24 years, which is 63 percent of total youths, have no scopes of digital connectivity. Only 5 percent of children and young people in West and Central Africa have internet access at home. In South Asia, Eastern and Southern Africa this percentage is 13 compared to 59 percent in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In West and Central Africa, very few children have digital access at home. Because of poverty, in the East and South Africa region, only three percent of children and young people have an orientation with internet access compared to 40 percent from the wealthiest families. The following figure gives an entire scenario of internet access facilities prevailing in the world:

Figure 1: Percentage of Internet Access Facilities of Children and Youth at home by Regions

Source: How many children and young people have internet access at home?
UNICEF, New York, 2020

Imbalanced Digital Divide Prevailing in UN Deployed Area

With the flow of technological expansion, the digital divide prevailing in the UN deployed area follows a strong vertical curve. In Africa, every 3 young people out of 5 remain offline compared to 1 youth out of 25 in Europe. Besides, they lack basic scopes and skills in accessing digital devices to learn from online opportunities. These digital divides amongst children are not only limited to technology access opportunity. The learning opportunity available in digital contents is another grey area that goes deeper than connectivity. In the online world, 56 percent of websites are in English and most of the contents are

Table 2: Statistical Table Showing Basic Indicators of Child Development

Countries and areas	Child Labour (%)		Number per 100 Population		Children with Inadequate Supervision (%)		Lower Secondary School participation	
							Net attendance ratio (%)	
	2010–2016*		2016		2005–2016*		2011–2016*	
	Male	Female	Mobile Phones	Internet Users	Male	Female	Male	Female
Central African Republic	27	30	58	2	60	62	17	13
Côte d'Ivoire	25	28	126	27	60	58	26	20
Democratic Republic of the Congo	36	41	39	6	50	48	39	31
Liberia	21	21	83	7			14	15
Mali	59	52	120	11	32	32	34	26
Sierra Leone	38	37	98	12	33	32	36	36
South Sudan			25	16			6	3
Sudan	28	22	69	28			31	32
USA	-	-	127	76	-	-	-	-

Source: UNICEF- The State of the World's Children'-December 2017

developed with a focused lifestyle of western society. Therefore, most of the children in the UN deployed area neither find interest in learning unfamiliar culture nor understand the content irrelevant to their lives. The regular practice of digital discrimination amongst children, if not bridged properly, may deepen the socio-economic divisions prevailing in the world. The following table will give a clear perception of the reality prevailing with the children living in the UN deployment area:

The era of technology has inducted a new disparity globally beyond the shape of discrimination so far observed between poor and rich. This disparity is the difference in knowledge, attaining resources, and understanding the educational system's change. During the COVID-19 pandemic, while the student substituted their educational system from physical presence to online meeting, the world's poorly facilitated students had to discontinue their academic careers. The unconnected children are missing out due to a lack of educational resources and access to global information. They fall apart from the opportunities to learn digital skills and remain away from the progressive development prospects of the online world that other children are enjoying. Therefore, to understand the necessity for bringing equilibrium in the digital rights of the Children, every sensible citizen of the world needs to address the following questions:

- a. In the present techno-centric world, can a child grow up in an environment without digital connectivity and compete or cope with globalization with the children groomed within 'Internet of Things (IoT)'?
- b. The outcome of COVID-19 taught the educational institutes to develop an advanced learning management system with 'technology adaptation' through online training, train the trainers' concept, etc. But similar future pandemic will terminate the study of many deprived children and educational mentors. How justified is it for a child who dreams of learning?
- c. Digital Technology or Cyber world is to connect people despite any form of physical distance. But is it valid for the non-privileged group too? Or it is distancing them, rather? Isn't Digital Technology creating disproportionally discrimination amongst Children?


But despite all limitations, the race of technology will leap forward with a lot of blessings for humanity to make a progressive generation. As accountable citizens of the world, it is the privileged group's responsibility to offer rights for the unfacilitated Children and orient them with technology advancement benefits. Again, every privileged and under-privileged child must recognize the risk they are undergoing or likely to encounter in the future from the online world. The international policymaking institutes like UNICEF, UNCRC, and other organizations working for human and children rights must formulate a firm

policy to protect them from digital connectivity dangers. They must orient children, their parents, and mentors about the dark side of the digital world that may risk children's future online unless a comprehensive digital rights management system is implemented.

Children Risking their Future Online

Typology of Risks: Most online children and many parents possess no knowledge or a minimal awareness of the amount of personal data and the digital footprint they are leaving on the internet. Thereby, as the recipient, Children encounter Content risk in the digital world, as participants in the adult-initiated activity, children fall under Contact risk, and as victim/actor, they embrace Conduct risk. Following typology of risks comprehensively shows patterns of online risks children encounter:


Figure 2: Typology of Risks of Children Exposed Online



Source: Educating 21st Century Children: Emotional Well Being in the Digital Age (2019)',
Centre for Educational Research and Innovation

Catalysts Amplifying Children's Online Engagement: The typology of risks categorizes distinct patterns of harms children encounter online. Again, researchers identified four triggers that create the sphere of harm: technology, offenders, victims, and socio-environment factors. The following figure shows that uncontrolled global technology trends and socio-environmental context influence victims' unmanaged online engagement by risking their exposure to crime. Again, online offenders gain opportunity from the technology and socio-environment to amplify the threat, and harm exists in the online world.


Figure 3: Children's Online Engagement



Source: The We PROTECT Global Alliance, Global Threat Assessment 2019

Children's Threat Exposure and Victim Categorization: The following figure illustrates the victim categorization in a cross variation with age, level of technology use, online harm, and exposure of the victim:

Figure 4: Children's Threat Exposure and Victim Categorization



Source: OCSE Victim Categorization

In this factual scenario, to offer digital rights to the children, it is more important to formulate holistic planning for all digitally deprived children of the world. The holistic planning should integrate with flawless digital connectivity, imparting digital literacy, assurance of protection from the dark side of the online world, and a strict legislative body to ensure policy implementation. The first and foremost requirement is to provide wide connectivity to the Children to undergo this implementation system. Since Bangladesh gained unique experience in implementing the A2I project, Bangladeshi Peacekeepers can apply this concept in the UN deployment area for digitally deprived children's data connectivity even in remote areas.

Almost every Child groomed in the UN deployment area is nurtured in a digitally deprived environment. If the peacekeepers are mandated for the 'Children's Digital Right' implementation process, Bangladeshi Peacekeepers can take the lead role to perform this noble responsibility. With its experience in working for the connectivity issue of the A2I project, Bangladesh Army may methodically work for successful implementation.

Implementation of A2I Concept by BD Peacekeepers for Digital Rights

Access to Information (A2I) Program is a UNDP and USAID-supported project (program) launched in Bangladesh under the supervision of the Prime Ministers' Office. This project aims to deliver e-services at the citizen's doorsteps in the broader digitalization framework throughout the country. The program widened the public's digital access by decentralizing educational, agricultural, and other capacity-building services through digital services in rural areas. The A2I program's implications launched the first citizen e-services following digital connectivity in a top-down approach from the nation's central hub up to Union Digital Center for onward connectivity to the poor's home. For e-service delivery, the program followed an innovative bottom-up approach inclusive of 56 e-services for different categories of citizens. Bangladesh's lowest level administrative unit, the Union Information Service Centers, is one of the most successful 'sustainable entrepreneurial-driven e-business models' of the world, offering a portfolio of e-services to almost all country citizens.

Amongst many services, one of the most mentionable e-services was the Children's digital access through the A2I project. The Ministry of Education involved teachers in developing digital content for their classrooms and impart lessons using networked connectivity even to remote areas. For students of rural areas, this new e-learning system and access to digital content stimulated their learning enjoyment. The capacity building of students through digital connectivity encouraged their participation in the e-class environment. Teachers displayed creativity in preparing and delivering lessons and that enriched confidence levels. Bangladesh Army and several governmental and private organs had hand-to-hand experience working with this project from connectivity issue to the level of implementation. This experience of instilling empowerment to the children through digital connectivity would be a workforce for similar assignments. Therefore, Bangladeshi peacekeepers can invest this experience for the digitally disconnected Children in the UN deployment area and assist in protecting their digital rights.

BD Peacekeepers Future Roles to Ensure Digital Rights of the Children

Under a special mandate of the UN, Bangladesh Army may task Signal Contingent to form a 'Communication and Cyber Support Contingent'. This contingent may establish Nodal Connectivity at respective UN deployment

areas following the concept of the A2I project. This contingent can work in coordination with mission Communication Information Technology Services (CITS), UNICEF, OHCHR, and other key institutions working for the Children's digital rights. Following step-by-step method may work as a draft outline for implementing the program:

- a. Coordination with local government and community leaders on the benefits of the project as part of the CIMIC program.
- b. Create Zonal Nodes as per the merit of the regions, density, risk involved, connectivity facilities etc.
- c. Information collection on governmental and private network resources.
- d. Information of network node of mobile operators and private Internet Service Providers (ISP), the network associated technical companies and other technical facilities with electricity connectivity state.
- e. Information collection of educational institutes, community learning facilities, common places.
- f. Information collection on children, young students, and dropped out students.
- g. Ground survey for nodal points by technical expert peacekeepers.
- h. Integrate existing local communication resources with UN network resources.
- j. Create local administration-wise/school-wise nodal points for internet connectivity.
- k. Create multiple Wi-Fi zone/hotspots in common places and the educational premises.
- l. Create Cloud-based resources or Online Libraries as 'Ready Access Resource'.
- m. Conduct digital literacy program for students and teachers as part of CIMIC program.
- n. Conduct cyber awareness program in 'train the trainers' concept.
- p. Make a comprehensive management program for handing over the project to governmental institutions.

Measures to Safeguard Children from the Online Harm

Ensure Access to Online Resource: To provide affordable access to digital resources for children, it is essential to reduce the cost of connectivity. Integrating fiber optic cable beside other communication media will give them additional resources for online access. Again, investment in public-access

hotspot points like in schools, shopping centers, libraries, parks, and community centers can intensely increase internet access for unconnected children. The government, international humanitarian organizations, and the private sector should provide internet access to the children even in conflict zones, border areas, refugee camps, and other public places. For growing interest in resource access and connecting the children of the remote areas, both private and public sectors should create contents relevant to children in their native languages. All associated stakeholders must develop a mechanism to curb social, cultural, and gender barriers for the children to offer them equal access to digital contents.

Digital Literacy for the Children and their Mentors: For ensuring online safety against potential vulnerabilities, Digital Literacy and Digital Citizenship are two essential prerequisites for the children. To attain digital literacy, Global Kids Online, UNESCO, and critical organizations emphasized a four-set of abilities: the ability to access and operate online safely and effectively, the ability to critically evaluate information, the ability to communicate responsibly through digital technology and the ability to handle digital content effectively. Again, to attain Digital Citizenship, two principles are most important: respectful behaviour towards others and civic sense to responsibly handle online contents. The program must impart knowledge on understanding the risks of content creation, sharing and learning to protect privacy and data sensitivity. The concept of establishing 'Cloud Computing Facilities' or online libraries with digital books, textbooks, Children friendly video contents, tutorials, and study materials will create alternative resources for academic career persuasion. UNESCO may train the children to educate them about their online and offline rights. Besides, cyber awareness training to stay safe in the digital world is essential for children, families, parents, educators, caregivers, health professionals, and community leaders. The parents and mentors must earn the confidence to become a digital role model and become good counselors.

Parental Mediation: Parental Mediation is one of the most critically essential measures to safeguard children from cyber risks and instilling their smart digital attitudes in the cyber domain. As a role model to the Children, Parents must maintain a harmonious relationship with 'Work-Life balance' in the family. They should inform children about cyber-violence, talk about risky cyber contents, and habituate personal information sharing with parents. Parents must set family media rules, demand to know about online friends, and discourage social media and apps not designed for young students. Habituating the family with the co-viewing screen is another effective method for protecting the children. Parents must not allow exploiting children's data for commercial use.

Protect Children from Harm Online: Protection of the children from cyber risks primarily focuses on safeguarding children's privacy and identities

online. The protection measure includes safety against child abuses, sexual exploitation, and trafficking as well. The technology firms and other associated must share digital tools, knowledge, and experience to assist law enforcing agencies for Children's protection. Adopting and implementing the 'We PROTECT Global Alliance Strategic Framework' is a world-famous project to combat sexual exploitation online. In society, the local government should develop a company culture that actively promotes child safety. Following eight skills prescribed by Internationally recognized DQ World institute would give a comprehensive package for protecting the children in the digital world:

Table 3: Children's Digital Skills Prescribed by DQ World Institute

Digital Citizen Identity	Ability to manage a healthy digital identity online and offline
Screen Time Management	Ability to manage one's screentime, multi tasking and engagement online
Cyberbullying Management	Ability to detect cyberbullying situations and handle them wisely
Cyber Security Management	Ability to protect one's data by creating strong passwords and to manage various cyber attacks
Digital Empathy	Ability to be empathetic towards one's own and other's needs and feeling online
Digital Footprint Management	Ability to understand the real-life consequences, and to manage them responsibly
Critical Thinking	Ability to distinguish between true and false info, good and harmful content, and trustworthy and questionable contacts online
Privacy management	Ability to handle with discretion all personal information shared online to protect one's and other's privacy

Source: DQ Institute Global Standards Report 2019

Children Focused Online Protection Approach: Despite children accounting for one-third of the total internet users of the world, the current international policies failed to develop a useful, robust, and enforceable legal framework for their protection from the harm of the online world. Now, the UN, Governments, and Institutions working for Children's rights and human rights must raise voice for the children in developing and implementing digital policies. The policy update in the future must distinctively track discrimination and barriers to access the digital connectivity for the deprived children. Because of the cyber world's uncontrolled dominance, legislation must integrate child and gender-specific issues for most of the relevant national policies and strategies.

Conclusion

The digital world has broadened children's opportunities to offer education, entertainment, games, and demonstrated to share, learn, and connect. Digital technology changed the world so that more children go online every day is increasingly changing childhood. Again, across the white potentials, it possesses susceptibility for children to harm both online and offline. However, amid this debatable concern, the challenge in basic internet connectivity in the poorest countries and rural areas is very significant. This disparity of digital rights is more vividly observed in the UN deployed site. The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child has already developed a General Comment on children's digital rights as an implementable policy for the future. With its vast experience in UN peacekeeping, Bangladesh Army can capitalize on the concept of the A2I project implemented in Bangladesh and pursue UN deployed area experience.

A special Signal Contingent from Bangladesh can be mandated with the task to ensure Connectivity for the Children in the UN deployed area. To succeed in the venture of 'Equilibrium of Digital Rights for all Children' in this changing landscape of cyber dominance, a coordinated global response from key institutions like UNICEF, OHCHR, DQ etc. in collaboration with local government, civil society, and private sectors is of paramount importance. The digital right must remain inclusive of ensured connectivity and cyber management for children with coordinated digital literacy for Children, mentors, and community leaders. Bangladeshi Peacekeepers can act as the prime mover in initiating this noble job for the children to see a World of Peace, equality and connectivity.

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Brief Biography



Lieutenant Colonel Md Ashraful Islam, psc, Signals was commissioned in the Corps of Signals with 45th BMA Long Course. He was awarded 'Golden Pen' for the best 'Individual Research Paper' from Defence Services Command and Staff College. He obtained B.Sc Engineering degree in 'Electrical, Electronics and Communication Engineering (EE&CE)' discipline and now undergoing Post-graduation at MIST. He also attained 'Master of Business Administration' (MBA) degree in 'Supply Chain Management' under Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP). He is an EC-Council Certified Chief Information Security Officer (CCISO), Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH) and Certified Internet Webmaster (CIW). He started his military career in 11 Signal Battalion, commanded Cumilla Static Signal Company and also served as the pioneer 2nd in Command of 8 Signal Battalion. As instructor class A and B, he served in Signal Training Centre and School. He also performed as the Grade-1 Staff Officer at the Headquarters of Army Security Unit. As a peacekeeper, he contributed to the UN mission of Liberia (UNMIL) and Mali (MINUSMA). Now, he is the Commanding Officer of 10 Signal Battalion.

Success of the UN Peacekeepers: A Study of the Future Dynamics of Peace Operations

Lieutenant Commander Shahriar Hamid Rasul, (G), psc

Introduction

More than 75 years have been come across by the UN, since its establishment in October 24, 1945. One of the oldest international organisations has been infusing peace and stability, security, protection of civilians with special emphasis on women and children and socio-economic development around the world. UN maintains these issues through its Member States, **‘to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war.’** Though, most of the UN peacekeeping operations are generally regarded as a success, the examples are: El Salvador, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Liberia, Ivory Coast and Haiti; however, few other missions are seen as obvious challenges, such as Rwanda and Somalia. Unfortunately, the successes of recent UN peace operations are outshined by some of the impediments faced in the mission area. The Srebrenica Massacre during the Bosnian War of 1992 – 95 occurred in the presence of the Dutch UN peacekeepers. This massacre of more than 8,000 Muslim men and boys is the worst massacre to have taken place in Europe since the end of the Second World War. In Africa, the UN also faced challenges to prevent the Rwandan genocide of 1994 which left about 1,000,000 people dead. In addition to this, UN peacekeepers in Somalia were forced to withdraw after the situation deteriorated in 1995. There are growing tensions of force protection, while the peacekeepers are facing challenges of asymmetric threats especially in the UN mission in Mali.


The UN Peace Operations (UNPO) has become one of the most predominant forms of conflict resolution in the modern time. Mostly, after the time of Cold War, many conflicts have been concluded through mediation process initiated by the UN or the involvement of third parties operating together. Three basic principles have traditionally been served the Peace Operations: (1) Consent of the parties, (2) Impartiality, and (3) Non-use of force except in self-defence and for the defence of the mandate. To deploy peacekeeping forces, the UN Security Council does consider a set of conditions that will be applied to implement the potential objectives of the mission. This has also emerged few questions: what dynamics influence the successful strategy of the UN peacekeepers, and how the peacekeepers may develop their actions in future peace operations?

The UN Security Council has approved 71 peace missions since 29 May 1948² so far. The peace operations’ purposes varied in terms of their mandate

and scope. UNPOs are archived under the categories of conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-building are the steps of UN to maintain peace and security around the world. If these steps are combined with unsystematic partial measures or with delay response, the missions could face challenges to provide comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of conflict and violence.³ An in-depth and updated knowledge of the geographical, political, and social situation of the conflicting region before, during and potentially after deploying the peacekeepers are important. The paper focuses on to the dynamics of few completed and significant UN Peace Operations, which has defined, 'what practices affected the results of the disputes and conflicts'. By conducting past analyses of the cases of peace operations, this paper connects common features that have led to either mission's success or challenges.⁴ It put further questions of what factors have had impacts on the result of the conflict, or what conditions are most essential for the outcome of peace operations missions? Finally, this paper has pursued to identify key features from few past cases of peace operations. The findings may be important to the think tanks, strategists, researchers and the planning organizers of UN Peace Operations with in-depth consideration of the operational environment of UNPO. This paper has endeavoured to highlight some important criteria that define the success of the mission and bring to light the key factors that contribute to those criteria. The three criteria that this paper has used to assess the missions are: understanding of the mandate and application of Rules of Engagement (ROE), evaluation of Peacekeepers' training, and evaluation of the performance of peacekeepers in UN Mission. The paper has tried to seek out, "why the peacekeepers succeed in some environments, while in other under conflicts or in hostile or in unfriendly environment with similar set-up, they have faced challenges/ impediments to continue with" and "what are the standards to adopt the success of peace operations". Consequently, proper evaluation of peace operation's success would result in several policymaking benefits. It may provide a prerequisite for, 'conditions associated with successes' and may give a broader and complex assessment of peace operations.

It is mentionable that Figure-1 showing locations of the ongoing thirteen (13) UN Peace Operations across four continents⁵ are excluded here for considerations as their outcomes are yet to be determined. The analyses of the study have been made for few significant and completed peace operations, resulted with success and challenges. The analyses were based on available mission reports and secondary analysis of the peace operations.

Figure-1: The map showing thirteen UN Peace Operations for last 73 years (29 May 1948 – 15 April 2021)



Source: <https://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/PKOBN.pdf>

Conditions of Success and Challenges

This paper assumes five conditions, which focus on specific peacekeeping dynamic that may affect the outcome of the operation. Therefore, the primary focus here is to endorse each idea as defined in following conditions:

Condition 1 (A – 1): Peacekeepers require safe zone⁶ or safe haven from which they operate.

Condition 2 (A – 2): Sufficient amount of funding (and Result-Based Budgeting) does not necessary lead to the mission's success.

Condition 3 (A – 3): The mission needs a set of sufficient and appropriate amount of personnel who are well trained and effective for the operations.

Condition 4 (A – 4): The longer duration of the mission does not necessarily mean the success of the mission.

Condition 5 (A – 5): External support and cooperation with other peacekeeping organisations (donors, international organisations, internal-external partners and stakeholders) are necessary to ensure the accomplishment and success of the mission.

The above stated conditions do not focus on the actions conducted by the peacekeepers, rather on to the provisional aspects of each operation. To determine and validate of each condition, information from secondary sources were considered.

Dynamics of the Peacekeeping

Evaluation of the Cases: Here, evaluation from the analyses of few of the UN peace operations missions⁷ has been considered. It was not easy to assess few of the missions, as their enactment of mandate was challenged/impeded by the low budget, or the UN peacekeepers were depending on the actions of other parallel forces. The mixed opinions on the outcome of each case are high; it has been identified the operations as either a success or with challenges. To decide unclear results, methods of analyzing the factors for further analyzing which are necessary to evaluate/measure the success of UN Peacekeeping Operations, have been considered. Here, few of the set criteria are required for the peacekeepers: knowing of the UN Security Council Mandate and its associated tasks to perform, knowing and application of the ROE, to 'use of force'⁸ or attaining the robustness of peace operations and lastly, the training of the peacekeepers and their performance in response to mandated tasks, end of mission reports and expert opinions from the returnee UN peacekeepers have been considered. Whether the peace operations implemented its mandate and established its orders, were the pre-requisites of a successful mission. If the peacekeepers could not to follow up the objectives of the mission's mandate, these were assessed as the mission with challenges. The comprehensive impression of the cases have been arranged by its official name, acronym, and the duration of the mission with a summary and result/outcome, highlighting the key successes or deficiencies/ challenges that contributed to the result of the discussed cases.

Comprehensive Impression of the Cases:

a. UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) November 1956 – June 1967: The first UNEF was established to supervise the withdrawal of French, Israeli and the UK forces from the Egyptian territory after establishing ceasefire. The mission meant to serve as a buffer zone between the Egyptian and Israeli troops, supervise Suez Canal's cleaning operations, and secure cooperation from the parties in implementing the armistice agreement. Although most of the operations' aims were implemented, however, there had few limitations. UNEF I mission is one of the exceptions that can be deemed a success, as it provided patterns for traditional peacekeeping missions and set general benchmarks for operations. It introduced the term 'holy trinity' of traditional peacekeeping, which are: consent, neutrality, and minimum use of force.⁹

b. UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) July 1960 – June 1964: The ONUC was created to address the conflict between Belgium and its former territory of Congo, which gained independence on 30 June 1960. The mission's objectives included withdrawal of Belgian troops and foreign military personnel, including the prevention of civil war. The achievement of mandate was a significant factor of the operation and it restored law and order in Congo, ensured the country remained a single unit, facilitated a restoration of a functioning government, and oversaw the withdrawal of foreign troops.¹⁰

c. UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) August 1988 – February 1991: This mission was deployed to verify and monitor the ceasefire between Iran and the mutual withdrawal of their troops. UNIIMOG was a successful example of an UN observer mission that managed to verify, monitor, and maintain a ceasefire between two former belligerents. Although UNIIMOG faced several challenges and limitations in an extremely volatile environment, the mission could manage the prevention of escalation to large-scale violence or inter-state conflict between Iran and Iraq.¹¹

d. UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) April 1991 – October 2003: Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the UN Security Council deployed the UNIKOM and established "De-Militarization Zone" (DMZ) between Iraq and Kuwait. UNIKOM was tasked to aid other missions operating in Iraq and to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in the surveillance of the DMZ. Lastly, it served to observe any potentially hostile actions from one State against another. Although the liberation of Kuwait was successful, UNIKOM is labeled as a challenged mission due to several reasons. Firstly, in the context of the invasion of Iraq, UNIKOM could not prevent hostilities between the belligerents. Secondly, the operation proved incapable of reporting the violations of the DMZ by the adversaries. Thirdly, it was significantly financed by one side of the conflict, which dented its integrity and impartiality.¹²

e. UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) February 1992 – March 1995: The UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina was tasked to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid during the Bosnian War. The fall of Srebrenica to the Serbs in July 1995 with massive violations of human rights could make UNPROFOR, full of challenges.¹³ UNPROFOR was the biggest operation of the immediate post-Cold War period, the massacre of more than 8,000 Bosnian mostly Muslim men and boys by the Bosnian Serb forces is viewed as a disaster. The main reason consists in Srebrenica being declared a "safe zone" and protected by the Dutch force but they were quite unaware to protect the innocent civilians.¹⁴

f. UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) December 1992-

December 1994: The ONUMOZ was established to secure a lasting peace in Mozambique following the civil war between the government and the Mozambican National Resistance. During this operation, major violent activities were ceased, demobilization was partially implemented, and the overall security situation prior to the elections was improved. A detailed investigation by UN peacekeepers on human rights abuses further contributed to stabilization of the situation, which in turn created a stable environment for the return and resettlement of refugees. After the operation was terminated in late 1994, large-scale violence did not recur and Mozambique began the process of peacebuilding and reconstruction, yielding impressive results in just a few years. UNOMOZ could secure a strong indicator of a successful peace operation.¹⁵

g. UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) October 1993-

March 1996: The UNAMIR was formed to assist the security of Kigali, monitor ceasefire agreement, establishing a demilitarized zone, and monitor the security leading to elections. The impediments of preventing to stop the genocide, labels the overall UN presence in Rwanda as a disaster. UNAMIR, with its limitations on implementation of the mandate, led to 700,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus being killed by the genocidal extremists that took control of governmental institutions.

h. UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) December 1995-

December 2002: The UNMIBH was established as part of the post-war peacebuilding mechanisms. This was the first time the UN deployed a mission primarily composed of a police force. The conflict started in Bosnia in April 1992 and ended in October 1995 after the offensive of both Bosnian and Croatian forces against the Serbs over the summer of 1995. Surely, without NATO's airstrikes (through Operations Deliberate Force) on the Serb positions in August and September 1995 the conflict would have had a different outcome.¹⁶ A ceasefire was agreed after the formal signature of the Dayton Agreement by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, Croatian President Franjo Tudman, and Serbian President Slobodan Milocevic. Thus, UNMIBH played a vital role to establish peace and was successful.

j. UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) October 1999 – December

2005: The UNAMSIL was officially authorized to implement the Lome Peace Agreement of July 1999, and assist the government of Sierra Leone to implement the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process. The mission also focused on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The operation faced problems when the belligerents continued to fight the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and the Civil Defence Forces. This had brought several of its peacekeepers

killed, holding hostages, and seizing their heavy weapons. The May 2000 tragedy spurred the UN to reinvent itself and this is perhaps the most important factor that led to UNAMSIL's success. The UN increased its troops and took several steps to improve international coordination and reorganization of UNAMSIL. The mission was successful and offers lessons for future peace operations.¹⁷

k. UN Organization Mission in the DRC or Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) November 1999 – June 2010: The MONUC was formed following the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In the aftermath of the massacre, the Rwandan Patriotic Front defeated the Hutu-dominated Rwanda Armed Forces and the Hutu extremist militia. The aftermath entangled four countries: the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. In an effort to create some confidence and lower the tensions that periodically involved fighting, MONUC established and facilitated an indispensable reconciliation between the countries. MONUC helped to secure the implementation of both the 1999 Lusaka and 2002 Pretoria Agreements. The accords helped to create a new constitutional order, which eventually led to generally accepted national elections. However, MONUC was unable to end the systemic violence against the civilians in eastern Congo. This created an impression of futility despite the protection to vulnerable Congolese.¹⁸ Though MONUC struggled to implement all its tasks, it is an overall exceptional success considering that it had to operate in a highly complex post-genocide environment.

l. UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) July 2000 – July 2008: The UNMEE was deployed after various international actors sought to stop the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea seemingly had all the ingredients for success, however ended in failure. By the end of 2006, UNMEE's utility was merely operating as the mission was unable to fulfill its original mandate or even play a deterrent role to ensure the separation of forces or the integrity of maintaining of the Tactical Separation Zone (TSZ) by Ethiopia and Eritrea. The non-compliance of implementing its mandate was due to lack of cooperation, especially from Eritrea.¹⁹

m. UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) April 2004 – June 2017: The UNOCI or ONUCI was deployed amid a failed coup attempt of the President Laurent Gbagbo by the soldiers of Ivorian armed forces. The mission's focus was to lead the country towards the presidential elections that was one key point of contention in the overall peace process, which could be done successfully. Despite UNOCI's mandate was repeatedly constrained by the weak consent of the country, the mixed policies and feelings of the UN Secretariat on the mere existence of the mission, the mission managed to lead the country towards successful presidential elections.²⁰

n. UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) June 2004 – October

2017: The MINUSTAH was established in April 2004 to replace the Multinational Interim Force that had been deployed to stabilize the country earlier in February 2004. Following MINUSTAH's deployment, Haiti president Aristide was once again ousted amid political turmoil and violence. MINUSTAH's mandate included support for security sector reform including police reformation of Haiti, promotion and protection of human rights, and the assistance in organizing and monitoring the following elections with capacity building of concerned national stakeholders. While the operation has undoubtedly contributed to the 'stabilization of Haiti', a string of sexual assault scandals afflicted the military components of MINUSTAH and fuelled an anti-UN sentiment in the country. Had it not been for the UN presence, the transitional government would probably have been engulfed in 2004 – 2006 surge of violence.²¹ Overall, MINUSTAH's implementation of mandate was an establishment of order in the country; and it could achieve the mission.

p. UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) March 2005 – July 2011:

The UNMIS was created to support the execution of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the government of Sudan including its armed forces (SAF), and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLA). The mission's success in mandate implementation was depending on two factors: the will of the parties to advance the CPA and their acceptance of UNMIS's supporting role.²² The mission was most successful when both parties welcomed its involvement. The most severe shortcoming of the mission was regarding its tasks for "Protection of Civilians (PoC)."²³ But, when fighting erupted between SAF and SPLA in Abyei in May 2008, UNMIS was critiqued for "not having done enough to protect civilians." The UNMIS's mission was having challenges to implement the CPA.

q. UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)

September 2007 – December 2010: The MINURCAT mission was deployed to address some of the spill-over effects of the war in Darfur, Sudan. The mission helped to carry out its mandate to protect civilians, refugees and displaced persons, including the facilitation for delivering humanitarian aid to Chad. MINURCAT could be considered as the UN's first 'pure' civilian protection operation. MINURCAT had to depend on the parallel forces of EUFOR. However, the UN-EUFOR operational coordination had impediments as the EUFOR commanders could not recognize the threat to civilians and other threats in eastern Chad.²⁴ So, MINURCAT had to face challenges to implement some of its initial tasks due to lack of establishing an effective liaison with parallel forces.

r. UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) April 2012 – August

2012: The UNSMIS was tasked to monitor a cessation of armed violence and support the implementation of Kofi Annan's six-point plan for Syria.²⁵ UNSMIS was a small, short-lived and unsuccessful attempt to end a rapidly escalating civil war that would go on to claim hundreds of thousands of lives and drive millions from their homes. Indeed, the mission was a clear failure if judged by the basic criterion of whether or not it helped ending the Syrian war. The mission was not able to "systematically monitor and report" both the freedom of movement or peaceful protests and the UN officials were observing protests and came under attack.²⁶ As UN National Security Advisor stressed, "a mission of 300 unarmed observers had to face challenges to deter or prevent violence, rather it faced lots impediments from security point of view."²⁷

Evaluation of the UN Peacekeepers

This has been implemented by considering several concepts including the number of personnel, budget, and the duration of each mission. Eventually, that has led to the evaluation of the UN peacekeepers. However, these could be possible by enquiring that the peacekeepers have clear understanding of the mandate and application of ROE for the 'Use of Force and firearms/ weapons', evaluation of peacekeepers' training²⁸ and lastly, by evaluating the performance of the peacekeepers in UN mission, through their responses to mission environment as per situation (calm, unpredictable, critical or urgent). A list of factors associated with peacekeeping, have set the realistic boundaries of assessment. A three-step process had to be considered, where the political situation, the social system, or the environmental factors of the conflicted region has been considered. It was focused on features related to the dynamics of the peace operations. Here, the 13 factors were derived from the analyzed UN peace operations. Therefore, these essential factors seem appropriate which cover few of the previously completed peace operations for fundamental accuracy. In the next step, similar factors are merged and eliminate any factor which does not relate to one of the five conditions, illustrating only 13 peacekeeping factors. However, the Table–1 lists peacekeeping factors, serially numbered with the conditions and concept.

Discussions on Key Findings

Key Findings – Estimating the Conditions: Here, the conditions and factors have been reviewed and these were related to the results of completed UN Missions, which include several successes and challenges filled impediment indicators, used to test propositions.

Condition 1: Requirement of protection (safe haven) for the peacekeepers, from which they are to work and operate: This was used to test this condition to ask whether the peacekeepers require a safe and secure

Table – 1: List of Peacekeeping Factors used for each condition

Condition	Factor (Serial)	Concept Of Evaluation
A – 1	1	The environment was secured and safe for the peacekeepers
A – 1	2	The UN peacekeepers were targeted by the conflicting parties
A – 1	3	The UN peacekeepers experienced casualties
A – 2	4	The mission received appropriate equipment and technology
A – 2	5	Each peacekeeper was sufficiently funded
A – 3	6	The mission received enough personnel to implement its aims
A – 3	7	The personnel were appropriately trained and coordinated
A – 4	8	The mission was deployed in a timely and effective manner
A – 4	9	The mission held an appropriate mandate and amended it when the situation changed in the region
A – 4	10	The peacekeepers were forced to withdraw by the request of the local government
A – 5	11	The mission operated in cooperation with non-UN external Organizations (e.g. NATO, OSCE, AU, ECOWAS etc.)
A – 5	12	Non-UN professional military engaged in fighting to protect the UN peacekeepers
A – 5	13	Non-UN external support acted independently from the UN and engaged in fighting without the consent of UN SC

Source: Author's Analysis

environment to successfully implement their objectives. To prove this enquiry, this thesis asked whether there were any casualties experienced during the course of the mission. It showed that the result of the successful case did not deviate significantly given the amount of casualties. In the case of UNAMSIL, the casualties phenomenally played an important role to reshape the mission's objectives and lead to its success. Actually, the May 2000 tragedy²⁹ served as the "necessary evil" for UNAMSIL and its successful mandate implementation and establishment of order, procuring the region a relatively lasting peace in the aftermath.³⁰ The mission could certainly reconsider its strategies and the factor indicated that even a small amount of deceased personnel is highly connected to the mission's challenges.

Factor-1 asked whether the peacekeepers were deployed into a safe environment, the result showed that the successful cases produced the most positive results. Indeed, the initial environment for the UNSMIS in Syria proved to be too challenging for the peacekeepers, especially given the mission's limited capacity. However, Factor-2 asked whether the peacekeepers were

targeted as part of the conflict and it showed that, it was not significantly important to the outcome of the cases with challenged filled cases with peacekeepers experiencing challenges from the conflicting parties.

Condition 2: Sufficient amount of funding (Result- Based Budgeting) does not necessarily lead to a mission's success: Today, the peace operations have evolved into complex operations with multi-dimensional elements going well beyond the initial concept of "peacekeeping"; the so-called integrated missions cover different aspects, such as peacebuilding, human rights, economic development, etc. In this respect, there is considerable room for improvement, first within the Secretariat and secondly within the UN system of organizations. The General Assembly on 18 June 2003, in its resolution number 57/290 B, requested for Joint Inspection Unit to submit an evaluation of the implementation of Results-Based Budgeting (RBB) in peace operations.³¹ The analysis undertaken for the preparation of report on funding and budgeting are based on the application in peace operations of those elements of the JIU results-based management (RBM) benchmarking framework considered relevant, in particular those related to the planning-to-evaluation cycle, as detailed in the series of reports on managing for results in the United Nations system prepared by the Unit. However, peace operations only apply RBB, not RBM. Since results are achieved through managing resources, including human resources, the human resources management component cannot be separated from a results-based approach. Thus some items contained in the benchmarking framework are not applicable in the context of this funding and budgeting. So, RBB is considered important in the application of any results-based approach, have been included as part of the analysis undertaken. To test the above condition, 'whether the peacekeepers received the necessary amount of funding to operate successfully', this study determined the approximate amount of funds disbursed for the deployed personnel of the mission. To find out the average funding of each operation, the statistical information derived from the readily available UN official webpages show that list the amount of maximum deployed personnel and the overall financing that each operation received has been made through calculation of the average financing per each staff member of each UN operation.

Condition 3: The mission needs a set of sufficient and appropriate amount of personnel who are well trained and effective for the operations: The MINUSTAH was launched with its mandate entailed technical assistance and training to Haitian National Police (HNP) as part of Security Sector Reform (SSR). Unlike other missions, MINUSTAH had fewer military forces relying on UN Civil Police. The mission was unable to contain the violence fully or had influence on political leaders since its functions were limited with strength. The mission needed a set of sufficient and appropriate amount of peacekeeping personnel. The mission's main limitation was laid in the absence of a sense of ownership of the HNP among political leadership and the Haitians. As a whole,

there had been challenges to establish order through mission's mandate as appropriate number of effective and well trained personnel were not there.

Condition 4: The longer duration of the mission does not necessarily mean the success of the mission: If we take the case of UNMEE, it was deployed on July 2000, after various international actors sought to stop the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The mission continued till July 2008, for eight years. Over this longer duration of time, the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea had all the ingredients for success but ended with challenges and impediments. Possibly, the operation's challenges could be attributed to both the countries themselves. By the end of 2006, UNMEE's utility was merely operating as the mission was unable to fulfill its original mandate of maintaining of the Tactical Separation Zone by Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Condition 5: External support and cooperation with other peacekeeping organisations (donors, international organisations, internal – external partners and stakeholders) are necessary to ensure the accomplishment and success of the mission: If we take the case of DR Congo, the MONUC mission was formed following the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In the aftermath of the massacre, the Rwandan Patriotic Front defeated the Hutu-dominated Rwanda armed forces and the Hutu extremist militia. The aftermath embroiled four countries: the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. In an effort to create some confidence and lower the tensions that periodically involved fighting, MONUC established and facilitated an indispensable reconciliation between the countries. After more than ten years of its existence and a record of financing for a single UN operation, MONUC helped to secure the implementation of both the 1999 Lusaka and 2002 Pretoria Agreements. The accords helped overt foreign intervention in the DRC, reunified the country, and created a new constitutional order, which eventually led to generally accepted national elections. A limitation of MONUC was such that, it was not capable to end the violence against the civilians in eastern Congo. This created an impression of unsuccessfulness despite the protection to vulnerable Congolese, as the integration and coordination among the donors, international organisations, internal–external partners and stakeholders were felt necessary.

Conclusion

The peacekeeping planners' efforts should focus on generating a sensible mandate for a mission, but keep in mind that it will need to be adapted as soon as the 'blue helmets' get deployed in the conflicting environment. The paper has showed that the five most important conditions lead to the mission's implementation of mandate, establishment of order, and ensuring a long-lasting peace. Those are, safe and secured platform (safe haven) for the peacekeepers to operate, procurement of appropriate equipment and technology for the peacekeepers with appropriate RBB, a sufficient number of

personnel to cover the fields of work, ensuring that the personnel are appropriately trained as per mission and ability to acclimatize a mission's objectives as soon as the situation changes. Additionally, the results showed that the joint operation with non-UN peacekeepers does not necessarily lead to a successful result due to possible conflicts of interest or unsuccessful communication. The paper could find out that necessary amendment, alterations and additions of tasks and responsibilities in the mandate as per the changing faces of peace operations are important. This leads to the dynamics of success of the peace operation. However, a mission could face challenges and impediments due to non-implementation of mandate which could have effected recommencement of violence, impeding the peace and stability in the region. Lastly, the paper could formulate that the combination of factors 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8 is one of the best methods to ensure a successful outcome of the peace operation. Table–2 represents a summary of the results.

Table – 2: Summary of the Results

Condition/ Factors	Concept and valid peacekeeping factors	Results/ Outcomes
Condition – 1	The peacekeepers require a safe haven from which to operate	Sound
Factor – 1	The environment was secured before the deployment of the peacekeepers	Strong support for
Factor – 2	UN peacekeepers were targeted by the conflicting groups	Weak support for
Factor – 3	UN peacekeepers experienced casualties	Weak support against
Condition – 2	Bigger amount of funding for the mission does not necessarily lead to its success	Sound
Factor – 4	The mission received appropriate equipment and technology	Strong support for
Factor – 5	The personnel were paid fittingly	Weak support for
Condition – 3	The mission needs a necessary amount of personnel to ensure the implementation of its objectives	Sound
Factor – 6	The mission received enough personnel to implement its aims	Strong support for
Factor – 7	The personnel were well trained and coordinated	Strong support for
Condition – 4	Longer duration of the mission does not necessarily correlate with the success of the mission	Sound
Factor – 8	The mission was deployed in a timely and effective manner	Weak support for
Factor – 9	The mission held an appropriate mandate or amended it in case of change of situation	Strong support for

Factor – 10	The peacekeepers were forced to withdraw by the request of the local government or due to disagreement at the UNSC	Weak support against
Condition – 5	External support and presence of other peacekeeping forces are necessary to increase the UN mission's implementation of objectives	Unsound
Factor – 11	The mission operated in cooperation with non-UN external organizations (e.g. NATO, OSCE, AU, ECOWAS etc.)	Strong support for
Factor – 12	Non-UN external professional military engaged in fighting in the UN mission's region	Strong support against
Factor – 13	Non-UN external support acted independently from UN	Weak support against

Source: Author's Analysis

Recommended Questions for Future Considerations

The success and challenges of the UN been discussed in details here in the paper also put some thoughts that UN has been working with in-depth analysis to formulate its policies and guidelines or instructions for the peace and stability of the host country and also for the protection of its own forces and components (military, police and civilian personnel). However, it has been felt necessary that the changing threat scenario and asymmetric threat environment³² around the world may demand further analysis about how best the UN Peace Operations may get go with success and achieving confidence in peace-building measures. To ensure reliability and confidence, allowing researchers to analyze way to success for the peacekeepers, a set of following questions are recommended for considerations of future dynamics of peace operations:

What factors and conditions may lead to a peace operation's success? The data analyzed in this paper explored the assumed factors and conditions influenced the result or outcome of the mission. Although, the assessments and evaluations in this paper have considered these factors and conditions which might have led to the success of the operations, these factors and conditions may be redefined in addressing and fulfillment of new challenges and tasks to determine the best practices and approaches of UN.

When should a peace operation be terminated and dismantled? While this paper has focused the success and challenges of the peace operations, there could be further questions about, 'what is the degree of commitment in relations to its budget that a peace operation should have?' or 'What are the conditions that will likely to minimize the probability of the resumption of a conflict?' or 'What are the DDR and SSR approaches that peacekeepers should focus and prioritize for further peace-building

opportunity?’ and ‘What could be the indicators which will determine the peace operation be terminated and/ or dismantled?’

What could be the size and shape of the peace operation? One of the main apexes of this paper was that, an operation needs appropriate funding and sufficient number of personnel and equipment to implement its mandate, so as to ‘Do more with less’.³³ However, it was observed that few of the peace operations, facing challenges and impediments to implement the mandate, could not deploy sufficient number of efficiently trained personnel with appropriate equipment/ gadgets for the requirement of peace and security in the region. So, with appropriate budget and funding, a question may be asked that, ‘How many military or police troops and equipment/ gadgets are required to be deployed to fulfill the mission’s mandated tasks?’ It is also suggested that the quality and effectiveness of the peace operations is more important than quantity of personnel or equipment, which ultimately will dictate the actual size and shape of the mission.

What future issues may dictate peacekeeping personnel to undertake new challenges of peace operations? This paper is neither a comprehensive nor a full-proof solution to the future dynamics of peace operations. Rather it opens up new horizons of such operations when the faces and approaches of peace operations are evolving with asymmetric threat environment or unconventional threats, with attacks under unmanned aerial vehicles, suicide bombings or even with devastating IED attacks by the terrorist armed groups or perpetrators. Even the future of the asymmetric threat environment could encounter computer software virus, internet hacking, disruption through emailing and documentation system, barrage jamming of electromagnetic frequency etc. This may put the think tanks at UN Headquarters to plan to mitigate threats to peace operations in its future endeavours.

Considering the above questions, following approaches may be applicable against threats to peace operations:

- a. Use of artificial intelligence, smart technology, modern electronics gadgets/ gears.
- b. Use of personal protecting equipment by peacekeepers.
- c. Use of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle and armoured vehicles.
- d. Use of improved communications and information gathering systems.
- e. Peacekeepers be vaccinated and fit (physically and mentally).
- f. Develop medical fast responder knowledge and methods among the peacekeepers.

- g. Review of the UN security management system to work under asymmetric threat.
- h. Integrated security resources of the UN Department of Safety and Security.
- j. Development of policy for 'Force Protection'.
- k. Mission specific training (scenario-based and field training, Counter IED).

It is strongly recommended that the future peace keepers may be well equipped and trained with effective knowledge, equipment with positive approach towards the ever changing faces of mission or asymmetric threat environment of the peace operations.

Notes and References

1. The Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations: We the Peoples of the UN Determined; to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/preamble/>, accessed on 10 March 2021
2. The first UN peacekeeping mission was established on 29 May 1948, when the Security Council authorized the deployment of a small number of UN military observers to the Middle East to form the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours.
3. Peacekeeping.un.org, Terminology, Retrieved from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/terminology>, accessed on 12 March 2021
4. Specially, the criteria used to evaluate the success or challenges of the operations, were extracted from the Oxford Handbook for UN Peacekeeping Operations, Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman's Evaluating Peace Operations, and other publications. The numbers of deployed peacekeeping personnel, funding/ financing, and fatalities were taken from accessible UN webpages. The concepts, factors and case results are further discussed in the later part of the paper.

5. UN Peace Operations Deployment, Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/map/world/united-nations-peacekeeping-operations-map-no-4259-rev-26-e>, accessed on 10 March 2021
6. “Safe Zone” or “Safe Haven” and the applicable laws: Protracted conflicts (both international and non-international) in many parts of the world renewed calls for so called “safe zones”, “safe haven” and “safe corridors” to prevent people from needing to seek protection abroad as refugees, and to encourage refugees and displaced people to return home. The concept has been practiced in various parts of the world under various names, such as, ‘save haven’, ‘interim zones of stability’, ‘neutralized zones’, ‘deescalated zones’, etc. The ‘safe zones’ suggest an area within a country engulfed in armed conflict or generalized violence that is made safe from military attack. Such zones are designated in the areas where the civilians and non-combatants face security challenges. Such zones can be created either by agreement of the parties in conflict or by Security Council Resolution. There is no clear principle for ‘safe zones’ in international law and the state practices are still evolving. Yet existing laws that regulate protection of civilians and non-combatants – such as, international refugee law, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the law of armed conflicts (Geneva Conventions 1949 and the Additional Protocols I and II) International Human Rights Law and the International Law relating to peacekeeping operations offer some guidelines on the nature and scopes of such zones.
7. The currently on-going 13 UN Peace Operations Missions have been excluded, as these missions require a different method of analysis, till the Mission Mandates of these missions are accomplished or attained. Besides, these missions may not be evaluated in the same way in terms of long-term peace commitments as these are done for the completed/ terminated missions.
8. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms as per Rules of Engagement (ROE) by the Security and Law Enforcement Officials under the tasks of UN Mandates (as Adopted by the 8th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990). Few of the important issues of ROE are: (1) Whereas the work of law enforcement officials is a social service of great importance and there is, therefore, a need to maintain and, whenever necessary, to improve the working conditions and status of these officials; (2) Whereas a threat to the life and safety of law enforcement officials must be seen as a threat to the stability of society as a whole; (3) Whereas law enforcement officials have a vital role in the protection of the right to life, liberty and security of the person, as guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed in the International Covenant

on Civil & Political Rights; (4) Whereas the Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners provide for the circumstances in which prison officials may use force in the course of their duties; (5) Whereas it is appropriate that, with due regard to their personal safety, consideration be given to the role of security forces and law enforcement officials in relation to the administration of justice, to the protection of the right to life, liberty and security of the person. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/useofforceandfirearms.aspx>, accessed on 12 March 2021

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26. Security Council Report, "Negotiations on Syria Mission renewal and Tremseh Press Statement," *What's in Blue*, 15 July 2012
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28. 'In-country training' refers such training before the departure of UN Peace Keepers for UN mission and 'Induction training' refers training in the mission area.
29. The UN Security Council Resolution 1289 (adopted: 7 February 2000) expanded UN troops to maximum of 11,000 and increased UN Charter: Chapter VII powers to cover humanitarian access, DDR, and support to the police, but this would still prove insufficient. In the course of a disorganized handover from ECOWAS Military Observers' Group, the UNAMSIL also faced challenges owing to underprepared troops and differing troop-contributing country understandings of the robustness of the UNAMSIL mandate. The situation reached to its nadir in May 2000, when RUF forces exploited UNAMSIL's weakness after ECOWAS's departure by kidnapping 500 UN peacekeepers. UN was forced to rely on the mediation of Charles Taylor and his influence over RUF to gain their release.
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31. The General Assembly, in its resolution 55/231 of 23 December 2000, approved a series of measures to implement RBB in the United Nations as proposed by the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
32. The asymmetric threat can be defined as "a broad and unpredictable spectrum of military, paramilitary, and information operations, conducted by nations, organizations, or individuals or by indigenous or surrogate forces under their control, specifically targeting weaknesses and vulnerabilities within an enemy government or armed force"

33. The package of administrative reform measures announced by the former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan will not only streamline UN bureaucracy and redirect resources from administrative overhead to program accomplishment, but also help change the Organization's management culture itself. It constitutes the kind of structural reform that will help the UN, "To do more, better, and for/ with less", Retrieved from <https://archive.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/annan/1997/trackone.htm>, accessed on 25 April 2021
34. An Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is a bomb constructed with innovative idea and deployed in ways other than in conventional military action. IEDs are generally seen in asymmetric or unconventional warfare by insurgent guerrillas. In the second Iraq War, insurgents used IEDs extensively against US-led forces. IEDs were responsible for about 63% of coalition deaths in Iraq. They are also used in Afghanistan by insurgent groups with fatal incidents of peace operations' forces. IEDs are currently being used in UN Multidimensional Integrated and Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The IED attacks by the Terrorists Armed Groups on the UN Peacekeepers have started since 2014.

Brief Biography



Lieutenant Commander Shahriar Hamid Rasul, (G), psc, BN was commissioned with 90A Batch (25th BMA Long Course) in the Executive branch of Bangladesh Navy in 1992. He is a missile expert and a qualified Gunnery specialist. He was graduated from Defense Services Command and Staff College, Mirpur with 24th Naval Staff Course in 2006. He holds a Masters in Defence Studies under National University in 2006. He has held Command, Staff and Instructor appointments in his 29 years of service with various afloat and operational formations of Bangladesh Navy. Under the Blue Helmets, he has served in the United Nations Mission in Ivory Coast (at UNOCI) as Military Expert on Mission (as a Francophone Military Observer) between 2006 and 2007. He is about to complete his persuasion for his second Master on Peace and Conflict and Human Rights Studies under the Bangladesh University of Professionals. He is one of the longest serving Instructor and a veteran UN Peacekeepers' trainer in Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training, infusing peacekeeping knowledge since 04 January 2016. He was assigned as International Subject Matter Expert for UN Peacekeeping training at Malaysia, Mongolia and South Korea for numbers of occasions.


Activities of Bangladesh Airfield Services and Management Unit-5 in UN Peacekeeping Mission in Mali

Air Commodore Md. Mamunur Rashid, BUP, afwc, psc, ADWC

Introduction

Bangladesh Airfield Services and Management Unit (BANASMU) of Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) provides key support to enable the mobility and agility of the forces of United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This professional unit was first deployed in Mali on 10 September 2014¹ under MINUSMA which is 9,651 km away from Bangladesh.² BANASMU-5 was deployed in Mali on 29 December 2018 consisting of 110 personnel, among them 4 were female officers. This was the first-time female officers from BAF were deployed in Mali. In MINUSMA, the main role of BANASMU is to provide airfield services to manage airport and heliport and its associated operations in Kidal and its detachment Tessalit. Airfield services include all required ground services to facilitate safe and smooth air operations to and from Kidal as well as Tessalit and airspace management over Kidal and Tessalit airfields. As there is no rail and secured road communication in between important cities of Mali, aircraft and helicopter are the only means of communication where BANASMU plays a very vital role for MINUSMA.

Figure 1: Air Regions of MINUSMA³



Source: MINUSMA Air Operation, GIS Unit, MINUSMA, Log Base, Bamako, Mali

Soon after the deployment, BANASMU-5 continued the operation at Kidal airfield without any hindrance. Besides, this unit also provided airfield support to Tessalit airfield, which came into operation in 2016.⁴ Since 2016, security of Tessalit airfield was enhanced by UN Troops which stopped rebel groups to use the airfield. The unit was tasked to provide all types of airfield services to carry out air operations both at Kidal (heliport) and Tessalit (helipad and airfield). Out of six air regions of MINUSMA, Kidal and Tessalit fall under Air Region 5 and 6 respectively.

Mission of BANASMU

The mission of the BANASMU is to provide airfield services in Kidal and Tessalit airfields which is under Air Region-5 and 6 respectively to conduct safe, expeditious and efficient air operations within the AOR to support implementation of MINUSMA mandate.⁵ To achieve this mission, BANASMU has specific role and task.


Role of BANASMU

The role of BANASMU is to provide all ground services to facilitate smooth air operations to and from Kidal heliport and Tessalit airfield.⁶

Organization

The Contingent was consisting of 110 manpower divided into two sub-units in Kidal and Tessalit. The Contingent Commander is directly commanding the main and sub unit deployed in Kidal and Tessalit and the Contingent Commander's deputy is delegated the command of the sub-unit deployed in Tessalit.⁷ The organogram of the Contingent is given below:

Figure 2: Organogram of BANASMU⁸



Source: The Statement of Unit Requirement for the Airfield Support Unit (Annex A)

Task of BANASMU

The specific tasks of BANASMU are mentioned below:

- a. To provide airspace management, flight information and collision avoidance service.
- b. To offer airfield and ramp control directing and moving aircraft on the ground.

- c. To make available flight monitoring, plotting, tracking and reporting of aircraft within area of responsibility (AOR).
- d. To provide weather observatory service to Air Traffic Control (ATC), Air Ops Mission Planners and aircrews.
- e. To provide support to aircraft in firefighting and emergency crash and rescue operation.
- f. To manage incoming and outgoing personnel and cargo.⁹

Different Sections of BANASMU

BANASMU is solely rendering airfield services and associated operations in the heliports and airfields of Kidal and Tessalit for safe and effective air operation of all UN and UN friendly aircraft. BANASMU accomplish these tasks through the following sections of Operation Cell:

- a. Flight Following Services (FFS).
- b. Air Traffic Control (ATC) Services.
- c. Aeronautical Meteorological Services.
- d. Emergency, Crash & Rescue (ECR) Services.
- e. Ramp Control and Aircraft Marshalling Services.
- f. Military MOVCON Services.

Brief descriptions on the activities of different sections of BANASMU are given in the subsequent paragraphs:

Flight Following (FF) Section: MINUSMA has established a FF network to track and monitor all UN aircraft operating in Mali. FF Section is a part of this network and responsible to provide FF services within Kidal (Air Region-5) and Tessalit (Air Region-6) Air Regions. FF services are provided by FF Controllers and FF Assistants. BANASMU FF section comprises of four officers and four airmen. This section does the following:

- a. Monitors movement of all UN aircraft within its AOR using both radio contact and sky web tracking system.
- b. Maintain co-ordination with all other air regions of Mali and also with Mission Air Operation Center (MAOC) for the smooth conduct of air operations.

- c. Maintains close co-ordination with all other sections of concerned agencies related to air traffic movements.
- d. Provides mission clearance for all incoming and outgoing UN flights in coordination with Air Operations Section.
- e. Monitors all radio communication of UN flights within AOR and obtains GPS positions of all UN aircraft every after 15 minutes through HF and VHF.
- f. Maintains all records (flight information, passenger, cargo, refueling) of UN flights meticulously both electronically and manually through various means i.e electronic radio log, manual radio log, sky web tracking system, COSMOS site, various log books (Event Log Book, Weather Log Book, Air Region Check List Log Book, FF Information Log Book, VVIP/VIP/MEDEVAC/ CASEVAC/ Recce Log Book, Daily Flight Schedule Log Book, Daily Activities Log Book etc).
- g. First to respond for any aircraft emergency within its AOR and disseminates all information to concerned agencies for Search and Rescue (SAR).
- h. Maintains liaison with Sector North HQ, G-3 Air Ops Section for the smooth conduct of reconnaissance missions within AOR.
- j. Remains always standby for any CASEVAC/MEDEVAC or any UN Special Missions other than regular air operations in support of MINUSMA.¹⁰

ATC Section: Effective and efficient management of the airspace both in Kidal and Tessalit is the prime job of ATC section. ATC section is responsible for the following:

- a. Manning Kidal and Tessalit Aerodrome Flight Information Unit (AFIU) to provide Aerodrome Flight Information Services (AFIS) to all traffic operating in Kidal and Tessalit Airfield for maintaining safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic.
- b. Coordinating and ensuring the availability and serviceability of heliport facilities including radio aids for safe air operations.
- c. Informing MINUSMA Aviation regarding any unserviceability for subsequent NOTAM action.¹¹

ATC section of BANASMU is comprised of total eight personnel, i.e. four ATCOs (Air Traffic Control Officer) and four ATCAs (ATC Asst). Out of eight

members two ATCOs and two ATCA are deployed in Kidal and same number of ATCOs and ATCAs in Tessalit. Both Kidal and Tessalit ATC tower is manned by ICAO qualified Air Traffic Controllers who are rendering smooth and efficient ATS support to all the aircraft and helicopters operating from Kidal and Tessalit through their professionalism, hard work and utmost dedication. According to Statement of Unit Requirement (SUR) signed between UN and Bangladesh, ATC section should provide Air Traffic Services (ATS) support to 10-15 flights per 24 hours both from Kidal and Tessalit airport and heliport.¹² However, recently the aviation activities of MINUSMA have significantly increased both in Kidal and Tessalit. At present ATC section is rendering ATS support to around approximately 20 UN and friendly non-UN flights per 24 hrs from both Kidal and Tessalit.¹²

Aeronautical Meteorology Section: The objective of Aero Meteorological section of BANASMU is to provide timely and efficient meteorological services for all UN aircraft operating throughout the area of operation. The vast northern desert part of Mali has a hot desert climate with long, extremely hot summers and scarce rainfall. Aero meteorological section performs the following:

- a. Providing precisely and accurately weather forecasts of blowing dust, harmattan and sandstorm.
- b. Maintains sunrise to sunset forecasting watch (including weekend/ holidays), reporting and recording METAR and distributes to all concern in MINUSMA through email and RT/Tel by hourly in accordance with ICAO procedures. Issuing of meteorological aviation warnings and SPECI to concern agencies are done by this section as and when required.
- c. Collects and stores statistical meteorological data derived from observations and forecasts. Services of Aero Met of BANASMU are provided by two meteorological officers and two meteorological assistants both from Kidal and Tessalit.
- d. Weather forecasts with power point presentation are provided by this section to every Monday and Friday morning brief at SNHQ, Kidal, Air Ops Tessalit and all concern in MINUSMA by mail in every morning in working days.
- e. Aero meteorological sections of Kidal and Tessalit remain always standby for any CASEVAC/ MEDEVAC or any UN special mission other than regular air operations in support of MINUSMA.¹³

Aero-met section has published Kidal Weather Booklet covering last five years weather data which was appreciated by all.¹⁴

Emergency Crash and Rescue (ECR) Section: The objective of ECR service is to save lives. This must assume at all times the possibility of and need for extinguishing fire which may occur either immediately following an aircraft accident or incident or at any time during rescue operations. BANASMU ECR section provides ECR services to all UN flights in Kidal and Tessalit during the regular operation hours as well as it responds in case of any medical evacuation or casualty evacuation. BANASMU provides this support through two officers and sixteen fire fighters in two different locations i.e Kidal and Tessalit.¹⁵ The crash fire truck is placed in the heliport in alert position with engine running condition minutes before arrival of any UN flight and 30 minutes before any departure of UN flight. The fire crash tender remains in position till 10 minutes elapsed after departure/ engine shut down.¹⁶ The fire crash tender along with ECR team also remains present during refueling and defueling of UN aircraft. Moreover, BANASMU ECR section provides firefighting support to Kidal super camp and Tessalit camp during any fire incident. After Indirect Fire attack over Kidal and Tessalit UN Camp and Airfield and also in Kidal City, this section performed extraordinary job in extinguishing fire since deployment which were appreciated by Sector Commander and all UN Staff. In 2019, there was a fire incident that took place at Sector HQ inside Kidal Super Camp of UN at around 2200hrs. That fire was also extinguished successfully by ECR Section of BANASMU-5 which was appreciated by Head of Office, MINUSMA, Kidal Sector.¹⁷

Ramp Control & Aircraft Marshalling Section: Ramp control section is one of the most important sections for ensuring safe operations in the airfield. This section is comprised personnel from two different specialty i.e ramp control and aircraft marshalling. BANASMU ramp control section provides support to all UN and UN friendly aircraft in Kidal and Tessalit. The section is responsible for:

- a. Ensuring ramp safety and marshalling of all aircraft/ helicopters and other ground support vehicles.
- b. Controlling the movement of all aircraft, vehicles and personnel in the airfield as well as in the taxiway is the responsibility of this section.
- c. Needs to declare the availability of the airfield with all its components to ATC tower at least forty minute before the first arrival/departure after necessary survey and FOD of the airfield.
- d. Remains standby for 24/7 to support any MEDAVAC/CASAVAC operation.¹⁸

There are total 12 personnel in this section who are divided into equal number for Kidal and Tessalit det.¹⁹ All the personnel are certified ramp controller and aircraft marshaller qualified for any international airfield.

MOVCON Section: MOVCON section is responsible to manage incoming and outgoing personnel and cargo including passenger and baggage handling, ticketing and ramp access, cargo consolidation, breakdown and distribution, passenger and luggage security screening, aircraft loading and offloading. They also assist UN civil staff for manifesting the passenger on time. In addition strict implementation of DG (dangerous goods) regulations and info unusual cargo/incidents to Air Ops Staff is the job of MOVCON section.²⁰ Presently 16 personnel, along with associated vehicles and equipment are entrusted with MOVCON section for smooth transportation/ movement of passengers and cargo. MOVCON personnel always maintain co-ordination with flight following section about the departure and arrival of scheduled aircraft for subsequent movement of passengers and cargo.²¹

Maintenance Cell: Maintenance Cell is comprised of two sections, Communication Section and Vehicle Operation and Maintenance Section. In total, 12 personnel from BANASMU work in two airfields for keeping and communication and vehicles operational which include all special vehicles those are used in the airfield.²²


Field Support Cell: Field Support Cell is comprised of two sections, Admin and Logistic Section and Life Support Section (Medical). In total, 26 BANASMU personnel work in these two sections for providing all kinds of admin and logistic support as well as medical in both the airfields.²³

Tessalit Detachment: Tessalit is located at North-East of Mali, close to Mali-Algeria border. The aerial distance and bearing from Kidal heliport to Tessalit airfield is 111 NM and 347° respectively. Total 45 personnel are deployed in Tessalit as the detachment of main contingent. Tessalit detachment renders airfield services and associated operations to UN and other UN friendly aircraft at Tessalit like Kidal.²⁴

Some Facts and Figures on the Activities of BANASMU-1, 2, 3, 4 and 5

BANASMU-1: BANASMU-1 arrived in Kidal, Mali on 14 December 2014. In 2015, BANASMU-1 provided airfield services support only in Kidal Heliport. The total movement of helicopter during BANASMU-1 was 1515.²⁵ The number of UN helicopter movement is shown above in Figure 3.


Figure-3: Aircraft Movement in 2015



Source: Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5

BANASMU-2: In July 2016, BANASMU-2 deployed a detachment at Tessalit to provide airfield support services for UN and UN friendly aircraft from Tessalit Airport. As such, BANASMU-2 provided airfield services support both in Kidal and Tessalit Airport and Heliport. The total aircraft movement during BANASMU-2 was 2770²⁶ which are shown in the following diagram.


Figure 4: Aircraft Movement in 2016



Source: Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5

BANASMU-3: BANASMU-3 provided airfield services support both from Kidal and Tessalit airports. The total movement of aircraft and helicopter during BANASMU-3 was 4744. During this time, monthly average aircraft movement in Kidal and Tessalit was 395 and 13 respectively. Month wise flight operation during BANASMU-3 in 2017²⁷ is appended below:


Figure 5: Aircraft Movement in 2017



Source: Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5

BANASMU-4: BANASMU-4 provided airfield services support both from Kidal and Tessalit Airport. The total movement of aircraft and helicopter during BANASMU-4 was 4071. During this time, monthly average aircraft movement in Kidal and Tessalit was 339 and 12 respectively.²⁸ Month wise flight operation during BANASMU-4 in 2018 is appended in Figure 6 below:


Figure 6: Aircraft Movement in 2018



Source: Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5

BANASMU-5: BANASMU-5 arrived in Kidal, Mali on 30 December 2018. BANASMU-5 provided airfield services support both in Kidal and Tissalit Airport and Heliport. During this time, monthly average aircraft movement in Kidal and Tessalit was 440 and 15 respectively.²⁹ Total flight operation by BANASMU-5 from 01 January to 31 December 2019 is appended below:

Figure 7: Aircraft movement in 2019




Source: Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5

Analysis of Aircraft Movement in Previous Years

According to Statement of Unit Requirement (SUR) between UN and Troop Contributing Country (TCC), Bangladesh, BANASMU should provide support to 10-15 flights per 24 hrs in compliance with ICAO standard both from

Kidal and Tessalit Airport and Heliport. However, gradually the operational activities of MINUSMA aviation have significantly increased both in Kidal and Tessalit. At present BANASMU is rendering support to more UN and friendly non-UN flights per 24 hours both from Kidal and Tessalit. Comparison of aircraft movements in last four years are shown in the following diagram:

Figure 8: Comparison of Aircraft Movement in Previous Four Years³⁰




Source: Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5

Activities of BANASMU-5

After arrival in the mission area, BANASMU-5 was rendering airfield services to the UN and friendly non-UN aircraft, passengers and freight with professionalism, hard work and utmost dedication both from Kidal and Tessalit. All the sections of the contingent were performing very well to uphold the image of BAF in an international arena. Till 31 December 2019, BANASMU-5 provided airfield and associated support to 5276 UN and friendly Non-UN flights in comparison to 4071 for the same period in 2018.³¹ Month wise (01 January to 31 December) aircraft movement comparison in 2018 and 2019 is shown in the following graph.


Figure 9: Month wise (01 January to 31 December) Flight Movement Comparison in 2018 & 2019



Source: Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5


During the tenure (01 January to 31 December) MOVCON section of BANASMU-5 handled total 26,647 incoming and outgoing passengers and 996 tons of cargo. During the same period, BANASMU-4 handled 27733 passengers and 1056 tons of cargo.³² Following charts represent month wise comparison of passenger and cargo handled by BANASMU-4 and BANASMU-5 during the first four months in 2018 and 2019.

Figure 10: Month wise (01 January to 31 December) Passenger Movement Comparison in 2018 & 2019



Source: Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5

Figure 11: Month wise (01 January to 31 December) Cargo Movement comparison in 2018 & 2019



Source: Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5

Visit Programme Conducted by BANASMU-5

During the whole tenure of BANASMU-5, the Contingent received a good number of high level delegations from MINUSMA and Bangladesh Armed Forces. SRSG visited the Unit during Eid-UI-Azha and Force Commander visited twice which include Medal Award Ceremony where he was the Chief Guest.

Achievement

- a. From 01 January to 31 December 2019, BANASMU-5 provided airfield services and associated support to total 5276 UN and UN designate flight, handled 26,647 passengers and 996 tons of loads in Air Region-5 and 6 without any accident and incident keeping aviation safety both in the ground and up in the air paramount.
- b. Aero-met section of BANASMU-5 has published Kidal Weather Booklet covering last five years weather data first time in the history of MINUSMA which has helped in ascertaining direction of newly constructed runway and time frame for construction of the new airfield in Kidal by UN.
- c. BANASMU-5 has prepared a magazine named 'Desert Rose' where they have expressed one year's experience of BAF peacekeepers in the Western Sahara Desert. The magazine is in printing process. Publishing of this magazine would help readers to get a comprehensive idea regarding the contribution of BANASMU, threat in peacekeeping operation in Mali and challenging life in the desert area.
- d. BANASMU-5 was awarded with Force Commander's Commendation for their dedication, hard work, sincerity and commitment for peace.
- e. BANASMU-5 could make few unserviceable vehicles serviceable which helped the nation to get the reimbursement from UN for those vehicles.

Challenges

There are few challenges the contingent are facing which need attention for smooth function of the unit.

- a. Due to high temperature, frequent sand storm, limited maintenance facility, no technical and spares support, most of the vehicles including special vehicles need replacement in regular intervals.
- b. As airfields are away from camp, the road connected to airfield is susceptible to Improvised Explosive Device (mine) as such the contingent needs Mine Protection Vehicle for carrying unit personnel to and from the airfields.
- c. As the construction work of new Kidal Airfield has started for fixed wing transport aircraft operation, BANASMU will need more manpower and vehicle for providing simultaneous airfield support in Kidal heliport and newly constructed airfield.
- d. Food and water will be a great problem for all peacekeepers living in Kidal as the food is transported by road which is being delayed due to mine attack in the road and there is shortage of water source in Kidal.

e. After arrival at Kidal, Mali on 30 December 2018, BANASMU-5 faced first indirect fire (IDF) which was 9 mortar attack from Terrorist Armed Group (TAG) targeting Kidal Heliport on 3rd April 2019 in the daytime at around 1330 hours. Providing airfield services to aircraft and helicopters during IDF attack requires highest amount of courage, dedication and sacrifice. This is the most dangerous challenge that BANASMU-5 faced both in Kidal and Tessalit airfields throughout the year when they have to provide airfield services under IDF attack of TAGs number of times. Figure below shows the impact point of the above mentioned attack over Kidal Heliport on 3rd April 2019.

Figure 12: Impact Points of 9 Mortar (IDF) Attack on Kidal Heliport



Source: Air Ops, Sector North HQ, Kidal, Mali

Conclusion

BANASMU-5 with 110 manpower could fulfill its assigned task successfully in Kidal and Tessalit airfields as mentioned in SUR. In extreme threat condition and scorching heat environment of Western Sahara Desert, this contingent could fulfill its mandate and discharged all its duty with utmost sincerity. This unit has provided airfield services and ensured airspace management in two airfields of MINUSMA without any accident and incident. Those airfields are the lifeline of UN due to no other communication available to travel from North to any other parts of Mali other than air. BANASMU-5 provided airfield services to highest number of aircraft/helicopters/UAVs among BANASMU 1 to 5 and ensured smooth airspace management of Air Region 5 and 6 without any accident or incident keeping optimum flight and ground safety which has become benchmark among all the airfield services unit and aviation fraternity in Mali. Due to highest commitment to peace and dedication to noble cause, Force Commander, MINUSMA awarded BANASMU-5 with Force Commander's Commendation Certificate. BANASMU-5 could make a

permanent footprint over Western Sahara Desert of Mali by their professionalism and could earn the heart and mind of people worked around them. They have served for peace and showed extreme courage and dedication taking highest life risk even during IDF rocket and mortar attack over airfield which is praiseworthy.

Notes and References

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4. Air Region Map, MINUSMA Air Operation, GIS Unit, MINUSMA, Log Base, Bamako, Mali, Created 2014, Last updated 2019
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8. *Ibid*, Annex A, pp. 10-11
9. *Ibid*, p.5
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11. *Ibid*, p.2-1
12. Flight Lieutenant Fatema Tuzzohura Mow, Senior Air Traffic Controller, Kidal Airfield, BANASMU-5, MINUSMA, Mali, Interviewed on 10 January 2020
13. Standard Operating Procedure, BANASMU, MINUSMA Aviation, 01 May 2019, p.3-1
14. Squadron Leader Monalisa Mita, Officer-in-charge, Aero-Met Section, Kidal Airfield, BANASMU-5, MINUSMA, Mali, Interviewed on 12 January 2020
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22. Standard Operating Procedure, BANASMU, MINUSMA Aviation, 01 May 2019, p.8-1
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24. Group Captain Mohammad Nayeemuzzaman Khan, psc, 2IC and Detachment Commander, Tessalit, BANASMU-5, MINUSMA, Mali, Interviewed on 16 January 2020
25. Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5
26. Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5
27. Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5
28. Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5
29. Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5
30. Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5
31. Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5
32. Ops Record, Flight Following Section, BANASMU-5

Brief Biography



Air Commodore Md. Mamunur Rashid, BUP, afwc, psc was commissioned in Bangladesh Air Force on 03 January 1989. The author actively participated in United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia as Military Observer in 2004 and joined United Nations Peace and Stabilizing Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo in 2012-13 as Detachment Commander Dungu Det and OIC Flight Following of Bangladesh Airfield Services Unit-10 at Bunia Airfield. He worked as Contingent Commander, Bangladesh Airfield Services and Management Unit (BANASMU)-5 under United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission at Mali (MINUSMA) in 2019. The author is an expert Air Defence Weapon Controller (Category 'A') who successfully completed M.Phil from Bangladesh University of Professionals in 2019. At present, the Air Officer is undergoing National Defence Course at National Defence College, Mirpur.

Glorious Journey of Female FPU of Bangladesh Police in UN: An Element of Crisis Prevention Agenda; Aspirations, Achievements and Challenges

Shawon Shyla, ppm, Additional Superintendent of Police

Introduction

Female FPU of Bangladesh is once again proving to be a gleaming example in the arena of UN mission, both in cases of participation and professionalism, which represents female participation of UN mandate as inevitable variant of the phenomenon. Through inclusion of more female peacekeepers, UN is trying to balance out the number of female and male in the police and military in case of peacekeeping missions.

Based on last 10 years analysis upon female FPU contribution of Bangladesh police, this article attempts to identify and examine four factors for more inclusion of female in UN peacekeeping in altering the gendered landscape, 1) Global South will continue to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations to bear the burden of providing security; 2) The perimeters of a conventional interest in gender and gender relations in thinking about peacekeepers and embracing for an intersectional approach to the issue of female peacekeepers, most importantly including the role of work life balance in the thinking through the social, cultural, and political effects of peacekeeping deployments; 3) Despite the mandate of increased female participation in the UN Peacekeeping mission, the progress has been near to the ground due to the gaps between policies and outcomes; 4) Success story of Bangladesh FPU who are playing leading role in the transition from conflict to peace, can be an example to improve female participation in UN Peacekeeping mission from all over the world. The outcomes have extensive inferences for what can be done to inspire female peacekeepers for moving forward.

Magnificence around the World as Peacekeepers

In recent years, female peacekeepers have assumed greater significance globally for their outstanding contribution to international peace, security and tranquility, which is making a sheer difference. Since this contribution of female FPU is espoused by UN, it is understandable that more female FPU can work in this peace process to end the war spectrum, which is wary for mankind as a whole. Yet the potential that female FPU possesses must not be ignored. In the landscape of peacekeeping, a fundamental reconceptualization of female participation can lead to more participation in peace mission.

Emergence as a Role Model in the Globe: Given the significance of ensuring meaningful, equal, and full participation of women in peace operation and security, the Father of the Nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman

who dreamt of a world free of conflict, inequality, and injustice, started inclusion of female officers in Bangladesh Police in 1974. Father of the Nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman affirmed the commitment of Bangladesh to UN Peacekeeping during his first speech in UN General Assembly. Bangabandhu called for all-out effort in establishing peace throughout the world.

Participation of Female FPU from Bangladesh in Peacekeeping Mission: While countries such as Bangladesh has been sending increasing numbers of female peacekeepers to various UN missions, it was not until 16 May 2010 that the First All-Female Formed Police Unit (BANFPU-2), MINUSTAH was deployed from Bangladesh to Haiti and hailed as a gendered success whereas first Bangladeshi Police officer was deployed in UNTAG, Namibia in 1989 and first BANFPU (Bangladesh Formed Police Unit) was deployed in UNOCI, Ivory Coast in 2005. In the UN history the first all-female formed police unit (FFPU) was deployed to the peace operation in Liberia in 2007.

Table 1: Type of UN Missions Completed by Bangladesh Police (as on 18 April 2021)

Serial	Type of Mission	Mission Completed		Total	G/Total
		Male	Female		
1	P-Level / UNP Jobs	27	-	27	20,316
2.	IPO/UNPOL Mission	4,592	74	4,666	
3.	FPU Mission	14,224	1,399	15,623	

Source: UN Desk, Police Headquarters, Dhaka (18 April, 2021)¹

Honourable Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina reiterates her commitment towards UN peacekeeping in every international arena. Constitutional Obligation of Peacekeeping is mentioned in the Constitution of Bangladesh in article 25 which provides for “1) Principles of respect for national sovereignty and equality, 2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, 3) Peaceful settlements of international disputes, 4) Respect for international law and the principles enunciated in the United Nations Charter.”² The embracing of the landmark Security Council resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security (WPS) and the latest espousal of the National Action Plan to implement it envisages Bangladesh’s momentous participation echoing steadfast pledge to put female to the forefront of the peacekeeping operations. To mark and celebrate 10 years of female participation of Bangladesh police in Formed Police Unit in UN mission, this article seeks to highlight the aspirations, achievements and challenges of female participation in FPU in the last 10 years.

Status and Prospects of Female FPU Participation in UN Peacekeeping

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 intends to increase female participation in peace operations and aimed at increasing gender equality to include female who were traditionally been excluded.³ To enhance the number of female peacekeepers, it is not precarious to ensure that peacekeeping remains a relevant institution in a rapidly changing environment of which convulsion, multiplicity and communication are fundamental features. In terms of contribution of female peacekeepers to the UN Peacekeeping Operations Bangladesh features as a promising country among the top countries which has become the first country to deploy a female military contingent commander in UN history in Cote d'Ivoire in 2016.

In 2017 when the United Nations Secretary-General's gender parity strategy was launched 21 percent senior leadership of special political missions and peacekeeping operations was existed.⁴ Thereafter, this strategy yielded positive results which visualized as female accounted for 41 percent senior leadership of special political missions and peacekeeping operations as of August 2020 whereas 15.1 percent of police personnel were female, compared to 3 and 10 per cent respectively in 2015. In various studies in the past have documented and assessed status and prospects of female participation in UN peacekeeping.⁵ In conflict prone area and in post conflict situation female peacekeepers can lead the way to prevent sexual violence, stimulate female participation in political processes. Moreover they can interact more effortlessly with female in gender-segregated societies. In the process of Peace building and peacemaking female are in the center. Evidence shows that female engagement in conflict resolution and peace building results in longer lasting peace.⁶

Bangladesh female FPU has provided practical peacekeeping skills to female to be able to address conflict when it arises. Local female victims feel more comfortable to complain to a female police than that of male police member. Once COVID started, these female peacekeepers started sensitizing people about the pandemic. It is essential for the effectiveness of security forces that they build their knowledge and understanding of gender equality and female rights. To ensure global SDG's implementation, we argue that encouraging female participation in both local and international fronts safeguarding world peace and development is advantageous to make certain gender equality.⁷

General Role of Female FPU in UN Mission

Peacekeepers address the root causes of conflicts in full-fledged coordination with civilian colleagues, contact with the population, bringing communities into dialogue, does in-mission trainings, anticipate attacks aware of everything surrounding Unit; talk to local leadership, counter misinformation and plan operations based on outcomes and desired effects.⁸

Table 2: Core Attributes of Female FPU in Mission Area

Conduct & Discipline	- Conduct and discipline and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) are always being addressed. ZERO TOLERANCE regarding SEA
Force Protection	-Peacekeepers' security is paramount -Robust patrolling, willing/able/capable of fighting, bases better protected interaction with the population during patrols
Intelligence /Situation Awareness	-Communication with local leader to collect information, explain actions, explain Mandate, gather concerns, bring communities to the negotiation table, counter misinformation -Intel cycle: coordination with civilians/UNPOL to be proactive, nimble, and agile
POC	-Comprehensive approach to Protection of Civilians implies constant coordination with civilian sections, and different stakeholders -Always try to identify and neutralize potential threats for inter-communal coexistence -Considerate comprehensive approach to POC (full coordination with civilian colleagues)
Best Practices/ Performance	-Prepare and share Best Practices -Evaluation of performance is critical to amend the overall Training and Accountability System
Training	- In-mission training are being reinforced

Source: Author's self construct

It is certain that gender equality in peace operations is an inevitable goal. Hence, the inclusion of more police and military female peacekeepers can also have important benefits for operational effectiveness. On 31 October 2000 for perseverance of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction, the Security Council adopted landmark resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. The resolution reiterates the significant role of female and vouches for the promotion of peace and security. At the same time this resolution stresses the importance of equal participation and full involvement of female in all efforts. These array include below mentioned issues which unfold why the presence of female peacekeepers can also be inevitable to maintain social cohesion and prevent conflict from further escalation: 1) communicate with female in societies where female are outlawed from speaking to men; 2) interview survivors of gender-based violence; 3) create atmosphere for the peacekeeping force to be approachable to female in the community; 4) address specific needs of female ex-combatants during the process of demobilizing and reintegration into civilian life; 5) encourage female in the host community by their presence for integrated women empowerment in host country; 6) the augmented recruitment of female peacekeepers help to reduce conflict and confrontation especially violence against women and children; 7) increase entrance and support for local female; 8) offer role models for female in the community, and 9) deliver a greater sense of security to local populations, including female and children; broaden the skill set available within a peacekeeping mission.

Challenges in the Way

Perhaps most importantly the fact of thinking out of gender stereotypes and/or prejudices is paving the path towards more inclusion of female peacekeepers. To ensure equal meaningful increased participation of female peacekeepers, we have to ensure in this ongoing COVID pandemic situation that there will be no marginalization of female with a view to spending on issues related with women empowerment and security. More particularly, to fight against COVID it is most likely that the light from upsurge of female peacekeepers will be shifted towards somewhere else linked with economic crisis as the whole world has already seen the massive implication of COVID. This global pandemic is a wake-up call to work for more equal and inclusive societies which have an impact on collective efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. From decades of female's peace activism lessons learned and for achieving long-lasting peace and security, it is inevitable to increase female peacekeepers in the mission area.⁹

Moreover, Some salient features should be revisited which includes: 1) with the number of female participants the efficiency of peace operations does not come up in the same line with same pace; 2) the working environment of peacekeeping operations should be more inclusive to all genders. In the light of the above, it can be said that more women will seek positions in the police resulting in more female peacekeepers who are not constrained to perform gender-specific roles if we can ensure equal gender environment for all.¹⁰

Changing Factors

In the landscape of future post-conflict situation to meet the mandate of United Nations, PCC needs to cope with undergone major changes in UN. PCC also needs to enhance the competency and skills emphasizing the potential problems of different regions. Despite the shared difficulties, in some cases women tend to view the other women in a stereotypical way. This contributes to their isolation and self-disapproval.¹¹

As there is different mission specific scenario, which demands acting with impartiality in the faces of large scale massacre or untoward incident in the mission area, Bangladesh Police is in a process of enhancing its skill on clear idea and conception on Rules of Engagement (ROE). It is recognized that, Police must be mobile, trained, flexible, productive and sustainable to act to the challenges posed by conflict prone area. As on the capabilities of rapid deployment and rapid responses to emerging crisis, which can be decreased by professional, trained, mobile force, Bangladesh Police has given emphasis upon it from the very beginning. Bangladesh Police is always ready to work under holistic approach of UN in any conflict prone area, anywhere in the world.

Accomplishments of Bangladesh Police as Female FPU in UN Mission

Bangladesh, the role model in the community of the UN Mission area, is one of the top contributors of female police officers to the UNPKO. At present Bangladesh Police has one Female FPU with a total strength of 180 personnel deployed in DR Congo (MONUSCO).

Table 3: Present State of Bangladesh Police in different UN Missions

Country	Name of Mission	FPU				UN JOB	TOTAL
		Authorized Strength	Rotation	Present Strength	IPO		
Darfur	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	BANFPU-1 (140)	May'2020	139	26	1	166
DR Congo	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO)	BANFPU-1 (180)	May'2020	180	3	-	183
Mali	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)	BANFPU-1 (140)	Sep'2020	140	1	-	141
		BANFPU-2 (140)	Oct'2020	140	-	-	140
South Sudan	United Nations mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)	-	-	-	19	-	19
UN HQ	-	-	-	-	-	02	02
Total				599	49	03	651

Source: UN Desk, Police Headquarters, Dhaka (January 2021)

Success story of Female FPU (BANFPU-1 Rotation 14), MONUSCO in DR Congo

BANFPU -1 Rotation 14 has to be conferred credit for many of its concrete actions including operations, patrols and other important tasks successfully carried out in its area of responsibility in MONUSCO, DR Congo. Through its work, BANFPU-1 has been able to promote the protection of civilians. BANFPU-1 conducted patrols which allowed deterring the assailants and creating a security landscape to protect the vulnerable people of the region. They are also performing well in building confidence in INCAL Base, Kinshasa. Furthermore, BANFPU-1 also employs quick reaction team which has managed to repel attacks and mitigate damage in cases of attacks, which helped to restore public confidence.

Table 4: Bangladesh Police Female Members' Present Deployment in UN

Type of Mission	Name of the Mission	Number	Total	G/Total
FPU	MONUSCO-1	82	175	183
	MINUSMA-1	32		
	MINUSMA-2	32		
	UNAMID-1	29		
IPO & UN JOB	UNPOL	7+1	8	

Source: UN Desk, Police Headquarters, Dhaka (20 February, 2021)

Female FPU commanders have paved the way and created a significant contribution for increasing the participation of female police members in different UN mission and around the world. In 16 May 2010, the First All-Female Formed Police Unit (BANFPU-2), MINUSTAH was first deployed from Bangladesh to Haiti and Rockfar Sultana Khanam, PPM, Additional DIG was selected to be the torch bearer as the Commander of the contingent. Following her path, thereafter more female police commanders have taken the challenging way to lead from the front and envisage women empowerment of Bangladesh in a global forum.

Sacrifices on the Glorious Path of World Peace and Stability

Additional IGP of Bangladesh Police Rowsan Ara Begum, ppm, ndc, who was the inspection delegation team leader to DR Congo in 2019, died in a road accident in Congo. Previously, she served as a crime analysis officer in a UN Peace keeping mission in Kosovo, and as chief of Staff UNMISS-UNPOL Peacekeeping mission in Sudan.

Measures to Overcome the Challenges

It reiterates four factors for more insertion of female peacekeepers in UN peacekeeping in altering the gendered landscape: 1) To bear the burden of providing security, Global South will continue to operate in UN peacekeeping operations; 2) Revisit the conventional interest in gender and gender relations in thinking about the role of work-life balance through the social, cultural, and political effects of peacekeeping deployments; 3) Female inclusion in the UN Peacekeeping mission has been near to the ground due to the gaps between policies and outcomes whereas UN mandate is in favor of it; 4) Increase of female officials at higher level in UN (HQ & different missions) will certainly help to increase the numbers of female peacekeepers around the world, and 5) In the transition from conflict to peace, success story of Bangladesh FPU who has unprecedented role, can be an example to get better female participation in UN Peacekeeping mission.

Key findings include the following regarding Role of UN to increase female Participation in FPU: 1) UN may increase the number from interested

PCCs than that of fixed number from a particular country; 2) UN may create special opportunity like UNPOL/IPO for experienced female FPU members, which will generate more interest among female members to serve under UN; 3) Through PCCs respective HQs, UN may maintain a profile to keep track about experienced senior female peacekeepers. Based on their performance & availability, UN may specifically nominate/ select them for creating senior female leadership pool; 4) UN may increase the opportunity for female peacekeepers to serve in UN HQ / Different UN branches and organizations' HQs as reward for their sacrifice for global peacekeeping. However, it will increase female Participation & motivate female peacekeepers to serve more under the 'Blue Helmet,' and 5) considering the family needs of female peacekeepers (especially the need of their child), UN may introduce a provision to allow them to go to their family, twice in a year. Female peacekeepers may be allowed to visit their family and allotted 25 days leave, after every six months of their tenure in UN.

Conclusion

What remains as unaddressed factors are the complex interdependence between family and work life balance and between gender dimension and gender sensitization. In each case, female peacekeepers need to prove them beforehand. As a result, PCC needs to develop policies corresponding with others. Female FPUs of Bangladesh Police are leading from the front for neutralizing the threats against women and children especially in violence prone UN mission areas. After completing successful ten years, today Bangladesh female FPUs are proudly bearing the highest number of female FPU peacekeepers around the world. Yet there are scopes to increase the number of female FPU members from Bangladesh.

As per resolution 1325 (Women, peace and security), full involvement and equal participation of female security members on the arena of peace and security have utmost implication. UN needs to take realistic steps to increase the number of female FPU members in various UN missions. Augmenting number of female peacekeepers from interested PCC, enhancing aggregate opportunity like IPO for experienced female FPU members may lead the way towards expanding the overall female participation. Appointing experienced female peacekeepers may play a significant role for the formulation of policy for multiplication of female FPU number. PCCs may also recognize their female peacekeepers' sacrifice for the greater good of establishing peace around the globe. Job opportunities in UN Headquarters and different UN organizations may be increased to attract female FPU members. For fulfilling their family need, there might be provisions for female FPU members to avail 25 working days as leave after every six months. Proper implementation of these policies will certainly bring changes in the role of female FPUs in UN missions. A permanent standing committee can be formed by the experienced senior

female FPU members from Bangladesh Police to analyze the potentials and find out best possible opportunities for increasing the number of female FPU participation in UN missions. Meticulous planning, well-coordinated efforts and maintaining close liaison with UN headquarter should be the prime concern for Bangladesh Police to grab maximum opportunities to increase the number of female participation in different UN missions, UN headquarter and other affiliated organizations.

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Brief Biography



Shawon Shyla, ppm, Additional Superintendent of Police, joined Bangladesh Police as ASP with 30th BCS Cadre. She served as Special Assistant of Additional Inspector General of Special Branch, (Chief), Bangladesh police for last six years. She obtained her B.S.S (Hon's) and M.S.S from the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka. She also achieved her second M.S.S in Police Science from Faculty of Law, University of Rajshahi. In 2015, she achieved 'Certificate of Completion on Capacity Building Training Program on Sustainable Development & Effective Governance' from Macquarie University, Australia. She participated in 'International Leaders Program' (ILP) of United Kingdom in 2016 selected by FCO of United Kingdom which was followed by the participation in 'Regional Conference of ILP- 2017', held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. She was awarded with 'Australian Award Short Course on CVE - Using Social Media to Counter Radicalization' in 2019. She was awarded with prestigious 'Presidential Police Medal' (PPM) for her outstanding commitment to the service. At present, she is serving in UN Mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO) as Admin officer of BANFPU-1/14. She is married to Major Imtiaz Pervez & blessed with a daughter.

Secrets of Success: Reasons Behind Bangladesh's Accomplishment in United Nations Peace Operations

"We want peace everywhere in the world and support the effort to strengthen it."

...Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman

Colonel Shams Mohammad Mamun, psc

Introduction

Guided by its constitution and conscience, Bangladesh started the journey of United Nations (UN) peace operations in August 1988 with the deployment of 15 Army peacekeepers in the 'UN Iran Iraq Military Observer Group' (UNIMOG). Since then, Bangladesh has been playing an important role in promoting global peace under the 'blue helmet'. Later, Bangladesh Navy and Air Force joined the journey in 1993. The expedition was not smooth all the way through; rather there had been some spells of horror, uncertainty, and supreme sacrifices. But, resilient peacekeepers of Bangladesh evolved with the ever-increasing challenges caused by complicated conflict scenarios. Bangladesh is now one of the leading troops contributing countries (TCC) in UN peace operations for about last one decade.

The dedication and sacrifice of Bangladeshi peacekeepers are duly acknowledged by the UN and the global community. In an exclusive interview with the editor of Dhaka Tribune, United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres lauded Bangladeshi peacekeepers for their indispensable contribution to world peace. Guterres said: "The people of Bangladesh should be very proud of their women and men who serve the cause of peace in some of the world's most difficult places such as Darfur, Mali, and South Sudan. Each time we call on Bangladesh's support, the country responds."¹ In other occasion, the Secretary General mentioned: "Though Bangladesh has graduated from least developed country to developing country this year (2018), but they graduated in peacekeeping much before."² Bangladeshi Peacekeepers achieved the credentials of the 'role model' in global peacekeeping by displaying their professionalism, calm, impartiality, integrity, and humane attitude in their approach for UN missions mandate implementation.

This honour of being a leading TCC and the pride associated with the 'role model' tag indeed came at a cost of 159 brave souls who embraced martyrdom with their supreme sacrifices while 240 accepted major injuries. This often debated/discussed in the international arena, how Bangladesh is so successful in UN peace operations being a developing nation? Or, what makes them so motivated to serve so devotedly for global peace? What's the secret of their success? Contributing to global peace on a large scale and with such an efficiency level seems impossible for any developing nation. But, if studied in depth taking the history, culture, and socio-economic context of Bangladesh in

consideration, one may not find it that surprising. This article shall try to analyse and discuss those factors that significantly contributed Bangladeshi peacekeepers to be successful in UN peace operations in last 32 years. Few of them are constitutional guidance, supportive legislation, and political consensus for committing assets for global peace, economic emancipation, and utilization of well-trained Armed Forces with a built-in posture of 'Protecting People.'

Psychological Proximity to the Nature of Duty/Environment

History of Persecution: Bangladeshis, as a nation, were subjected to persecution and humiliation for decades prior to independence. During the liberation struggle in 1971, the nation further experienced an indescribable spell of horrors, which can be characterized by mass murder, displacement, torture, and abuse. These are also the common features of the environment where UN peace operations are planned. Who can better feel the pain of another nation/population in distress than a nation that went through the ordeal of systematic persecution? This instinctive and deeply embedded feeling has always been a great source of motivation for Bangladesh to ardently work for the distressed population and global peace.

Alike Socioeconomic Context: Some of the current UN peace operations, mostly in Africa, are planned and being executed in developing nations. The fundamental socioeconomic features of these countries are quite similar; problem over limited resources, corruption, poor functioning of local administrations, lack of good governance, strong external influence etc. Understanding the environment is the first step for the successful conduct of any stability operation. Bangladesh, being a developing country itself, either has previously faced or is currently facing similar difficulties. Hence, assessing the socio-economic context of the assigned environment and understanding common behavioural patterns of locals, and accordingly deciding on the action plans are relatively easier for our peacekeepers. Consequentially, this psychological edge helps them to perform better in mission mandate implementation.

The Outlook of Bangladeshi Peacekeepers: Protection of civilians (POC) is one of the most important mandates of UN peace operations. This is a delicate task for peacekeepers, if not complicated. This mandate implementation needs a humane approach, calmness, and acceptance from varied stakeholders; taking out the ego and power mongering from the equation completely. Culturally, the 'Social Face' of our Armed Forces is predominant over the 'Warrior Face'; protecting people is predominant over killing enemy.³ Such an outlook makes Bangladesh Armed Forces very suitable for UN peace operation. Bangladeshi peacekeepers are habitually motivated to protect people from the tyranny of evils. Hence, they are expected to act better in assignments like POC.

Supportive National Legislations and Political Consensus

Constitutional Obligation: Constitution gives a country the legitimacy for its actions, provides inspiration and guidance for its involvement in different affairs. The preamble to our constitution mentions, “We may prosper in freedom and may make our full contribution towards international peace and co-operation in keeping with the progressive aspirations of mankind.”⁴ It also remarks, “Support oppressed peoples throughout the world waging a just struggle against imperialism, colonialism or racialism.”⁵ So, the pledge for our contribution to global peace is indeed hallowed in the Constitution of Bangladesh. This constitutional direction has been the guiding principle and a motivational source for Bangladesh’s participation in UN peace operations.

Foreign Policy Guidelines: The Foreign Policy of Bangladesh emanates from article 25 of the Constitution. One of the four basic principles of our foreign policy is, “Friendship to all, malice towards none”. As a country, it believes in peaceful co-existence and ready to extend its hands for the cause of global peace. Bangladesh also desires to promote peace in the international arena, and hence it formulated “World Peace” as another basic principle of its foreign policy. It is also related to the national security and development of the country. There are various significances of these principles such as Bangladesh believes in peaceful cooperation, peaceful settlement of conflicts and peaceful changes in international arena.⁶ Due to these foreign policy principles, Bangladesh can easily decide and effectively contribute to the global peace with the UN mandate without much political or bureaucratic backlash. Such policy also supports the smooth preparation, liaison, and deployment of peacekeepers under the ‘blue helmet’ and their onward functioning.

Political Consensus: Bangladesh is a democratic country. Democracy in developing nations is usually chaotic. Changes in policies on a partisan basis to secure domestic gain are part and parcel in any democracy. Although major political parties in Bangladesh have their fundamental differences, the national policy for the commitment for global peace, mainly through the UN, has never been contested. Persistent with the constitution, contribution to the peaceful and constructive global need has always been a consistent part of the foreign policy of Bangladesh. So, we built this phenomenon of committing troops for global peace strength to strength without facing any major domestic policy backlash.⁷ Such political consensus helped the build-up of comprehensive systems for participation in UN missions, simplified associated upkeep, and appropriate funding.

Necessity to Secure National Interest and Pride

Projection of the National Intent and Strength: In international politics, ‘there are no permanent friends and no permanent enemies; there are only permanent interests.’⁸ It is all about adding value to a country’s worth and

Figure 1: Factors Contributing to Successful Conduct of UN Peace Operations



Source: Conceptual construct by the author

projecting the strength to bargain for securing its own national interest. To remain as a credible and useful member of the world community, each country needs to offer something on the table. Bangladesh has decided to project its strong willingness to contribute in global peace by committing its well-trained Armed Forces under the 'blue helmet'. It offers that intent as its strength to promote global peace by contributing troops to the UN peace operations. In exchange, it desires a respectful place in the global map and support from the international community to protect own national interest.⁹ Such intent obliges the country and its peacekeepers to commit their best in UN peace operations.

Economic Emancipation: Bangladesh has moved to a low-middle income developing country club in July 2015 with a gross national income per capita of \$1,314. Despite considerable economic progress over the last two and a half decades, Bangladesh still struggles to cope with a very high population density and limited economic resources. This encourages the government to look for economic opportunities abroad.¹⁰ Contribution for UN peace operations through committing troops offers some economic compliments to our economy. Although not a very befitting or fundamental source of inflating the foreign currency reserve, there is no denying fact that peacekeepers do fetch economic benefits to the organization and the country.


Dedicated and Comprehensive System

Over the period of our involvement in UN peace operations, Bangladesh has developed a comprehensive system to communicate with the UN and respond to the UN request for peacekeepers. In the UN Headquarters (UNHQ) at New York, Bangladesh has a permanent mission (PMBNY)¹¹ with dedicated defence attaché (DA) for looking after UN matters. At the Governmental level,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Armed Forces Division (AFD) deal with the memorandum of understanding (MOU), various negotiations, policy formulation and related decision making.¹²

At the service level, all three services of Bangladesh Armed Forces have dedicated directorates to deal with UN matters, mainly for selection, organization, training, and evaluation of UN peacekeepers. Overseas Operations (OO) Directorate at Army HQ, Directorate of Overseas Naval Operations (DONO) at Naval HQ, and Overseas Air Operation Directorate (OAOD) at Air HQ deal with UN peace operations. Each service has already introduced detailed guidelines and laid out procedures for selecting appropriate personnel, equipping the contingents, and fulfilling logistical requirements. Besides, the prescribed standard of the contingent is ensured through inspections and conducting efficiency tests at the formation level. Dedicated organizations, their professional functioning, and elaborate procedures for supply-chain management are some influencing factors for the better functioning of our Bangladeshi peacekeepers.

Figure 2: Comprehensive System for dealing UN Peace Operation



Source: Conceptual Construction by the author

Well Trained and Professional Armed Forces

Bangladesh Armed Forces have already established themselves as 'professionals' with their dedicated performances in joint/multinational training and exercises and disaster management duties both at home and abroad. Overall, our Armed Forces are well trained with an effective and comprehensive training system. 'Train hard, fight easy' has been the motto of our training system since independence. Our officers fetched good honours for the organization and the country while attending various training courses and performing staff responsibilities across the globe. Almost three decades of

experience and sacrifice in UN peace operations significantly improved the proficiency level of our Armed Forces, especially in UN mission mandates implementation.¹³

Institutional Capacity Building Programme: UN peace operations, low-intensity operations, and stability operations are taught or discussed in almost all institutional training courses of our Armed Forces, in varied forms based on the level of the target audience. It builds a generic capacity amongst all members of the Armed Forces to operate under the 'blue helmet'. Besides, Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training (BIPSOT) is a prestigious training institution, which is dedicated to train the peacekeepers for their employment in all types of UN peace operations. Its mission is to impart specialized multifaceted training to national and multinational military, police, and civilian participants on peace operations per current international standards through research, education, and professional programmes. This institute fulfils the requirement of United Nations Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO)¹⁴ as per General Assembly resolution, which outlines 'the necessity and responsibility of every nation to train their armed forces before any deployment.'¹⁵ BIPSOT conducts as many as 20 different training courses for national and international peacekeepers irrespective of their roles and responsibilities. This institution also conducts various national, regional, and multinational seminars, workshops, and exercises for the capacity building of the potential peacekeepers. These institutional trainings have tremendous contributions in showcasing befitting performances during mission deployment.

Learning Organization: Excellence cannot be achieved only by organizing, training, and following instructions. Improvisation and learning from mistakes are also important to become proficient in any job. During this journey for three decades in the pursuit of global peace, Bangladesh had to negotiate some spells of disappointment. It never denied its limitations or the part of the play in those discontents, if any. Rather, it quickly learnt from those mistakes, conducted the need assessment and designed programmes to deny repetitions of those. That's how our peacekeepers have grown more matured and efficient in the UN peace operations.

Early Pledge for Participation: UN has worked out with member states a new arrangement called the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS). Through the PCRS, member states can pledge to have specific units available for UN peacekeeping. Far in advance of a possible deployment, the UN Secretariat performs an assessment of the readiness of the personnel, training, and equipment of those units. Select units can also be pledged to the Rapid Deployment Level (RDL) of the PCRS. When placed so, a unit can be made available within 60 days of a request from the UN Secretary-General. This system helped reduce the deployment timelines of military forces for mission start-ups.¹⁶ Bangladesh Armed Forces have placed total of 20 various

types of units under PCRS¹⁷ to cover almost all possible types of UN deployments. The list includes Infantry Battalion, Quick Reaction Force (QRF), Signal and Communication Unit, Engineer Company, Military Police Unit, Field Hospital, Maritime Units, Naval Special Force Unit, Utility Helicopter Unit, etc. Early placement of units in PCRS obligates the national system to earmark, prepare and train the pledged unit for quick deployment. The system guarantees efficient preparation and better performance as well as deny haste and ad-hoc arrangement before deployment.

Evolution with the Changing Requirements of UN

The environment of UN peace operations changes perpetually with the time. Especially in the last two decades, the situation worsened and became more complicated. In '90s UN Mission was launched where two contesting parties agreed to peace and the UN was to act as a neutral actor and mediate to keep the peace. Today UN Mission is launched in areas where there is 'No Peace to Keep.'¹⁸ With the changes in the environment, UN needed to change its mandate for peace operations. Over the years, UN mandates altered from peacekeeping to peacemaking and from peacemaking to peace enforcements. Now there are environments where peacekeepers are committed almost in counter-terrorism role (i.e. UN peace operations in Mali - MINUSMA). Security issues in some areas of deployment are no longer contained locally, rather have globalized consequences with their fluid and volatile nature. Peacekeepers had to transform their posture from friendly to offensive to quell those volatile situations at times. Establishments related to UN peace operations, once considered as safe heavens, are tremendously threatened now. Receiving mortal shells in UN camps and IED attacks on UN convoys along supply routes are now considered expected ingredients of the environment. If analyzed the condition deeply, that's a hell of a change in the operational environment. No peacekeeping force can simply survive, let alone flourish and shine, without required evolution in such ever-changing environments. Bangladesh recognized those changes and took timely efforts to evolve with the situation to remain effective in mission mandate implementation.

Adapting to changing security scenario is easier said than done. It obligates upgrading the 'Force Posture' (to include organization, equipment, training) of the peacekeepers which needs perspective planning, time, and resources. Management of all these, pose serious challenges for a developing nation like us. With the aggravated security situation, casualty numbers have increased in manifolds. Maintaining sharp motivation amongst the peacekeepers in the face of life-death scenario is another challenge added in recent UN peace operations. Besides, mission creep, the existence of parallel authority beyond local government and UN, lack of strong intent, etc. sometimes add more misery to the peacekeepers. However, Bangladesh took

bold measures, whenever necessary, to overcome the challenges posed by the volatile security environment. It pledged, planned, and executed necessary evolution needed to remain effective in peacekeeping operations. UN Secretary General recognized our effort by saying: 'I want to specially highlight the impressive willingness of Bangladesh to adapt and contribute to the new needs of peacekeeping. We are adapting our missions to the challenging environment in which they are deployed. We need new capacities, new methods, more technology, and better information.'¹⁹

Bangladesh has systematically equipped its contingents to meet the UN's current and emerging requirements. Due consideration is given to cope up with the advancement of technology. It has equipped the contingent in Mali (MINUSMA) with Mine-Resistant and Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) at their own cost. Efforts are also underway to deploy night operation capable helicopters, Unarmed Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Improvised Explosives Device (IED), Jammers and advance transport aircraft. Bangladeshi contingents deployed in UN Mission are instructed to be pro-active instead of being reactive and put special emphasis on 'Force Protection'. Arrangements are also made to facilitate gathering intelligence for effective deployment. Units are made agile and robust to protect civilians and to facilitate humanitarian assistance in the mission area. Infantry troops are organised and equipped as self-reliant, capable of conducting a broad spectrum of operations.²⁰ These efforts are taken to ensure an effective edge over potential threats in the mission area. However, this evolution and development is a continuous process.

Besides, Bangladesh has already restructured the training system according to the need of UN to upgrade the efficiency level of her peacekeepers. Mission specific training lessons have been incorporated in the syllabus according to the mission mandate. Subjects like Protection of Civilians, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), peacekeepers' conduct and discipline, robust peacekeeping, and language skill are given special emphasis.²¹

Bangladesh has always been very keen to adhere to the requirements and policies laid down by the UN. Few of the examples are initiatives in adopting UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 for Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), preparation of National Action Plan on WPS following UNSCR 1325, signing of Voluntary Compact, Contribution to the UN Peacebuilding Fund and SEA Victim Support Fund, Implementation of the aspects of Cruz Report and increased participation of female peacekeepers. Here, it is worth mentioning that Bangladesh has fulfilled the UN target of deploying 16% of female SO/UNMO in the UN Missions. Currently, 284 female peacekeepers are participating in UN mission. Besides, Bangladesh has already deployed two female helicopter pilots and a female community engagement team of platoon strength in DR Congo. The inclusion of such female engagement team with all major units will continue in future deployment as well.²²

Implementation of the Recommendations of 'Cruz Report' and 'A4P' Initiative

In 2017, Brazilian Lieutenant General Santos Cruz, who was former UN Force Commander in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Congo (MONUSCO), was requested to conduct a broader strategic review of peacekeeping missions with a special focus on the adaption of UN peacekeepers with the changing nature of the conflict. The main objective of the report was to improve the peacekeepers' security by reducing fatalities in the mission area. In that report, he identified four broad areas where UNDP and member states shall work out meticulously.²³ Important problem areas identified in the report were: lacking in pre-deployment and in-mission training, poor intelligence gathering, disproportionate defensive posture of the peacekeepers, leniency in the selection procedure of the contingent members, lack of medical capability. This is worth mentioning that Bangladesh took the report seriously and addressed most of the problem areas as quickly as possible.

Figure 3: Core Issues of Cruz Report



Source: Cruz Report - 'Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers' ²⁴

In 2018, UN Secretary General (SG) issued his 'Action for Peacekeeping' (A4P) initiative where most of the recommendations of Cruz report were taken into considerations. The main aim of this initiative was to guide the related stakeholders to strengthen the peacekeeping efforts by focusing on eight broad target areas. A4P initiatives refocused peacekeeping with more targeted mandates, make PKO stronger and safer, mobilize support for political solutions, and better equipped and trained forces.²⁵ Bangladesh Armed Forces scrutinized, redesigned, and restructured the selection, training, and evaluation system to address the focus areas of A4P initiative and Cruz report recommendations. Implementation of recommended actions is another enabler for Bangladeshi peacekeepers to better perform in today's changing environment.

Conclusion

‘Success’ and ‘dedication’ are the two words that can summarize Bangladesh Armed Forces’ involvement in UN peace operations. These three decades long expedition was challenging, but it was worth fighting for. It has fetched honour, recognition, and economic emancipation to this developing nation. Peacekeepers, through their valour and sacrifices, promulgated the worthiness and potential of Bangladesh Armed Forces to the global community. Their actions successfully transmitted our strong national intent for contributing in global peace. When the peacekeepers are the most pivotal and tangible force for orchestrating this success, there are other factors that significantly contributed to their performances. Constitutional guidance with conforming foreign policy and broad political consensus for committing troops for global peace had been the key factors for this successful journey.

Strong motivation plays an important role not only to be successful in any assignment but also to sustain that success over a long period. Although a daunting task, Bangladesh could successfully keep its peacekeepers motivated for the last three decades to relentlessly pursue the excellence in UN mission mandate implementation. Strong national intent to project its strength and goodwill in the international arena has been a key motivational factor. The economic interest of the nation was and still is a driving force too, although arguably not a major factor. A well trained and professional Armed Forces ready to serve the nation and the global cause has also inspired the nation to embark on a challenging task like UN peace operation in a foreign soil. Harnessing the national pride and intent deep inside the heart, Armed Forces personnel also dedicated their wholehearted efforts for global peace. Their success came at a cost, sometimes at the cost of valuable lives and numerous discomforts.

One of the most significant factors for Bangladeshi peacekeepers’ achievement in UN peace operation is the continuous evolution with the changing requirements and environment. In the last two decades, the operational environment in the mission area went through a radical transformation. The contexts of the conflict and UN force deployment became more complicated and volatile. Consequentially, the casualty of peacekeepers spiked in manifolds. Hence, the UN needed to change the mandate specific to the security scenario, which in turn necessitated the fundamental change in peacekeepers’ posture. Cruz report and SG’s A4I initiative called for the actions by the member states needed to address the aggravated security situation. Bangladesh evolved its peacekeepers accordingly to materialize the new requirements set by the UN and continue to be effective in the UN peace operations. With the solid motivation of the peacekeepers, strong national intent supported by the constitution and foreign policy, and the correct attitude to evolve with the requirement, Bangladesh is presently one of the best performers in the UN peace operations. The nation and its peacekeepers are dedicated to maintain the standard and shine even brighter in coming days.

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Brief Biography



Colonel Shams Mohammad Mamun, psc was commissioned in 1996 with 35 BMA Long Course in the corps of Infantry. He is a graduate from Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC), as well as from U.S. Army Command General and Staff College (CGSC) in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA. He also attended 'Strategic Management Course' under Cranfield University, United Kingdom, 'National Authority and Chemical Database (NACD)' Course under University of Helsinki, Finland and 'Infantry Officers Weapons Course' from Infantry School, India. Colonel Shams holds master degrees in Military Science and Business Administration and received the 'Chancellor's Award' for later. He Commanded 22nd Bangladesh Infantry Regiment both in hills and plains. In instructional capabilities, he served as an instructor of Tactics Wing in School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T) and as a Directing Staff (DS) in Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC). His prominent staff appointments include Deputy Assistant Military Secretary -1 (DAMS-1) in the Army Headquarters and General Staff Officer -1 (GSO-1) and Colonel Staff in the Armed Forces Division (AFD). At present, he is serving as the Senior Instructor in DSCSC.

The Reform of the United Nations ‘Peace and Security Pillars’: Implications on Bangladesh

Brigadier General Md Aftab Hossain, BSP, ndc, afwc, psc, M Phil

Introduction

Reform is one of the most useful tools to make an institution effective to achieve its objectives. The same has been observed in case of United Nations (UN) also especially in the field of peacekeeping efforts for world peace and stability. The realization for cooperation of different nations as instrument to settle crises peacefully was a precious lesson for the mankind. Therefore, after the sufferings of the humanity, as a follow-up of the World War I, the League of Nations was established in 1920 with a view to have a peaceful world. Following this phenomenon, after World War-II, the UN was founded on the 24 October 1945 with a motto ‘to maintain world peace’ on the principle that the nations of the world can and should cooperate to resolve conflicts peacefully.¹ Thus, the ‘United Nations’ has basically replaced the ‘League of Nations’ through the ratification of the Charter with a view to make the world a safer place for people’s living.² The context clearly indicates necessity of reforming/rearranging the organizations and stakeholders for the purpose of finding the most effective ways for world peace, security and stability. Following the phenomena, recently the UN ‘Peace and Security Pillars’ – involved in designing and implementing UN peace effort, has been restructured. The purpose of this restructuring is to address the changing nature of global security environment vis-a-viz the evolving nature of the UN missions.

Bangladesh is a leading troops and police contributing country (T/PCC) of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) and at present contributing about 8% of the globally deployed peacekeepers.³ The contribution of Bangladesh in the field of world peace and stability has multifaceted positive implications and has been always applauded by the international communities. Therefore, being one of the leading T/PCCs, it is of paramount importance for Bangladesh to understand the aim, objectives and purpose of rearranging/restructuring of the ‘Peace and Security Pillars’ of relevant departments and its implications on Bangladesh to continue her leading role in the field of UN peacekeeping.


A plethora of literatures are reviewed on the UN reform and restructuring of its ‘Peace and Security Pillars’. It has been identified that the relevant literatures have discussed the context and requirement of the reform but have not highlighted its implications for the leading T/PCCs like Bangladesh. Therefore, in this research an endeavour has been made to discuss the salient aspects of restructuring and monitoring arrangement of the UN missions

along with its implications on the appropriate approach of Bangladesh towards the UN peace efforts. In the process, the contribution of Bangladesh in the UNPKOs for maintaining world peace and stability has been also discussed.

The Spectrum of the UN Peace Activities and Its Evolving Nature

Range of Peace Related Activities under the UN Umbrella: The UN takes initiative that includes different steps and activities to ensure security and maintaining peace and stability of the world. As the first step it may be the preventive diplomacy which seeks to resolve the disputes before violence can break out. Normally, in the next steps peace-making and peacekeeping initiatives are taken by the UN as those are required to halt the conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. Successful conduct of them reinforces the opportunities for post-conflict peacebuilding activities which are essential to prevent the recurrence of violence among the people and warriors parties. All these actions are taken mostly simultaneously and sometimes sequentially so that those comprehensively contribute in securing peace in the spirit of the UN Charter. Therefore, the UN peace process is not limited to one type of activity rather it covers a wide range of activities. More importantly, those activities rarely occur in a linear or sequential way rather from the previous experience it is observed that to make them mutually reinforcing those activities should occur whenever situation on ground demands. In this regard, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) António Guterres stated “We must work better together across the peace continuum, focusing on all the dimensions of conflict” (UN Peacebuilding, 2018).⁴ Therefore, boundaries among peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacebuilding and other element of peace process are not distinct rather blurred as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: ‘Linkages and Overlapping Areas’ in the UN Peace Operations



Source: United Nations, Capstone Doctrine, 2008 ⁵

Changing Trends of the UNPKOs: The UN Security Council (UNSC) is entrusted with the responsibility of peace, security and stability of the world. But just after the World War II, in many of the occasions UNSC used to become ineffective due to the Cold War rivalries. Therefore, in 1948, the first UN mission started in the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Since 1948, the 72 years of journey through 70 UNPKOs has shown that UN peacekeeping is an evolving undertaking and it has been observed that with the end of Cold War era, the security environment of the world has changed. Consequently the strategic context of the UNPKOs has also changed dramatically. In response, the UNPKOs also have transformed from 'traditional' to 'multidimensional' missions as a comprehensive approach for sustainable peace. The studies have shown that the new threats like violence, extremism, organized crime etc. have increased significantly. In addition, there is record number of refugees including Internally Displaced People in different troublesome spots of the world.⁶ The situation is directly impacting international security environment and increasing instability of the world. It has generated discussions about reform of the UN, particularly regarding the deployment and management of its peace operations. The nature of conflicts is changing with the course of time and the UN needs to adapt accordingly. After World War II, the UN peacekeeping had to cope with a few potentials and immediate interstate wars/crisis. However, since 1970 the UNPKOs have focused primarily on intrastate civil wars involving rebel groups and government.⁷ With the changing nature of conflict, the UNPKOs had to gradually transform from traditional monitoring/observer missions to multidirectional peacekeeping that includes peacebuilding, and in some cases peace enforcement before that. Therefore, the strategic framework for peace operations and political missions is changing and it was also identified that the future conflicts are becoming even more complicated as it would be dealing with intra-state affairs.⁸ The crisis issues involve ethnic groups, non-state actors and giving rise to issues of state failures. Therefore, the UNPKOs are much more challenging nowadays as the UN peacekeepers are dealing with the conflicts and trying to establish peace in the different troublesome parts of the world.

Focus on Peacebuilding Tasks: Deployed peacekeepers are now increasingly asked to perform variety of complex tasks in the mission areas. Those tasks include monitoring human rights, reforming security sector, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of the former combatants, build sustainable capacity etc. In all the current missions peacebuilding efforts are predominant with ultimate aim of sustainable peace. Therefore, to substantiate the peacebuilding effort numbers of special political missions are on-going around the world.

Special Political Missions: Though most of the T/PCCs are more focused about the missions conducted by Department of Peace Operations

(DPO), however, at present there are about 25 missions which are administered by the 'Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)'.⁹ These missions conduct activities through good offices, conflict prevention, peace-making and peacebuilding. As those missions normally involve very less or no military personnel, it remains out of the sight of most of the T/PCCs. DPPA engages around the world and plays a central role in peace and stability. It focuses primarily in conflict prevention, peace-making and post-conflict peacebuilding for sustaining peace by enhancing partnerships. DPPA aims to perform the tasks by ensuring sound analysis and early warning to manage political crises and violent conflicts. Therefore, from the UN platform, one of the significant tasks of DPPA is to assess the global political developments focusing to identify the potential crises before they can erupt. Side-by-side they focus on devising the effective responses mechanism needed to be taken by the international communities. The most important and critical analyses the UN does is whether there is a requirement to conduct peacekeeping operations in the process of the UN peace effort. Notwithstanding the fact that DPO and DPPA are two separate departments but their responsibilities are closely entwined for peace, security and stability of the world. Therefore, the restructuring of the UN Peace and Security Pillars has basically focused on integrated approach of the different organs of the UN for a sustainable peace.

Reform of the UN Peacekeeping Affairs

Brahimi Report, 2000:¹⁰ To cope up with the changing pattern of conflict and evolving challenges of peacekeeping, there were few landmark reforms and the 'Brahimi Report' in 2000 was the first of this nature. Responding to the failures in mid 1990s on the part of the UN, a high-level panel was convened by the former UNSG Mr. Kofi Annan in 2000 to reform the UN organs related to the UNPKOs. The panel was chaired by the former Algerian Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi and under his close supervision the study was conducted for four months. Thereafter, Brahimi Report 2000 was published addressing many of the resulting dysfunctions of the UNPKOs. It contained huge concrete recommendations and many of those were implemented to improve the peacekeeping related activities and its outcome. The recommendations of the report tackled many of issues and dilemmas and set down the principles that remain central to the modern peacekeeping affairs. According to the recommendations the number of headquarters staffs in the UN Secretariat was increased of to support the field missions. The Peacekeeping Best Practice Unit (PBPB) was also established to analyze the lessons learned from previous experience. Following the report, the field missions had scopes to get clear and realistic and implementable mandate from UNSC. Implementation of those recommendations has significantly improved the managements of the UNPKOs. The UN missions became more multidimensional and integrated,

incorporating the issues of human rights, humanitarian assistance, and rules of law etc. including security of the peacekeepers. Thus the Brahimi Report is considered as a milestone to revival of the UN peacekeeping effort.

The ‘High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)’

Report 2015: With a view to make the UN peace effort more effective, the former UNSG Ban Ki-moon convened HIPPO in 2014 to conduct a thorough analysis of the current UNPKOs to find the emerging needs of the future. A 16 member’s panel, chaired by former President of Timor-Leste and Nobel Laureate Jose Ramos-Horta supervised the study. After a thorough analysis, the panel issued a comprehensive review of the UNPKOs and submitted the report titled “Uniting our Strength for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People”. Outcome of the analysis endorsed in ‘the HIPPO Report -2015’ has highlighted the requirement of essential shifts in four aspects while conducting UN missions.¹¹ Firstly, the report emphasises on the involvement of politics intimately for the design, execution and implementation of the UNPKOs. Secondly, attention is drawn to utilise the full spectrum of peace operations based on the changing scenario on ground rather than following the prototype one. Thirdly, it reiterated the importance of partnership among the UN, host nations, T/PCCs, finance contributors and other stakeholders for peace and stability of the world. Fourthly, the HIPPO Report has brought two very essential functional aspects of effective peace efforts i.e. the UN Secretariat should be more field oriented and side-by-side the UNPKOs should be more people centric rather than political leader centric only.¹² The HIPPO Report also suggested embracing a more pragmatic term i.e. ‘peace operations’ to express the variety of responses required for successful UN peace process. This may also assist in continuity of response and smoother transition of phases in the UN of missions.¹³ According to Druch, W. (2016) the report contains at least 125 separately listed recommendations including all sub-recommendations for each one. This landmark report is considered to be an effective tool to make the UN peace effort more efficient. The most important part of this report is empowering the T/PCCs as partner of peace where Bangladesh can contribute more in managing peace and stability of the world through its enhancement on the UNPKOs.

The Cruz Report 2017: The UN peacekeeping was experiencing persistent elevated rate of casualties of peacekeepers in recent days since 2013. The UNPKOs suffered 56 fatalities due to the violent act in 2017 and that was highest casualties after 1994.¹⁵ To respond the issue, an experienced former Force Commander of two UN missions was assigned by the UNSG to study for improvement of security issues of the peacekeepers. The report titled “Improving security of UN Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business” known as ‘Cruz Report’ was published in 2017.¹⁶ Outcome of the report has focused on to change the way the UN manages missions and peacekeepers conduct operations in high-risk environments where most of the

UN peacekeepers are operating. The study reveals that the security environment is now featured with actions of armed groups, terrorists' activities, organized crime, political exploitation etc. To overcome those and increase security, the report has recommended actions need to be taken by the member states in preparing the peacekeepers through pre-deployment training, appropriate action by the peacekeepers while conducting operations including appropriate actions of the UN Secretariat and the mission headquarters.

The Recent Restructuring of the UN 'Peace and Security Pillars'


Brief History of the Restructure: The reforms to consolidate and professionalize political and peacekeeping structures and staffing in the UN system started back in 1992. The first step was creation of two departments in the UN Secretariat by the then UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali to have focus on world peace and stability. One was Department of Political Affairs (DPA) that used to monitor global political development and the other one was Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) which was the custodian of world peace and security. Thereafter, the Peacebuilding Architecture was created in 2005 to enhance peacebuilding activities to ensure sustainable peace. Side-by-side, to improve the aspects of logistic support functions, another department i.e. Department of Field Support (DFS) was established to separate logistic support activities from operational activities of DPKO in 2007. Subsequently, with the initiative of former UNSG Kofi Annan, Brahimi report - 2000 was published which has restructured DPKO and made it more effective for directing and managing the UNPKOs.

Recent Restructuring from the 1 January 2019: The evolving nature of the UNPKOs necessitated the reform of the UN Secretariat to cope up with the on-going peace efforts. With a view of prioritising prevention and sustaining peace and to provide better service, the UN General Assembly passed resolution to reform UN 'Peace and Security Pillars'. Under this reform, from the 1 January 2019, DPKO, DPA, PBSO and DFS were reformed and turned into new departments. DPKO is renamed as Department of Peace Operations while the Department of Political Affairs and the Peacebuilding Support Office have combined together and came up as Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA). Goal of this reform was to enhance the effectiveness and coherence of the UNPKOs and Special Political Missions from a single integrated Peace and Security Pillars.¹⁷ Now these two new departments share a single regional political-operational structure which performs the responsibility of management of political issues and operational activities related to peace, stability and security under a single Assistant Secretary General (ASG) – a high-ranking UN leadership. This ASG is responsible to both the Under Secretary General (USG) of DPO and DPPA. DPO is responsible for directing and supporting the UNPKOs to prevent, respond and manage conflicts. On the other hand, the DPPA is in charge of the strategic, political, and

operational affairs along with peacebuilding responsibilities to all the political missions. DPO concentrates on conflict management with a view to facilitating implementation of political agreement and provides integrated strategic and political advice. On the other hand, DPPA manages more holistic approach and engagement across the conflict continuum i.e. to ensure conflict prevention, electoral assistance, peacebuilding, sustaining peace and so on. The responsibilities of the two departments are inextricably interrelated and overlap for smooth peace process. Therefore, the two departments work together as a team to ensure coherence of the political-operational structure, particularly in relation to countries and regions. To ensure coherence and consistency there are seven shared services between DPO and DPPA at the headquarters level management, administration and strategic communication. New arrangement of the 'Peace and Security Pillars' is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: An Organogram Depicting the New UN 'Peace and Security Pillars' Structure

(Two new departments with a 'whole-of-pillar' approach and a single regional structure)



Source: Reconstructed by the Author with information from UN DPO Website, 2021 available at <https://reform.un.org/news/peace-and-security-pillar>¹⁸

The central purpose of this restructuring is to focus on effective conflict prevention and sustaining peace under single security architecture. Along with the restructuring of two departments: DPO and DPPA, the Department of Field Support (DFS) was also renamed as Department of Operational Support (DOS). It's worth mentioning that DFS was responsible to provide logistic support to all the UNPKOs, SPMs and other Secretariat entities. The

contingents deployed in the UN missions need to depend on DOS for logistic support including transportation during deployment and repatriation. Significant change, of this restructuring is shown in the Table 1.

Table 1: Significant Changes of the UN ‘Peace and Security Pillars’

Old/Former Department	New Department	Responsibilities
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)	Department of Peace Operations (DOS)	UN peacekeeping operations and peace and security
1. Department of Political Affairs (DPA) 2. Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)	Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)	SPMs and peacebuilding activities
Department of Field Support (DFS)	Department of Operational Support (DOS)	Provide logistic and budgetary support to the UNPKOs and SPMs

Source: Evaluated by the author

In addition to those changes, for the smooth conduct of the operations there are seven share services led by directors for coordination and to ensure coherence and consistency at the UN headquarters level. The restructuring of different departments closely involved with the UNPKOs clearly indicates the necessity to coup with the evolving nature of UNPKOs. The most important aspect of the restructuring is indicating the close coordination between Peacekeeping missions and Special Political missions. Therefore, there is necessity to rethink restructurer or at least rearrange the approach of coordination at the end of Bangladesh also to be more focused and well connected with the UN about all affairs of the UN peacekeeping affairs. It is also necessary to understand the implications of the restructuring on the part of Bangladesh.

Implications of the Recent Restructure of the UN Peacekeeping Affairs on Bangladesh

Contribution of Bangladesh for the UNPKOs and Emerging as Leading T/PCCs: To understand the implications it is very important to know about the extent and the trends of contribution of Bangladesh for world peace and stability. Bangladesh has started its journey to blue helmet in 1988. Since then the UN has commissioned 58 UNPKOs and amongst those, Bangladesh has participated in the 54 UNPKOs in 40 countries which is a remarkable contribution for the world peace and stability.¹⁹ Thereby, Bangladesh has emerged as leading T/PCCs of the UN since 2000 and maintained her leading position for last 20 years. In last 33 years, Bangladesh has contributed about 600 various types of contingents in different missions and about 1,76,669 Bangladeshi peacekeepers have participated there.²⁰ However, for the achievement of Bangladesh in the fields of UNPKOs so far 151 valiant

peacekeepers of Bangladesh have laid their life for the cause of world peace. In addition, 240 peacekeepers have sustained injury while serving in UNPKOs. At the moment, Bangladesh is the top most T/PCCs and has deployed 30 contingents/ units with 6,608 deployed peacekeepers (including 301 female peacekeepers) in eight different UN missions. Details of the participations of Bangladesh in current and completed missions (represented by blue and green colour respectively) are at Figure 3.

Figure 3: Current and Completed Deployment of Bangladesh in Different Countries



Source: Prepared by the author with data from Armed Forces Division (AFD) and UN Department of Peace Operations Website²¹

In addition, Bangladesh is also a registered member of UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS). It implies that Bangladesh has quick deployment capabilities to deploy contingents within 30-90 days in case of any urgent requirement of the UN to a new or existing missions. Bangladesh was the first T/PCCs to deploy contingents to UN missions from this standby arrangement system in 2017 and already has deployed several contingents to different missions under the PCRS arrangement.

Understanding the Agenda of the Recent Restructuring: To understand the focus of recent restructuring of the UN 'Peace and Security Pillars', it is necessary to know about the context and background of it. The last 72 years' experience reveals that the UN peacekeeping faces several challenges which results its inability to deliver on the mission mandates. It happened due to the absence of political solution, improper priorities and also lack of commitment of all the stakeholders in the fields. Therefore, ultimate aim of sustainable peace had many missing links among the different stakeholders working for the same purpose in the same context. As a result, a coherent effort seemed missing especially between the UN Secretariat and field level entities to achieve an enhanced result. To respond those challenges, in 2018 the

present UNSG has launched the “Action for Peacekeeping (A4P)” initiative to the UNSC meeting on ‘Collective Action to Improve United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’. The agenda for A4P focused on sustainable peace through implementation of goals that has emphasised commitment on eight priority areas. Details of those priority commitment areas where more attention are expected are shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Eight Priority Commitment Areas of Action for Peacekeeping




Source: United Nations Peacekeeping, 2021. Action for Peacekeeping. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/what-is-a4p.pdf> ²²

It is understandable that neither the ‘peacekeeping operations’ nor the ‘peacebuilding activities’ alone can ensure sustainable peace for the war-torn nations. Therefore, for a sustainable peace, at the UN end integration of employment of the military, police and civilian components and other stakeholders is essential to succeed. Similarly, at the T/PCCs’ end alongside the military and police component, the civilian component should also contribute and participate in UN peace effort. Therefore, at Bangladesh’s end a holistic approach through diplomatic initiatives under political umbrella is required.

Requirement of Integrated Approach of Bangladesh for the UNPKOs: Experience has shown that Bangladesh's troops' contribution centred to the peacekeeping phase of the UN peace effort. However, the UN peace process is a holistic and integrated approach that involves military, police, civilian and other stakeholders for sustainable peace. Normally it starts with conflict prevention/preventive diplomacy and culminates with the peacebuilding effort for preventing relapse into conflict again. The different elements of the UN peace process is shown in the Figure 1 and already has been mentioned that it does not follow the sequential format, rather often overlaps with other phases. Therefore, focus of Bangladesh to a particular phase (especially in peacekeeping phase) only may not adequately portray her real contribution for the peace and stability of the world. The existing policy of Bangladesh does not restrict contribution to different phases of the UN peace efforts but at the same time nothing specifically mentioned to take more initiative for contributing to conflict prevention and peace-making which normally takes place before peacekeeping phase. The Article 25 (1) of the Constitution of Bangladesh regarding promotion of the international peace and solidarity, support Bangladesh's initiative for world peace and stability.²³ It clearly stated "...support the oppressed peoples throughout the world waging a just struggle against imperialism, colonialism or racialism".²⁴ Therefore, Bangladesh has constitutional commitment to deploy her Armed Forces, Police and other components for establishing and maintaining peace, security and stability of the world. Alongside, diplomatic effort of Bangladesh should be followed to have a concerted effort for creating positive impact in the field of international peace. Therefore, a blend of contribution by Bangladesh Armed Forces and Police for the UNPKOs and diplomatic initiative by Ministry of Foreign Affairs is required to excel in the UN peace effort. It can be directly linked to the rearrangement/restructuring of the UN 'Peace and Security Pillars' where the DPO (former DPKO) and DPPA (former DPA and PBSO) are brought under one single structure for more effective output and intense results with more coherence. It is well understood that for a sustainable peace of any conflict, DPO and DPPA need to work side-by-side. Similarly, Bangladesh may have coordinated arrangement among different stakeholders within the country for a more integrated approach. Though Bangladesh Armed Forces and Police have their own established coordination arrangements but for the integration of civilian components a coordination cell at national level maybe established as shown in the Figure 5.

Figure 5: Peace Operations Coordination Cell (POCC)



Source: Author's self-constructed

Conclusion

The UNPKOs is one of the focused areas of the UN and it proved to be the most effective instrument for establishing peace and stability of the world. Bangladesh has started her journey to the UNPKOs in 1988 and has emerged as leading T/PCCs by contributing about 600 contingents/units in the UNPKOs so far. At present she is contributing 6,608 personnel which are about 8% of the total globally deployed UN peacekeepers. The contribution of Bangladesh in the UNPKOs always has been applauded by the international communities. The UN 'Peace and Security Pillars' have been reformed time to time to cope-up with the evolving nature of the UNPKOs. The Brahimi report 2000, the HIPPO report 2015, the Cruz report 2017 etc. are some of the instrumental documents that have contributed significantly to the reform the peacekeeping affairs of the UN. The reform/restructure at the headquarters' level takes place based on the precious lessons of the best practice over the period of time. However, the T/PCCs sometimes remain less aware about the context and purpose of the reform at UN Secretariat level. It is observed that there remains a gap amongst understanding at headquarters level and field level. Therefore, it is very important for the T/PCCs, especially the leading troop's contributors like Bangladesh to understand the context appropriately and rearrange the internal mechanism to support the UN peace effort. Recently, UN 'Peace and Security Pillars' have been restructured with the centre purpose to focus on effective conflict prevention and sustaining peace under single security architecture. The former DPKO has been renamed as DPO and former DPA

and PBSO have combined together as DPPA. Bangladesh being a leading T/PCC may study the salient aspects of the recent restructure at the end of UN 'Peace and Security Pillars'. Accordingly it may be necessary for Bangladesh to rearrange the internal coordination and mechanism to support UN peace effort appropriately through integrated approach of military, police and civilian component. It is very important to note that diplomatic initiative of Bangladesh is required for UN partnership in the field of peacekeeping to maintain her leading role through contributions in the UNPKOs and keep the already earned positive image thriving around the world.

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Brief Biography



Brigadier General Md Aftab Hossain, BSP, ndc, afwc, psc, M Phil is serving in Bangladesh Army for 28 years. He is a graduate from Defence Service Command and Staff College and National Defence College. He served in different infantry regiments and served as Staff Officer of Bridge, Division and Army Headquarters. He has commanded 1st Bangladesh Infantry Regiment and 72 Infantry Brigade. In the field of peacekeeping, he has served as Planning Officer of DPKO in UN Secretariat, New York, Adjutant in UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone and Colonel Staff of Overseas Operations Directorate, AHQ. He has a number of publications in Armed Forces Division Journal, Bangladesh Army Journal and National Defence College Journals. He was a contributor to "The Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2013" published by Center on International Cooperation, Lynne Rienner Publisher. He has completed M.Phil from Bangladesh University of Professionals and now is pursuing PhD on the subject 'The Evolving Nature of United Nations Peace Support Operations: Opportunities and Challenges for Bangladesh' in the same university. Presently, he is serving as Deputy Commandant of Bangladesh Military Academy.

Effects of Corona Pandemic on Contemporaneous Peacekeeping Operations: An Analysis of Challenges with some Plausible Guidelines

Major Md Shahriar Rajib, psc

Introduction

Peacekeeping operations endorse solidarity, promote security and maintain stability in some of the most perilous and challenging places across the globe. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, UN peacekeepers were a thin blue line and working beneath a wide range of increasing complexity and diverse threat. The implications of COVID-19 are severe for those people caught in the midst of conflict, often living right at the survival line with extreme poverty and having a lack of basic health services.

The COVID-19 has presented an era-defining challenge to the global economy, social and political environments. The COVID-19 has already taken over two million¹ lives, cost the global economy \$11.5 trillion,² excavated social inequality, widespread discontent, triggered large-scale conflicts, and threatened to set back peace processes. Besides, it has imposed significant changes in armed conflict dynamics as recently demonstrated in the Sahel region, where Terrorist Armed Groups (TAG) have exploited this pandemic situation to attain their objectives on a large scale. Consequently, the earlier success of global peacekeeping efforts on the ground has diminished significantly.


At present, all peacekeeping operations across the globe are in full crisis management mode. They had to adapt to an extreme situation while simultaneously carrying out two colossal tasks: 'implementing mission mandate and applying prevention measures'³ to restrain the spread of the Corona pandemic. The UN budgets are more likely to be contracted due to worldwide recession. Besides, most of the Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) have prioritized inland operations more and the national thespians have re-franchised the budget of the crisis at the expense of the current institutional framework. All these superimposing challenges have the potential to restructure the UN crisis management systems that are more viable amid COVID-19. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the detrimental effects of COVID-19 on peacekeeping operations is of utmost requirement at this moment. Since the periphery of the discussed topic is quite vast, only the significant challenges that have a direct impact on the sustainment of the peace effort will be illustrated. Health crises caused by a pandemic are excluded since various humanitarian institutions are working with those issues. In this write-up, an endeavor has been made to examine the catastrophic effects of the corona

pandemic on existing peacekeeping operations; its challenges with some plausible solutions.

Impact of COVID-19 on Peacekeeping Operations

The recent corona pandemic has emerged with numerous unprecedented challenges in the health sector, social and economic environments. In this segment of the discussion, an endeavor has been made to identify a relationship among those overlapping challenges resulting from varied environmental, economic, and epidemic effects. For example, both global economic downfall and domestic effect (engagement in the varied domestic affairs) result in less contribution to the UN budget and force strength. An illustration is appended in figure -1 below:

Figure-1: Relationship on Overlapping Challenges of COVID-19



Source: Author's self-construct


Global Toll of Pandemic

The corona pandemic has ruthlessly crippled the global economy with disastrous consequences for all communities and individuals. 'World Economic Outlook has projected global growth in 2020 to fall to 3 percent, increased unemployment rate up to 15 percent⁴ and cause 400 million forcibly displaced persons.^{5, 6} An abridgment on the overall effect of corona on various global economic indexes is illustrated below:

- a. Global GDP is predicted to lose about \$346.98 billion (<https://www.statista.com>).

- b. \$220 billion reductions in revenue in developing countries (<https://en.wikipedia.org>). The cumulative Output loss from 2020 to 2021 is approximately \$9 Trillion.
- c. Loss of 400 million full-time jobs.
- d. Cost \$165^{8&9} billion emergency financial assistance to 83 countries. Global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) downfall amid COVID-19 is shown in figure-2 below:


Figure-2: Global GDP Downfall



Source: 'World Bank, 08 June 2020'¹⁰


The effect of COVID-19 on various economic indexes is illustrated in figure-3 and 4 respectively:

Figure-3: Global Poverty & Unemployment state amid COVID-19 (2019-20)



Source: Statista¹¹


Figure-4: Unemployment Problem (2019-20)



Source: Statista¹²

Shrinkage of Global Economy

The worldwide financial crisis in the year 2008 has already contracted the UN funds by approximately 20 percent¹³ and the recent corona pandemic may cause a further 30 to 50 percent reduction. Consequently, the UN is going through a process of significant reduction of troops from varied field missions across the globe. For instance, in 2015, UNDPKO deployed approximately 100,000 troops in various missions and operated with a budget of over US\$8 billion.¹⁴ The peacekeeping mission in Darfur, Sudan has drawn down from 20,000 to 4,000 troops. Similarly, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has stirred towards the off-ramp, already scaled down its 16,000 troops and over 1,000 police. UNDPKO has sanctioned no new missions since 2014. According to Catherine Pollard,¹⁵ "The ongoing PKO is struggling with an inadequate cash position of about \$1.4 billion which is "barely sufficient" to sustain field operations up to next fiscal year." Figure-5 and 6 exemplify the trends of troops and fund reduction in UNPKO amid COVID-19.



However, the financial pressures arising from the economic depression may lead the UN to minimize mission-essential tasks, adopt smaller-scale mechanisms as an affordable substitute. On the contrary, tensions and conflicts intensified by the corona pandemic have justified the claim for large-scale UN peacekeeping operations as ramparts against increasing hostility, instability, and violence in most of the fragile countries across the globe. Recently, the Action for Peacekeeping¹⁴ (A4P) declaration emphasizes that member countries should offer adequate resources in line with the mandates of UNPKO. However, the responses from member states are not encouraging. In the long run, the cumulative consequences of all these challenges encountered by the UN are more likely to overturn their ongoing conflict prevention initiatives

Implementing Social Distancing Policies in Peacekeeping Operation

Most of the host nations (where these missions are ongoing) have imposed strict social distancing measures and circumscribed freedom of movement. South Sudan has requested the UN headquarters not to rotate fresh troops in her country. As a result, some units have to overshoot their specific tenure in the mission area for a prolonged period. In most of the field missions, the civil employees were given the option to leave. Even they could not proceed for leave since the borders have been closed. As a result, they have to remain in confinement to their residence area for an uncertain period. All these issues are more likely to create trauma and mental strains, and most UN peacekeepers are suffering from this. Besides, social distancing has put an embargo on training and other essential activities. Moving to active conflict zones with Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is not realistic also.


Providing “Multi-Faceted “Support in Pandemic Era

At present, most of the host countries are on the fringe of the pandemic where peacekeeping missions are deployed. Therefore, peacekeepers need to carry out varied tasks simultaneously; battling¹⁷ COVID-19 arm-in-arm, community outreach besides performing their mission-essential tasks. Recently, the Department of Peace Support (DPS) has instructed all field missions to provide the following additional support to host nation’s including:

- a. ‘Developing and securing supply chain management system including the delivery of essential commodities that national or political actors may strive to deliver.’¹⁸
- b. ‘Preserving medical and public-health initiatives by the WHO and International Org.’¹⁹
- c. ‘Assistance in political backing to help political opponents to withstand overall peace processes and political bargains.’²⁰

The peacekeepers are likely to be more exhausted with further splits of limited resources to perform additional tasks. Accordingly, UNPKOs are prioritizing and limiting their operational schemes to the most essential. Restraining operations to the rudiments will restrict the outburst of the Corona pandemic. However, in the long run, their mandated benchmarks and objectives are more likely to be impacted. How the operational environments of concurrent UNPKOs have been overstretched over time is illustrated in figure-7 below:

Figure: 7 Operational Environments in Field Mission amid COVID-19



Source: Author's self-construct

Challenges in Logistic and Peace Support Operation

All UN missions are in possession of a contingency plan for the probability of large-scale evacuation. There are 3,000 civilian staff, 1,000 police officers, and 13,500 troops in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in The Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). If these massive numbers of troops get infected by COVID-19, where will they be evacuated? Most of the field missions have inadequate medical facilities in terms of test kits and other emergency services. Moreover, 'UN Peace Support Operation is likely to be impacted amid COVID-19 for the following reasons:

- a. Concurrent UNPKOs are suffering from severe budget constraints. As a result, on 19 April 2020, the United Nations launched an urgent appeal for the US \$350 million²¹ to rapidly scale up routine logistics services.
- b. Implementing COVID-19 management protocol and emergency medical service at the field level.
- c. Reduction of fighting strength since people are placed in quarantine.
- d. Industrial agitation has occurred in China that ultimately ruptured global supply chains.
- e. Manufacturing deficiencies as demand ascended.

Changed Dimension of Extremism

The COVID-19 has intensified ongoing conflict and raised new waves of violent extremism in most of the fragile states of Africa presently struggling with terrible famine. On 16 January 2021, Aljazeera broadcasted the present scenario 'To the east, thousands have crossed the border to escape new attacks; to the west, thousands more hide in churches or the bush. A major humanitarian crisis is deepening in the Central African Republic (CAR) after an array of armed groups launched a military offensive and unleashed fresh unrest in the war-weary country.'²² On 13 March 2020, the UN Secretary-General called out for a global ceasefire. However, this effort was in vain. Consequently, the corona pandemic has been going along with the protraction of political violence across the globe. Some significant terrorist attacks in the recent past are listed in table-1 below:

Table-1: Recent Terrorist attack in Africa

Location	Date	Type	Killed	Injured	Perpetrator
Nganzai, Nigeria	13 Jun 20	Shooting, rocket attack,	62	100	Islamic State - West Africa Province
Al-Bab, Syria	06 Oct 20	Car bombing	20	80	YPG (suspected)
Jere, Nigeria	28 Nov 20	Massacre	110	6	Boko Haram
Aden, Yemen	30 Dec 20	mass shooting	25	110	Houthis (suspected)

Source: Author's self-construct

The recent surge in violence and escalation of conflict is not only preventing aid groups from rendering essential humanitarian support, but also bringing a change in overall combat dynamics for the following reasons:

a. Some autocratic host governments and violent fanatics across the ideological spectrum grasp the global pandemic as an opportunity for exploitation. Taliban, a leading Jihadist groups, has depicted/ portrayed the corona virus as a 'syndrome ordained by the Almighty Allah.'²³

b. Various state actors are exploiting COVID-19 to tighten their grip over power and undermine political opposition.^{24, 25} According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset, state subjugation has been amplified approximately by 30 percent during the pandemic and in some regions, like the Sahel, recent armed conflict against locals by state actors is witnessing a nerve-racking increase.

c. Nowadays terrorists have demonstrated some new trends of violent extremism (both positive and negative). New Trends of violent extremism are illustrated in table-2 below:

Table-2: New Trends of Violent Extremism

Positive Trends		Impact
a. Reduced recruitment activities in public spaces and offline settings.		a. Significant increase in online activities, notably on social media.
Negative trends	Impact	Way outs
a. Spread of falsified information and propaganda. ²⁶	a. Violent extremists aim at propagating mistrust and disinformation on COVID-19 among authorities, through varied online and offline platforms.	a. Developing strategies for a media campaign against false information regarding COVID-19.
b. Backfire of preventive COVID-19 lockdown measures.	b. Imposing an extreme limit of social distancing policies by local authorities may create disfranchisement among young people.	b. Carrying out capacity building of security forces and local authorities to admire human rights and fundamental freedoms.
c. Contracted international security assistance missions	c. Reducing training activities for local military and police forces may severely affect the capacity building in Counter-Terrorism	c. Conducting regular training events and develop online technological solutions to uphold peacebuilding efforts amid COVID-19

Source: Author's self-construct

Changed Paradigm of US Funding


The United States is the largest contributor to the UN Mission in terms of fund donation and providing necessary diplomatic and technical assistance. The outburst of the pandemic has upended the US economy with record-long economic contraction (6.5% decline in GDP at the end of 2020), collapse in employment (31.7% in June 2020), and disrupted trade flows and supply chains completely besides exacting a large human toll. In response to COVID-19, three stimulus packages of \$2T²⁷ were launched by the United States Congress in March which will significantly limit the United States' contribution to the UN budget. 'In the financial year 2019-2020, The US contribution to the UN Peacekeeping budget was \$1.14²⁸ billion, a reduction of 27%.²⁹ The projected loss of the US economy amid the Corona pandemic is given in figure-8 below. Besides, a graphical representation of the US contribution to the UN fund is illustrated in figure-9 below:

Figure-8 Putting the Cost of COVID-19 in Perspective



Source: 'A. Coop, 2021'³⁰

Figure-9 The US Contribution in PeaceKeeping Operation



Source: Author's self-construct

Other donor countries are facing similar consequences amid COVID-19. Besides, most of the TCCs that have contributed the most to the UN peacekeepers in the past may also come under domestic pressure for financial or corona virus risk-related reasons. As a result, the UN needs to review the operational approach and mode of conduct. It will affect the ongoing peace operations significantly with a greater impact.

Mass friction in Global Unity

The impending impacts of COVID-19 have revealed the fact that global harmony has already been amid realignment. As an instance, in 2008, a massive financial crash had driven a global economic recession (~10 percent). The US was largely affected by this, even though it (US) raised the international response through the G20. On the contrary, during this global emergency period, President Donald Trump declared to turn out the US-WHO relationship.

Nowadays, the Security Council is struggling with a lack of fluidity in the decision-making process. In any issue, permanent members are unable to find a common ground. As a result, the UN has not yet succeeded to lift off any significant integrated effort to fight against COVID-19.

The UN Response to COVID-19: Miscarriage or Efficacious?

The UN's initial response to the pandemic, imposing stringent lockdown, was surprisingly effective. To lessen the risk to the host populace and peacekeepers alike, the UN has iced up all regular rotations until 30 June 2020 and implemented social distancing policies and restricted large-scale engagements and other non-essential activities to all 13 active PKO. In response to COVID-19, the following operations have been adopted on a priority basis; increasing community awareness, constructing quarantine spaces, and stockpiling necessary medical equipment. Most of the field missions have developed emergency medical support and kept ready to assist local authorities if needed. For example, 'UNMISS has also provided valuable support to local authorities in Yambio, where there is a lack of proper infrastructure.'³¹ Besides, the UN has been working to implement its "2030 Agenda" which incorporates the intricacy, interconnectedness, and interdependency amid peace, development, health, and stability through its 17 goals. Furthermore, recently the UN has formulated the following three resolutions in response to the corona pandemic shown in table-3 below:

Table-3: UN Resolutions amid COVID-19

Date	Details of Resolutions	Formulated by
2 Apr 2020	A/RES/74/270 ³² Global solidarity to fight the corona virus disease 2019.	General Assembly
20 Apr 2020	A/RES/74/274 ³³ International cooperation to ensure global access to medicines, vaccines, and medical equipment to face COVID-19.	
1 Jul 2020	S/RES/2532 ³⁴ Maintenance of International peace and security.	Security Council

Source: Author's self-construct


Although the UN missions have minimized the COVID-19 eruption as best they can, it could have longer-term strategic repercussions (as discussed earlier), more specifically for how the UN responds to ongoing violent conflict as recently demonstrated in Mali, Niger, and the Sahel region.^{35, 36}

Determination of Risk Benchmark of concurrent UNPKOs Amidst COVID-19

Threat Model: A quantitative analysis has been carried out to determine the extent of risk (in terms of numeric value) on concurrent peacekeeping

operations amid COVID-19. A threat model is formulated in this regard. In this threat model, two input agents have been considered: The Threat factor and the Competency factor. Threat factor is defined as the collective adverse effects on mission sustenance and Competency factor refers to the capabilities of own forces to carry out mission mandate. The chronological process of risk factor analysis is illustrated in Table-4 below:

Table-4: Proposed Threat Model



Source: Author's self-construct

Survey: A survey has been conducted (with open based questions) of over twenty mid level officers (Presently participating in the UN Mission amid COVID-19) through an online platform (Google form). In the survey following influential elements of threat and competency factors have been considered. These are illustrated in table-5 below:

Table-5: Influential Elements of Threat and Competency factor

Influential Elements of Threat factor	Influential Elements of Competency Factor
1. Effect of epidemic /Diseases (Ebola/ Corona/Flu)	1. Resources. (Fighting strength/ troops, financial backup, vehicle, arms and equipment, communication, training, self-sustainment, etc.)
2. Threat on operational Environment (IED threat//Base Camp attack /Ambush on convoy/Suicidal attack	2. Logistics (accommodation, supply of necessary commodities, and self-sustenance equipment)
3. Extend of Operational Load (Basing on strength of troops, the additional task included in Mission's mandate, Internal security, etc	3. Co-operation & assistance with an allied partner, both UN and Non-UN actors, and different humanitarian agencies)
4. Social threat (Move restriction, confinement, Recreational facilities, administrative loads/ hostility of locals, etc)	4. Psychological Factors (morale, Trauma) and Unit administration


Source: Author's self-construct

Outcomes of Analysis

From the survey and analysis through threat model following results are found:


- The Threat Factor of UNPKO before (2010-2019) and throughout the COVID-19 period (2019-ongoing) are 3.125 and 3.675 respectively. More illustration is given in Graph-1 below.
- The Competency Factor before and throughout COVID-19 periods are 2.25 and 2.975 respectively. See Graph-2 below.
- The overall risk factor on concurrent peacekeeping operations is 163% more from the baseline and 63% from the Median value. See Graph-3 below.
- The comparative Risk Factor of ongoing UNPKO is 148.33% more (baseline value) than the earlier period (2010-2019) and a 48.33% upsurge from the Median value (Rf-1). That refers to a sharp inclination in overall risk factor amid COVID-19 (almost 48% more than the previous year).

Graph-1: Determining Threat Factor




Source: Author's self-construct

Graph-2: Determining Competency Factor



Source: Author's self-construct

Graph-3: Determining Comparative Risk Factor



Source: Author's self-construct

Ways Forward

Opportunity to Reform UNPKO: Pekka Haavisto³⁷ at the ministerial-level virtual meeting³⁸ on “UN Peacekeeping in the Time of COVID-19” said “The COVID-19 pandemic has intensified existing conflicts, but it has also afforded an opportunity “to rethink and develop United Nations peacekeeping further.” The UN should take/grasp the opportunity to bring a radical change in conventional peacekeeping emphasizing on following aspects:

- Peacekeeping operations need to be envisaged along a larger spectrum. In the present context, a reduced-scale peacekeeping mission may perform better through developing partnerships with the private sectors, rising better intelligence capacities, and facilitating to create a consensus around political processes.
- Mission mandates need to be refurbished base on a new reality, new-fangled risks, and additional requirements. Besides, ongoing PKO needs to be more flexible and responsive to rapidly changing conflict dynamics.
- In the pretext of COVID-19, peacekeeping missions quickly need to adapt community outreach besides/in parallel with day-to-day mission essential tasks.
- Department of Peace Operation and the Member States need to reorganize the overall crisis management system that is feasible both economically and politically in the light of COVID-19.

Secure Global Economy through Partnership: The UN is struggling with a shrinking global economy, contracted budgets, and criticism of alleged ineffectiveness. Recently, Fifth Committee has approved a peacekeeping budget of \$6.51 Billion for 13 Peacekeeping missions in 2019/20. However, the approved budget is quite insufficient to fulfill the UN requirements amid COVID-19. In this backdrop, the UN leaders and the member should emphasize on following aspects:

- a. Building strategic partnerships and alliances among the UN and all actors and guarantee/confirm that the UN ongoing peacekeeping operations are sufficiently funded and resourced to mitigate peace and security challenges amid COVID-19.
- b. From the eve of the pandemic outbreak, many international donors, charity organizations, humanitarian agencies, and national and international NGOs have been working in various areas across the globe with their specific missions, mandates, and tasks. the UN should interlink their approaches so that, the resulting effects will be magnificent on humanity.
- c. The UN should ensure the effective implementation of various stimulation packages of different international monetary organizations (IMF, UNCTAD, World Bank) to ensure the economic recovery of member states. This will facilitate the UN to have a significant enhancement in fund collection even during the period of COVID-19.

Escalation of Conflict and Violent Extremism: The ongoing escalation of conflicts across the globe has created an influx of millions of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)³⁹ and hampered varied humanitarian organizations' essential life support services. Therefore, the UN needs to minimize the ongoing escalation of conflict and violent extremism amid COVID-19. In this regard, emphasis may be given to the following aspects:

- a. Protection of Civilians should get more priority over all other mission-essential tasks due to recent exposure of nerve-racking violence in Syria and the Sahel Region. Providing incessant assistance to host peace-building actors and internal mediators, and restorative strategies that limit violent behavior are at the core of this.
- b. Third-party support can be included in the overall crisis management system to implement effective ceasefire agreements among rival parties.
- c. Department of Peace Operations should adopt a long-term process to fight against violence and terrorism including wipeout the root causes of grievances and determining local capacities to recover from crises.

Strengthening of Global Partnership: The outbreak of pandemic has tested not only the operational aptitudes of the UN and WHO but also global solidarity. The recent outbreak of the corona pandemic is a global disaster that cannot be dealt with by a single nation or by individual efforts. To fight against COVID-19, a coordinated approach through the strengthening of global partnership is of utmost essential. Although the UN has failed to bring all confronting superpower on the same platform, it should maintain its continuous effort in these regards emphasizing the following issues:

- a. Upholding the motto of the UN “Shaping Peace Together” by strengthening the communal commitment towards peacekeeping operations.
- b. Developing strategic partnerships with continental unions, regional partners, and alliances to ensure the availability of necessary resources, including financial support to overcome global peace and security challenges.
- c. Re-enforced diplomatic back channels, were possible among various states and non-states actors to communicate over probable escalatory risks in conflict-prone regions.
- d. The recent outbreak of the global epidemic may create an opportunity for overhauling fragile relationships. For instance, the UAE, the potential rival of Iran in the Middle East, has airlifted over 30 tons of humanitarian aid to Tehran that infused new hope in the bilateral relationship. The UN needs to take such opportunities to re-establish global unity.

Conclusion

Even at the pre-eminent time, peacekeeping is a perilous and challenging job. In the era of COVID-19, the UN peacekeepers need to struggle ceaselessly against not only bullets and bureaucratic red tape but also a deadly virus, COVID-19. The first wave of the epidemic is almost over with far-reaching humanitarian, economic and social consequences. However, it is still maintaining rapid diffusion across the globe. By any chance, if the blowout of COVID-19 reaches Africa, at the levels of the United States, the effect will be exponentially terrific since Africa is presently struggling with famine and constant violence.

In the context of the ongoing economic downturn, the UN is more likely to close or down-size its ongoing missions. TCCs may prioritize inland operations over global responsibilities. Some host regimes as well as armed groups may exploit COVID-19 as a pretext to limit the mass populace's freedom of movement. Missions support cannot provide essential logistic backup to the ongoing mission. More prominently, the condition of ill-fated inhabitants in conflict zones remains tremendously precarious since they are often becoming a victim of terrorist armed groups and government forces.

In response to COVID-19, the UN could take some noteworthy initiatives and kept the pandemic outbreak at a low level, yet, the pandemic has reviled with varied long-term strategic challenges including the preclusion of ongoing violent conflicts in fragile states across the globe. However, strengthening partnerships among all humanitarian actors, international institutions and local organizations will be the foremost requirement to recover from COVID-19 and sustain an ongoing peace effort. Jane Sherman⁴⁰ at the ministerial-level

meeting held on 7 October 2020 opined, “We need to strengthen the collective commitment to peacekeeping at a time of increased importance, from political attention and financial support to capacity building and equipment, and to use the current crisis to better prepare for future ones.”

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Brief Biography



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Women in Peacebuilding- An Agenda for Sustainable Peace: A Criticism of Gendered Solutions in Post Conflict Scenario

"Women are critically important peacebuilders and I am strongly committed to their inclusion in all peacebuilding processes."

- UN Secretary-General António Guterres

Colonel Md Hussain Reza, BGBM, psc

Introduction

Since the time immemorial women had been engaged in household matters that includes rearing of children, preparing food, looking after domestic issues and also taking care of patients, wounded/sick persons due to their softness, peace and loving attitudes and special strength to negotiate pain and trauma. In primitive time of civilization, the battles were usually fought in the battle fields from dawn to dusk which were the domain of the male combatants. After the end of war during the process of negotiation and even in peacebuilding process there was no scope for women to take part equally. With the progress of science and technologies and interest of the belligerents, the war entangled women in various sectors including women as a fighting machine and also as a negotiator/ mediator. That means the women were engaged in three stages of peace process such as in peacekeeping, peace-making and peacebuilding. Peacekeeping usually refers to the third-party interventions to stop or contain hostilities by keeping the fighting parties apart—with their consent—through the use of some kind of barrier, be it neutral soldiers, peacekeepers from the United Nations (UN), or a group of neutral nations. Peace-making, on the other hand, is the process of diplomatic efforts through nonviolent dialogue, usually done through third-party mediators who may be official diplomats or citizens, to reach a peace agreement between the conflicting parties. A peace agreement is only the beginning but should be followed by long-term peacebuilding which is a process of normalizing relations and reconciling differences between the opposing parties for sustainable peace.¹

Peacebuilding takes place after termination of direct and indirect violence including structural violence with an intention to pursue for long lasting peace where there is no relapse of violence. During war, women are forced to participate in combat besides their traditional role in their host community which becomes double burden for them (women). It is seen that after the conflict is over, the women were not treated as warmly as were during the conflict. During the time of negotiation, in most cases women were not welcome, since declaration and fighting the armed conflict were assumed to be the male's domain. The participation of women was more of symbolic not as an active mediator/ negotiator. The peacebuilding covers a series of factors that includes

capacity building, reconciliation, social transformation, civilian and military peacekeeping, advocacy work, humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention, and infrastructural developments where presence of women were negligible. As a result, sustainable peace could not be ensured ignoring the need of half of the population (women).

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325(2000) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) is the strongest and first instrument that recognised disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women and girls, acknowledged their contribution in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and in peacebuilding process emphasizing their equal participation as active agents in the post conflict situations for long lasting peace.² The ten subsequent resolutions on WPS have been adopted stressing the importance of women's leadership and meaningful participation in conflict prevention and conflict resolution, addressing the sexual violence, training and capacity building of women and gender equality and equal participation of women in three phases of peace processes.³ Surprisingly, the 1325 and other ten subsequent WPS resolution did not get enough response due to many reasons among which political will, gender inequality, patriarchal society dominated by masculinity and gender based violence (GBV) are most significant. But the UN kept on pursuing the issues and could make substantial progress in last decades. The researchers and the practitioners stated that sustainable peace may be ensured only by active participation of both men and women as women form half of the populations having different needs and experiences. Therefore, the role of women in peacebuilding is very important. In this study participation and role of women in peacebuilding process will be analysed in details with some recommendations to overcome the barriers. It will be a qualitative study with a comparative methodology. Since it is a qualitative one, therefore, it would be based on secondary sources.

A Close Look at Sex, Gender, Peace, Violence and Structural Violence

According to Kamla Bhasin, sex is biological. It refers to visible differences in genitalia and related differences in procreative function. It remains unchanged and constant everywhere. On the other hand, gender is socio-cultural and is man made, refers to masculine and feminine qualities, behaviour patterns, roles and responsibilities which can be changed.⁴ According to Johan Galtung, peace is a social goal at least verbally agreed to by many, if not necessarily most. These social goals may be complex and difficult but not impossible to attain. Peace is absence of violence. There are three kinds of peace such as negative peace, positive peace and liberal peace. Negative peace takes place when direct violence such as armed conflict ceases. On the other hand, positive peace is considered when indirect and structural violence such as gender discrimination are not present. In positive peace there is no scope to relapse to violence. Liberal peace is designed in transitional

states through intervention (e.g. In Iraq and in Afghanistan) to create sustainable peace through democracy, rule of law, open market economy and etc. Violence is somatic incapacitation, or deprivation of health alone (with killing as the extreme form), at the hands of an actor who intends this to be the consequence.⁵ According to Johan Galtung, Peacebuilding implies positive peace. Structural violence is being conducted by the community and society due to their practice, tradition and religious beliefs, which is not considered as oppression or crime on women and girls. It is not visible, typically built in the society which goes unnoticed and gradually leads to eroding humanistic values and impoverish human lives. Structural violence is difficult to repair and often leads to direct violence.

Genesis of Peacebuilding, Proponents of Post Conflict Peacebuilding

Johan Galtung in his essay “Three approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peace-making and Peacebuilding” in 1976 first mentioned the term peacebuilding. He emphasized to address root causes of violent conflict and thereby ensuring sustainable peace. An Agenda for Peace (1992) by Boutros Boutros-Ghali addressed the post conflict peacebuilding as an action to identify and support structures which will trend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. If peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy is successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post conflict peacebuilding, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples. The proponents of post conflict peacebuilding include negotiation, disarmament of warring parties and their demobilization, safe custody of weapons/destruction (if required), rehabilitation of all segments of combatants, return of refugees, establishing peace and security through advocacy and training of security personnel, activate administration and strengthen local government, conduct and monitor elections with associated training and logistic supports if required, assist marginalized groups of the society ensuring their right and privileges, assisting political institutions for good governance and assist judiciary to perform its task to ensure democracy with other proponents.⁶


In 1999, International Alert of UK organized a global campaign with support of 100 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) named “Women Building Peace” with the aim to address women’s absence in decision-making processes for peace, security, and development. The campaign compelled the UN to adopt UN Security Council resolution 1325 on WPS in the month of October 2000. Basically resolution 1325 is the instrument to mainstreaming gender perspective irrespective of differences and to trial violence related matters of women and girls which was technically ignored before signing of resolution. On 08 October 2020, UN observed 20th anniversary of UNSC resolution 1325 on WPS where UN Secretary General António Guterres termed it (1325) as a ground breaking step for women’s leadership and participation spearheaded by feminist movement and women leaders. He also urged upon

all leaders and head of the states to reaffirm UNSC 1325 and therefore, to comply with detailed plan (7- point action plan) for women participation. Women after conflict has different groups such as widows, single mother, sexually abused, belligerent warriors, mother with children and old/ injured members and so on. Each and every group needs separate management. Participation of women in above circumstances would create space for each segment which would ensure sustainable peace.

Participation of Women in UN

Participation of women is a holistic approach for which UN emphasized to enrol more women in peacekeeping missions and in Headquarters who will in turn play important roles in integrating more women in the peacebuilding process around the globe. To ensure that, UN has passed Security Council Resolution 1325 in the year 2000. The UN statistics says that in 1993, women were only 1% of the deployed uniformed personnel. In 2020, the percentage increased to 4.8% in military contingents and 10.9% in Formed Police Units (FPU). Though the UN encourages and advocates for more women for deployment but, the responsibility lies with the Member states. In 2028, UN targeted to increase women participation to 15% in military contingents, 25% in military observer and staff officers, 20% in FPU, and 30% for individual police officers.⁷ The details are illustrated in the figure below:

Figure 1: Women's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions



Source: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/infographics>

Benefits of Employing Women Peacekeepers in UN

Participation of women in peacekeeping operation enhances the operational performance and effectiveness in many ways. According to UN some of the significant benefits are: (1) helps to reduce conflict and confrontation; (2) it provides a greater sense of security to women and children; (3) it improves access and support to women, and (4) it makes peacekeepers more approachable to local women. Some of the important benefits are illustrated below:

Helps to Reduce Conflict and Confrontation: UN women can establish rapport with local women more easily where cultural and religious barriers restrict male counterpart to penetrate. Frequent interactions build trusts which facilitate sharing information which is not only important for the civilian to protect but also provides early warning to UN troops before any exposure to avoid ambush or such incidents. Thus, trust and credibility gained by UN women through interaction with local women and girls reduces conflict and confrontation.

Provides Greater Sense of Security to Women and Children: As the UN women have access and frequent interaction with the local women and children, therefore, the UN women get information regarding their security issues. The UN women takes necessary steps to overcome the security issues which make them (local women) feel a sense of security.

Improve Access and Support for Local Women: Major General Lund of Norwegian Army in her tour of duty at Afghanistan experienced that her women combatants could access 100% local population which was impossible for the male counterparts due to social, cultural and religious barriers. This access established rapport, repaired wounds, could know the gender sensitive issues and could support women and children as they come across violence in different way.⁸

Make Peacekeepers more Approachable to Local Women for Better Information: Through interactions, women peacekeepers establish trust which make them feel near and dear one to share their pain, trauma, suppression/repression, and violence which are opposed to peace. During extreme operational situation when local men avoid the UN peacekeepers, the women were found more approachable which facilitates to solve the issue. In Afghanistan, the women and children used to inform UN women regarding recruitment and activities of Taliban while local male counterpart were totally antagonistic.


Empowering Women in the Host Community: The UN women representative plays vital role in eradicating barriers of the local women by ensuring gender equality, access to decision making process, resources, education, land and credits. Thereby, the local women are empowered which is a dominating factor in women's participation in peacebuilding.

Participation of Women in Peace Building Process

In various fields of peacebuilding women should be an agent or active participant where agency creation is very important. The commonly used definition of agency is “Agency is the capacity of individual to act independently and to make their own choices”. To understand the concept of agency, it is important to discuss power and how power is linked with the masculinity; therefore, women can only be subsidiary partners of power to the men. Women can get access to the spheres in which power is exercised, however, this is in the male sphere and women cannot get equal access to the power.⁹ In Afghanistan, women make up 27% of MPs (more than the UK), but of the 70-member High Peace Council charged with negotiating peace, only nine were women.^{10 11} Female members have to deal with travel bans and their work is limited to social outreach activities only keeping away from the negotiation process.¹²

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR, 2020) found that women are rarely included in formal peace processes. Between 1992 and 2019, women constituted 13% of negotiators, 6% of mediators and 6% of signatories in major peace processes around the world. In year 2020, good progress observed in Peace efforts. Women represent 10% of negotiators in the Afghan talks and 20% as negotiators in Libya’s political discussions. No women representation found in Libyan and Yemen’s peace talk which are in progress. Recently, Stephanie Williams, acting head of UN support Mission in Libya is leading Libyan peace process- is a glaring example of women lead peace process.¹³ Experts opined to include women in the peace negotiations to create long lasting peace as needs are different from men and often vulnerable which are not addressed in peace negotiations made by men. Moreover, the women can bring forward gender sensitive issues and can be addressed accordingly. UN Women in their 2015 report stated that women’s participation in peace agreement increases the probability of lasting peace at least for two years if by 20 percent of participants, and for 15 years if by 35 percent of participation.¹⁵ After the resolution 1325 and true pursuance of UN, the women participants increased which are shown below:


Figure 2: Percentage of Peace Agreements including at Least a Reference to Women (1990 to Oct 2000 and Nov 2000 to 2015)



Source: <https://wps.unwomen.org/participation/>

In recent days due to systematic advocacy and monitoring by UN the participation of women in peace talks has been substantially increased which are shown in the following figures:

Figure 3: Participation of Women in Peace Talks



Source: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/20-years-of-women-peace-and-security>

Women's Group in Peacebuilding

The most obvious way to support peacebuilding is through organizing women's group which were found very effective in Liberia, Bosnia and also in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). There are many types of women's organizations with variations of agendas. In Liberia, the women's group surrounded the meeting room and compelled the warring parties and mediators to sign the peace agreement.¹⁵ In Bosnian war, the women's group took care of women, children and elderly. They were also leading the peace work and initiated the peace talk with 'the other side' so that common platform is made to stop the armed conflict. In DRC women were active in conflict prevention and conflict resolution during the time of armed conflict in 1990. With their initiation the 'Pretoria Accord' was formulated in 2002. But in peace negotiations only few were women.¹⁶ It is also found that local or peripheral women group had better contribution than central level women group. In Sierra Leone, the process started at local level to demand and foster peace. That means the demand is echoed from periphery to the centre mostly.¹⁷

The Impediments to Peacebuilding Faced by Women

There are numerous impediments being faced by women during the process of peacebuilding which are appended below:

Political Will: Political will is the single factor which is the main barrier of women's participation in peacebuilding. Leaders sidelined women priorities in their political agenda for which women participation is overlooked.

Gender Inequality: Due to gender inequality the women are deprived in peacebuilding process. It is found that the state with better economy has got better gender perspective which provides better opportunities to the women which is favourable for ensuring peace.

Unequal Access: Women face unequal access to resources, education, decision making and in power sharing which naturally restricts women in participating peacebuilding process. Due to less of education women are falsely labeled as incompetent to take part in various fields of peacebuilding.

Structural Violence: Due to structural violence the women are miserably deprived of their due shares which vary community to community. This structural violence is not manifested and seems indirect which may trigger into serious armed conflict at any time.

Traditional and Social Norms: There is strong perception among the people that the fighting of war and negotiation followed by subsequent resolution and reconstruction are the domains of men, where women do not have any scope to participate. Traditional and social norms of the society define gender which create the boundary of the women in that society. In most of the cases, it hinders women's participation in peace building process as most of the activities in peacebuilding are considered not preferable for women.

Intimidation due to Violence: The women and children are the prey of all sorts of violence. The women experience violence in different manner than that of men which is horrific in nature. Valerie Hudson in her book 'Sex and World Peace' stated that the deaths due to violence on women are more than total number of war deaths in 20th century. Therefore, the women suffer from trauma which keeps them away from peace building.

Poverty and Economic Inequalities: Poverty and economic inequalities compels women in a post conflict state to pursue for a job for financial security which is a double burden for them, hinders involvement in peace building activities.

A Gap between Local and Central Government: Central government and the associated politicians and political parties having gap with local government trends to initiate misunderstanding which keeps away the women to take part in peacebuilding.

Conclusion

Women had been engaged in traditional household activities due to their softness, peaceful minds and loving attitudes. They were also entangled in armed conflict as combatant. Violence against women and girls crosses its limits during armed conflicts and takes more lives than war. Once the conflict is over, the women neither were rewarded nor accepted in peacebuilding process. Peacebuilding is a process to normalize relations and reconcile differences

between the opposing parties for sustainable peace. It is the process where there is no scope for conflict to relapse. The women constitute half of the population of the world. Keeping the need of half of the population aside, it is not possible to ensure sustainable peace. The peacebuilding covers a series of factors that include capacity building, reconciliation, social transformation, civilian and military peacekeeping, advocacy work, humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention, and infrastructural developments where participation of women were found very low.

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 and its subsequent ten resolutions on WPS based on four pillars (prevention, participation, protection and peacebuilding) were the strongest instrument that recognised disproportionate, unique impact of armed conflicts on women and girls. It also defined violence against women and girls during conflict as a criminal offence and provides authority to trial. The Resolution 1325 and other subsequent 10 resolutions could make remarkable impact on women's participation in peacebuilding process, even though the result is much lower than expectations. The UN could increase women peacekeeping force (uniformed military, FPU and Individual Police officers) after continuous pursuance and assistance by host countries. The UN also employed top officials including Force Commander for peace to sustain in war ravaged countries. The benefits of employing women peacekeepers are: (1) it helps in reducing conflict and confrontation; (2) it provides a greater sense of security to women and children; (3) it improves access and support to women, and (4) it makes peacekeepers more approachable to local women.

The study found out that the women face numerous challenges while participating in various stages of peacebuilding process such as gender inequality; lack of political will by the politicians; unequal access to resources, education and credits; structural violence on women and girls; and traditional/social norms are mentionable. The core issue was patriarchy, GBV and different perspectives of gender which initiated other issues. Women play a vital role in negotiating conflicts and restore peace in her family. By default, women are peace builders and therefore, no special training is required. Less access to education and less opportunity labelled them falsely as incompetent in peacebuilding activities. There is no denying fact that if women can bring peace in her family so can they at regional and at national level. History says that women group with some strategic mission and vision has put good impression in the past. In Liberia, Sierra Leone and also in DRC women group compelled the parties to seize conflict and to sign agreements. The local/ peripheral women group found more active and vibrant than that of the centre. Countries with conservative attitude and weak in economy have less participation of women in peace building process due to lack of women empowerment. Therefore, women empowerment needs to be given emphasis along with agency creation. After detailed study a set of remedies/ ways out were finally articulated in the subsequent paragraphs.

Recommendations

A Bosnian woman peace activist stated, "We have to achieve gender equality in society. We will then acquire power, which will give us the means to achieve sustainable peace".¹⁹ Attaining peace and retaining peace for sustainable period demands equal participation of men and women in each phases of peace negotiations, resolution and in reconstruction. As women has the access to get inner information of conflict and has less belligerent attitude than men therefore, participation of women in peace building would give better dividend. A few of the ways to increase the participation of women in peace building scenario are articulated below:

Formulation of Gender-Responsive Policies: Formulation of gender responsive policies is the policies where gender equality is being ensured at all level. Also, special needs of women need to be addressed and measures to be formulated to ensure the safety and security of the women from violence. Patriarchal attitude to be wiped off from the society, sensitive issues like religion and culture to be addressed with due care so that misinterpretation should not complicate the issue.

Empowerment of Women: Women have to be empowered at individual level, group level and at societal level. To be empowered, the women need to have the access to resources, education, lands and in credits. They should have the voice of decision making.

Adequate Training: By born women are good conflict resolvers, therefore, they don't need special training. The programme should be simple easily understandable addressing women from all walks of life which depend on the requirement of the society. For Afghanistan and Iraq political empowerment, negotiation, advocacy, leadership and vocational training were in the curricula.²⁰

Strengthening at Local Level: Women at local level can contribute to the maximum which has to be linked with the central level. The reward and recognition by both local and central authorities plays a vital role. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are the main link to establish from individual to institutional level.

Recognizing and Supporting Women Organizations: Women organizations are the mechanisms to achieve collective goals where the gender relation, violence, voice of the marginalized or left out groups to be emphasized. Women participation in post conflict situation is not a homogenous body, rather a heterogeneous body combining with windows, ex-combatants, survivals from sexual violence, displaced or HIV infected women with more challenges which need different approaches to implement peacebuilding. The inputs to be forwarded at appropriate level so that even the demand of small ethnic group is not overlooked. Supporting women organizations mean supporting the peacebuilding process for sustainable

period. In Ireland two women formed an organization which ultimately changed the history.²¹

Long-Term Support and Funding: The women's participation for sustainable peace to be supported by long term arrangements with adequate funding. The access to job is restricted for a woman than a man; again the burden of children and injured and/or old adults falls on the survived women. Besides, participation of a woman in peacebuilding needs travel, lodging, protection and other associated matters for which a woman needs money. Therefore, individually or collectively women need long term support and funding for peace building.

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Brief Biography



Colonel Md Hussain Reza, BGBM, psc was commissioned in the Corps of Infantry with 29th BMA Long Course on 16 December 1993. He attended various courses both at home and abroad. He is a Graduate of Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC), Mirpur. He Completed Masters in Peace, Conflict and Human Right Studies Programme from BUP. Besides regimental appointments, he served in two Infantry Brigade Headquarters as staff officer. He commanded one Infantry Battalion and one Border Guard Battalion (at CHT). He has completed two UN Peace Keeping Missions in Liberia as contingent member and in Sudan, South Sudan as Military Observer. Presently, he is serving as Additional Director General of Bangladesh Armed Services Board, 160 Kakrail, Dhaka-1000.

Logistic Transportation Management: Challenges for UN Peacekeeping Mission

Group Captain Md Moniruzzaman Kashemi, psc

Introduction

Bangladesh is one of the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping missions. The mission areas are normally located in the remote parts of the world. Most of the mission areas are located thousands of miles away from our home country. In some areas, nothing is available for survival except oxygen and water. In some locations, water is also not available due to extreme desert environment. Despite some manmade and natural impediments, we participate in the UN peacekeeping missions for a noble cause: to protect affected communities and establish peace. Bangladesh has already attained a respectable position to the world communities due to her participation in the UN missions over the last 03 decades. Participating in any peacekeeping mission has also beneficial effect to our economy but we have to meet certain conditions for that. Smooth logistic support is the precondition for achieving that honour and pride. So, when a new contingent is deployed for UN mission, a few appointment holders are initially detailed to form the deployment cell. The main task of the initial formation is to prepare logistic plan that includes ascertain the requirement, timely procurement and determining the mode of shipment. Providing logistic support to the UN mission is a very complex and challenging issue as it depends on size of the contingent, climate condition, location of the mission area and operational tasks. Logistic transportation is the most challenging part of logistic management for providing support to the peacekeepers. Quite often we face lot of difficulties to ship the items and for their timely arrival at destination due to our lack of proper understanding the logistic transportation management and associated rules and regulations.

Logistics and Transportation Management

We all know that logistic management is the art and science of obtaining, producing, and distributing material and product in the proper place and in proper quantities in right time. On the other hand, transportation logistics management is defined as the movement of people, animals and goods from one location to another. Modes of transport include air, rail, road, water, cable, and pipeline. Transportation is just simply a part of logistics. When it comes to logistics, logisticians make further decisions beyond the mode of transportation to include packaging, containerization, documentation, insurance, storage, export & import regulations, freight management, managing vendors and all partners, etc.¹

Transportation Logistics Management for UN Consignment


We deploy our troops for UN peacekeeping mission in the form of contingents in different parts of the world. As per MoU, the contingents carry their initial self-sustainment including major equipment to the mission area under UN arrangement. Withdrawal phase is also done under UN arrangement. UN has movement control (MOVCON) staffs who are well trained and experienced to handle and arrange transportation. Problems become challenging for the deployed contingents while getting resupply from home country or from the nearby countries. The challenges aggravate when the contingent's staffs or Contingent's Logistic Officer (CLO) lacks knowledge in the field of supply chain management and negotiating skills. As CLO of BANAIR at Bunia in DR Congo, I faced some challenges while receiving a resupply container from Bangladesh and receiving a shipment from another mission. I will share those challenges in the next paragraphs so that next peacekeepers do not face any problem while receiving resupply from home country or from any mission of another country and from nearby countries.

Transportation Challenges for Resupply from Home Country

During my tenure as CLO of BANAR at Bunia, DR Congo (DRC), a container consisting of different COE items was shipped from Dhaka against our demand. 201 Maintenance Unit (MU) shipped the items in favour of the consignee BANAIR Commander, Bunia, DRC. Mode of shipment was sea involving transshipment and crossing land boundary of 03 different countries-Kenya, Uganda and DRC. As per document I found that 04 different logistic organizations were involved in shipment and transportation process. They were Inter-speed Shipping of Bangladesh, Scan Global Logistics of Denmark, Maersk Shipping line and Kenfreight of Kenya. After embarkation of the items at the ship, consignor 201 MU forwarded all the shipping documents to Bunia through email. I thought that the consignment would come to Bunia automatically and did not even imagine for any other subsequent actions which might be required at different stages. One day while discussing with the UN MOVCON cargo staff about our shipment of BANAIR consignment, he asked me whether I had forwarded all the shipping documents to UN MOVCON located at Goma, DRC. He advised me to include invoice, packing list, bill of lading etc. with the documents along with a certificate from Contingent Commander for obtaining permission from Ministry of Commerce of DRC for tax free entry and to get priorities in all the custom check posts. He also informed me that UN MOVCON obtains that permission on behalf of the deployed contingents of a particular mission. I was surprised as I did not know anything like this although it was my 2nd mission in the same place i.e. Bunia. Delay in submission of documents would cause huge port demurrage, container halting charge and driver's remuneration. After knowing all these procedures, I immediately rushed to our contingent and forwarded all the

necessary documents to UN MOVCON. It took around 10 days to get feedback from MOVCON and required another 02 weeks to obtain permission from DRC Govt. Soon after receiving the permission letter, I got a phone call from the transportation logistic chain partner, Kenfreight, located at Mombasa Sea Port, Kenya for sending the said letter to them for port and customs clearance at their end.

Figure 1: Shipment of BANAIR Container from Bangladesh to Mombasa, Kenya by Sea



Source: Google Map

Distance from Mombasa, Kenya to Bunia, DRC is approximately 1643 km² stretching the rough terrain and worsening road condition. The inland road network had 02 customs check points at Busia, Uganda and Mahagi, DRC. Customs formalities, port clearance and arrangement of long-distance container hiring took around 15 days at Mombasa sea port. Kenfreight was acting as freight forwarder at Mombasa and Busia inland port of Uganda. They also undertook the job of transport logistic provider up to Bunia, DRC but negotiated with Comexus, DRC for doing freight forwarding job for Mahagi inland port of DRC. As the container did not reach to Bunia within the estimated time so we collected the phone number of the driver from Kenfreight. We tried to contact with the driver over mobile phone but his language was unfamiliar. His response was neither in English nor in French language. So, we had to take help from the interpreter and came to know that he was speaking in 'Soheli' language. We came to know from the driver that journey of the container laden truck was as per forecasted time frame until it reached to Mahagi land port of DRC. The truck got stranded at Mahagi land port for 03 consecutive days for complicity in customs clearance. Due to unexpected delay, the driver and his helper fell short of their pocket allowance for paying their meals and hotel bills due to unexpected delay at Mahagi land port. So, they were desperately trying to collect money from their Kampala, Uganda office. In the meantime, top

customs official of Mahagi land port headed for Kisangani for official trip via Bunia where the officer planned to stay overnight. The local freight forwarder, Comexux Bunia, came to my office and requested me to accompany him for pursuing the custom officer for expedite release of our container. I along with the manager of Comexux official went to Bunia and met with the Mahagi Custom officer which ultimately helped the local freight forwarder for speedy clearance and enter the truck into the DRC border.

Figure 2: Shipment of BANAIR Container from Mombasa, Kenya to Bunia, DR Congo by Long Trailer



Source: Google Map

Distance from Mahagi land port to Bunia is 159 km but road surface is as usual unpaved and rough like other parts of DRC. We expected the container laden truck to reach in our camp within 24 hours but the next day I got a phone call from the driver that the vehicle bogged down somewhere at Kpane check post near to Bunia city due to gear box shut down. I immediately rushed to the spot and found the vehicle parked alongside the road for repairing the gearbox. In the spot, I also found a long queue of vehicles on both the ways. I came to know from a local that further security and documentary checking are done while entering into the city and for outward vehicles. The truck remained there for another 02 days until the gear box was repaired. Finally, the container reached to Bunia but it took around 15 days to reach to Bunia from Mombasa Sea port, Kenya.

Transportation Challenges for Resupply from another Mission

While doing my 2nd mission in DRC, another BANAIR contingent with 03 x Mi-17 helicopter was deployed to Kidal, Mali for UN peacekeeping mission. BANAIR was facing some problems for operating the helicopter for which helicopters were lying idle on the ground for long time. As a result, BAF decided to relocate some engine, gearbox, swash plate and other accessories from Mali

Figure 3: Transportation of BANAIR Container from Mahagi land port of DR Congo to Mission area (Bunia, DR Congo)



Source: Google Map

to Bunia, DRC. 201 MU in consultation with Air Headquarters gave this responsibility to DHL for transporting the items from Mali to Bunia. Kidal is located in the northern desert region of Mali and 1537 km⁵ away from capital Bamako. Road condition from Kidal to Bamako via Gao was extremely bad due to political instability. After several capture and recapture of the Kidal city, the rebels finally undertook control of the only airport of Kidal. Since then, flight operation at Kidal airport was closed for indefinite period. Movement of UN personnel and cargo confined to limited helicopter services operating only from inside the military super camp. So, DHL decided a daring option for transporting the 17-line high value air assets by road from Kidal to Bamako before onward despatch to Bunia, DRC. DHL took 14 days to bring the container carrying BANAIR items from Kidal to Bamako. Initially the items were kept in the DHL warehouse of Bamako airport. After arrival of the items at Bamako, DHL asked the CLO, BANAIR MINUSMA of Mali to arrange export permission of Malian government and import permission from both Ugandan and DRC government as items would travel to Bunia through Entebbe Airport of Uganda. CLO, BANAIR Mali was completely unaware about how to obtain such permission. He started to ask here and there over telephone and email about the procedure for obtaining such permission. He also called me and sought my help for obtaining permission of destination country, including transshipment country. We started to work simultaneously both at Mali and Bunia which took around 03 months to obtain the required permissions. In the meantime, DHL transferred the items to their own warehouse from airport to reduce cost. After obtaining all permissions, DHL aircraft took off from the Bamako International Airport after 03 months 15 days from the date of despatch from Kidal. The shipment underwent transshipment at Paris, Amsterdam and Kenya during its journey from Bamako to destination port Entebbe, Uganda. DHL handed over the consignment to

Entebbe UN Logistic Base after 02 months from the date of departure from origin port Bamako. DHL kept the goods at their designated warehouse within the customs areas at Paris, Amsterdam and Kenya. Finally, BANAIR C-130 aircraft transferred the items from Entebbe to Bunia, DRC through a non-reimbursement flight and thus ending a constant supervision and monitoring of CLO of BANAIR Mali and DRC and Air HQ. It took around 06 months to transfer and relocate the consignment from Kidal, Mali to Bunia, DRC.³

Figure 4: Relocation of BAF Air Assets from Kidal, Mali to another Mission Area (Bunia, DR Congo)



Source: Google Map

Resupply from Host Country or Nearby Country

During my both tenures as CLO in Bunia, I observed that we required some items such as computer printer cartridge, liquid hand wash, batteries, etc quite often to replenish the shortfall. We used to submit demands to our home country for replenishment. Home country dispatches these items with the members of BANAIR when they return from leave. Transporting some items, especially DG and valuable goods, with the passengers is risky and creates uncertainty at different stages of journey. Timely despatch in such mode of shipment is uncertain as leave goes do not plan as per the requirement of consignor. Moreover, this type of dispatch does not cover with insurance policy. We operate our troops in the remote areas such as Bunia, DRC or Kidal, Mali where the required things are neither available in locally nor in the nearby towns. However, it is possible to obtain the things either locally or from the nearby countries. In this respect I can give example of CLO BANAIR- 14 of Bunia who bought some containers from local supplier after inspecting the containers physically in Kampala, Uganda.⁴ Buying of those containers was essential to replace the old and life-expired contingent owned containers in order to get full reimbursement in the contingent owned equipment (COE)

category. So, it saved unnecessary long-distance transportation from home country and reduced the cost and logistical risk. Another good option is resupply from nearby country. Logistic hub for any mission area is always located in a safe and urban area where all sorts of communication and common user items are available. There is also a routine airlift facility exist between the contingents and logistic hub. Common user Class C materials and vehicle spares can easily be transported from the nearby cities using the UN flights through raising Cargo Movement Request (CMR). This will reduce logistical risk ensuring self-sufficiency for COE inspection. Raising CMR needs little bit of skill and confidence on computer operation.

Minimizing Transportation Costs and Logistical Risk

The easiest way to minimize transportation costs is to eliminate unnecessary transportation. We can do this by finding closer suppliers. We can reduce transportation costs by consolidating shipments while initial deployment. During shortage of any item, operation of the contingent may come to standstill. So, CLO of the contingent must explore and find a nearby secure supply chain. The chain must be able to deliver the items quickly and rapidly, with a minimum risk of delay. In this regard contingent commander has the responsibility to help and guide the CLO to find secured and safe supply chain to meet the unexpected requirements. Although we carry and stock sufficient back up spares but urgent requirement quite often arises. Back in home we do not produce aircraft spares and we are dependent on foreign supply. So, we can order against AOG or priority demands assigning place of delivery directly to that contingent or to the nearby logistic hub. This will reduce the transportation cost and reduce the delivery time. During my first tenure as CLO BANAIR in DRC, our helicopter fleet was seriously affected due to a sudden severe storm. So, we needed a Swash Plate and some other spares. BAF shipped the items through DHL destined to Entebbe, Uganda from where our own helicopter transported the equipment through a non-reimbursement flight. We could ship the items using the UN flight but that would require some more time and effort. Decision of the then BANAIR contingent reduced logistical risk and made our helicopter serviceable within the shortest possible time. Cost of non-reimbursement flight was compensated by quick recovery of helicopter and generating more flying hours and upholding the image of BANAIR. Continuous training, experience sharing and effective negotiating skill will reduce unnecessary delay and logistical risks in our shipment. UN MOVCON staffs are well trained and highly specialized on all sorts of transportation service. So, we may consult with them prior to undertaking any complicated and long-distance shipment.

Conclusion

Transportation logistics is a specialized subject that needs thorough knowledge and experience. During troops' rotation, we tend to carry our COE

items with the limit of troops' personal luggage allowances. Some time we become successful but in most of the cases we fall back on separate arrangement through commercial sources. Replacing bulk items or equipment such as engine, vehicle, generator, etc. is never possible utilizing troops' rotation flights. Those are always arranged either through commercial sources or utilizing contributing country's transport aircraft. In any sort of mode of shipment, the Logistic Officer must consider the port of destination, place of delivery, and port handling charges. Any gap in the transportation chain will create uncertainty and delay in handing over consignment to the recipient. Despatching unit must prepare accurate invoice, packing list, Bill of Lading or Airways Bill and the end user certificate so that the documents match with the physical items checking by the custom authority at border entry points. An advance notification and subsequent timely despatch of documents to the concerned consignee unit is necessary for appropriate actions by the consignee. In all the UN mission areas, UN has well connected air and ground transportation network. So, the logistic officer of both consignor and consignee units must try to utilize the UN flights which are safe, hassle free and enriched with point to point communication. There are many world-renowned transport logistic providers who are doing multi-billion-dollar business employing thousands of people all over the world. Transportation of items from one part of the world to any remote corner of another part has become very easy because of their chain network management. We need only knowledge and negotiating skill to avail their established transportation network. We should always try to utilize the host nation or nearby country's support to avoid logistical risk and reduce transport cost. Participating in any peacekeeping mission is obviously prestigious and economically beneficial but we must be capable to provide continuous and uninterrupted logistic support to our troops to meet their operational requirement.

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Brief Biography



Group Captain Md Moniruzzaman Kashemi, psc was commissioned in Bangladesh Air Force on 03 July 1991. He is a logistic branch officer and did his Basic Logistics course from OTS, BAF. He did Advanced Logistics course from India and Logistics Readiness Course from USA. He attended several other courses and seminars both at home and abroad. He is a Mirpurian and got MDS from National University. He served in different BAF bases, units, Air HQ and DGD. He also served twice as Logistic Officer of BANAIR in DR Congo. He has visited Russia, China, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, UAE, Australia, South Africa and Zambia for different purposes. Presently, he is serving as Officer Commanding, 201 Maintenance Unit of Bangladesh Air Force.

Mali, the Deadliest UN Mission: Threat Overview with Technical Analysis vis-a-vis Strategy and Preparedness of Bangladesh Army to Face the Challenges

Lieutenant Colonel Kudrat-E-Khuda, psc

"Bangladesh has become a brand name in peace support operations for our utmost dedication and professionalism"

-Honourable Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina

Introduction


In UN peacekeeping, Bangladesh is graduated since August 1988 by sending peacekeepers in Iran-Iraq Military Observers Group. Bangladesh Army, today, stepped into 32 years of its glorious journey in UN Peacekeeping Operations and has become a very important player for UN peacekeeping efforts. So far, Bangladesh Army has taken part in 54 peacekeeping missions in 40 different countries and at present, 15 contingents of Bangladesh Army are deployed in UN Peacekeeping operations around the world.

In present days, Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is the deadliest UN Mission. Due to the asymmetric nature of threat, the security of peacekeepers is a concern for all participating nations. So far, 213 peacekeepers have made supreme sacrifice and more than 361 peacekeepers have been wounded in action. Despite such security environment, Bangladesh is the highest troops contributing country (TCC) in MINUSMA. Though there are frequent improvised Explosive Device (IED) and complex attack, Bangladeshi peacekeepers are fighting valiantly against those hostile groups. Bangladeshi peacekeepers are known to be the bravest one to the leaderships of Force Headquarters (FHQ) and Mission Headquarters. In many cases, the leadership chose Bangladeshi contingents as alternative, once some contingents of other TCCs avoided performing their responsibilities.¹

Country Profile of MALI

Mali was the French Colony since 1893 and got independence in 1960. It is the 24th largest country in the world having an area of 12,40,193 Sq km. Terrain condition is desert or semi-desert which covers about 65% of area. The terrain is part of Savanna, high plateau and rugged hills in the north-east. The country is very rich with minerals like Gold, Diamond, Iron Ore, Uranium and Oil. Weather is extreme which is above 45°C (warm season from March to May) and below 32°C (cold season from July to September). Population is approximately 19.83 million where majority are Muslim (94.8%) and rest are Animist, Christian and other of religions. People of Mali speak in many languages like French, Bambara, Bomu, Songhai & Arabic. They have number of ethnicity which mostly placed within the regions are shown below.

Figure1: Location of Different Ethnic Groups of Mali ²



Source: Overseas Operation Directorate, AHQ

Genesis of the Conflict and Deployment of MINUSMA

The crisis in Mali started due to deprivation of the Tuareg. Main reasons are economic inequalities between North and South; also political and economic discontentment of the Northern people. In 2012, Tuareg-led rebellion swept the north of the country and seized control of northern MALI, declared independence of AZAWAD and GAO city. The insurgency forced the Malian government to request assistance prompting France to deploy military forces and assistance from the UN to begin the peace keeping mission MINUSMA to stabilize the region as Malian government sought peace with the various factions. Security Council approved the deployment of foreign troops in Mali on 12 December. French deployed 3000 troops under "Operation Serval" on 11 January 2013 and African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) also deployed to regain the lost territory. On 01 July 2013, MINUSMA was deployed replacing AFISMA. In 2013, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, defeating Moussa Mara, won presidential election. Thereafter, France government handed over the responsibility of Mali to MINUSMA.³

Mission and Mandated Tasks of MINUSMA

MINUSMA was formed by Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013. Mission and task of MINUSMA was to focus on assisting reestablishment of state authority, protection of civilians (POC), ensuring security with a view to rebuilding of the security sectors and to support political processes in Mali.

Mandate: Mandate for MINUSMA was passed by Security Council Resolution 2100 on 25 Apr 2013, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and was last revised on 28 Jun 2019.⁴

Mandated Task:

- a. Assisting the execution of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali.
- b. Helping in reestablishment of Government authority in the Centre Mali.
- c. Safety of civilians and defend against asymmetric threats.
- d. Worthy offices and resolution.
- e. Humanitarian support.
- f. Uphold and safeguard of human rights.

Figure 2: MINUSMA Deployment Map⁵



Source: Internet

Significant Events that Took Place after Deployment of MINUSMA

In 2015, Malian Government and Rebel Groups signed Peace Agreement with an alliance of Tuareg and Arab rebels called the Coordination of Movement for Azawad (CMA), but implementation was slow. The emergence and reorganization of new jihadist elements calls into question the relevance of the

2015 agreement and threatens to spill over state borders into Niger and Burkina Faso. The anti-Government protests took a surge in 2020. National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) who overthrew President formed on 18 August 2020. On 25 September 2020, a transitional Interim Government was formed for 18 months which is approved by African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Bangladesh as the leading Troops contributing country (TCC) was offered by the UN to send troops and the Government of Bangladesh promptly responded and sent troops in 2013.

Figure 3: Deployment Map of Bangladesh Contingents⁶



Source: Overseas Operation Directorate, Army Headquarters

Operational Environment in Mali

Mali is part of Savanna desert. Its infrastructures are very poor. There is no definite route which can be utilized for the purpose of convoy escorting and conducting other operations. Therefore, on and often peacekeepers are bound to follow unidentified and undesignated route which is likely to have IED and other security attack. There are many groups operating in Mali; some of them are Compliant Armed Group (CAG) who have signed the peace agreement and others are non-compliant armed groups who have not signed the treaty. Persistent IED threat, complex attack, increasing threat of terrorist the activities in Mali highly restrict freedom of movement/manoeuvre/operations of the UN Forces. The security threats in Mali are increasingly transitional and hostile in nature.

Violent Extremist Groups (VEOs) Functional in Mali⁷

Jama'a Nusratul-Islam waal-Muslimin' (JNIM): This jihadists group known as JNIM, operating in the Maghreb and West Africa. JNIM was formed by the union of Ansar Dine, Al-Mourabitoun, the Macina Liberation Front and

AI-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): AQIM's is originated in Algeria but expanded into Mali during the 2012 coup. This jihadist group operates in Timbuktu and the far north of the country. Mission of AQIM is to extent Islamic law and free Mali from its French colony.

Al-Mourabitoun: Al-Morabitoun was formed in August 2013. Aim is to “unite all Muslims from the Nile to the Atlantic in jihad against Westerners” and oppose French power.

Figure 4: Violent Extremist Groups operating in Mali



Source: BANBAT in Mali

Ansar Dine: Ansar Dine is also known as the Macina Liberation Front (MLF). Ansar Dine originated in the Timbuktu region in December 2011 led by a former Tuareg rebel leader, Ilyad Ag Ghaly. The MLF wants to impose Islamic law in Mali.

Ansaroul Islam (AI): This jihadist fighters group came to eminence in December 2016 and claimed responsibility for an attack on a military base in northeastern Soum Province (killed 12 person of a counter-terrorism unit). This group conducted number of attacks on military and civilians. Their leader Ibrahim Dicko previously fought in the jihadist group name as “The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa” (Mujao) in neighboring country. This group has got support and training from Katibat Macina and Katibat Serma and also has “ideological, operational and logistical links” with JNIM.

Locations of VEOs Operational in Mali

Kidal Region: Al-Qaeda affiliated JNIM, formed by former Ansar Dine brigades, Al-Ansar, Youssef Ibn Tachfin, and Tariq Ibn Ziyad is operating here. Their main focus on security forces operating in the area around Tessalit in the Kidal region.


Gao Region: The defunct elements of Al-Qaeda affiliated group Jama'at Nusratul-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM), Group to support Islam and Muslims (GSIM) and JNIM are operating in the area around Gao and Menaka.

Central Mali: The focus of militant activity (JNIM & GSIM) has moved to centre and is primarily focused in the region of Mopti. JNIM and GSIM has been increasingly conducting cross border operations into Niger and Burkina Faso.

Asymmetric IED Threat Faced by MINUSMA

Unlike other peacekeeping missions, peacekeepers of MINUSMA encounter asymmetric threat. The main threats in Mali are IED in different forms and suicidal attack. The UN Peacekeeping mission is not basically designed to counter terrorist activities or IED attacks. Therefore, it is often a threatening concern for all the peacekeepers while conducting operations for the implementation of mission mandate.

Figure 5: IED incident in 2019 & 2020 Targeting MINUSMA ⁸




Source: Bangladesh Army C-IED Fusion Center

Details of IDF and IED Incidents in Mali

Different groups operating in Mali are capable of bringing indirect fire of 60 mm, 82 mm and 120 mm mortar onto the Super Camps and other security posts. In most of the cases, the security posts, Super Camps (where the peacekeepers live along with other major equipment) and The UN installations are registered targets of different groups. They apply a different tactics where they initially attack the camps/outposts/patrols operating outside. Thereafter, they attack any petrol going for reinforcement. Nowadays, the rate of such activities has increased a lot.

Figure 6: IED Incidents as per Category – 2019 & 2020⁹




Source: Bangladesh Army C-IED Fusion Center

IED and IDF Threat Overview with Technical Analysis

Area of Target: Sector North (KIDAL, AGUELHOK and TESSALIT) remains the focal point of terrorist activities. But recently, the concentration of IED attack has shifted to MOPTI-SEGOU region. It is assumed that TAGs had been reinforced by IED experts in the central MALI area that resulted in an increase of IED events in the MOPTI-SEGOU region since February 2018. In Sector NORTH, the Indirect Firing like mortars and rockets threat against TESSALIT, KIDAL and AGUELHOK still remains. Mines are being placed very close to KIDAL Super Camp to hamper the freedom of movement of MINUSMA/BARKHANE forces.

Figure 7: IED Incidents by Region – 2019 & 2020¹⁰



Source: Bangladesh Army C-IED Fusion Center

Types of Explosives Used: Composition of explosives in IED in Mali are primarily composed of explosives taken from conventional munitions, mines and fertilizer. Most commonly used ingredients are Ammonium Nitrate - Sugar (ANS), Ammonium Nitrate - Fuel Oil (ANFO), Potassium Chlorates - Bromates and Urea Nitrate. The use of conventional anti-tank mine is found in different sectors. The use of this mine is very popular due to its high non-detectability for its low metal content.¹¹

Figure 8: IED constructed by conventional Munitions and Mines



Source: C-IED Data Center

Tactics, Technique and Procedures (TTPs) Followed: As VEOs observe our forces TTP, thereby, it is assumed that they can emplace double stacked mines against out protected vehicles. Highly likely the efforts of the VEOs will continue. There will be no significant changes in their TTPs like Mines, Vehicle Operated IED (VOID), Remote Control IED (RCIED), Suicide Vest Bomb IED (SVBIED) and IDF. In sector WEST, the main threat remains focused along Main Supply Route (MSR) with the use of RCIED & VOID. IED attacks in MOPTI-SEGOU region against MDSF would likely remain.

Current Trends and Assessment: As VEOs observe the TTPs of MINUSMA forces, thereby, it is assumed that they may emplace double stacked mines against their protected vehicles. There will be no significant changes in their TTPs (mines, VOID, RCIED, SVBIED and IDF). Since 2018, Mali has experienced a significant increase in IED incidents, which resulted into high casualties among civilians and impeding stabilization efforts. Since February 2019, three incidents took place where dead bodies with IED were used as booby-trap. In November 2020, Radio Activated Victim Operated IED (RAVOIED) was found on MSR and this type of IED functions as a regular VOID with pressure plate after being remotely activated.¹²

Figure 9: Remote control devices are used in various IEDs



Source: C-IED Data Center

Latest IED Attack: On 27 January 2021, a complex attack took place on MINUSMA (BANBAT-7) convoy in the vicinity of SIGUIRI, 18 km East of Dallah in Mopti region of central Mali. The incident occurred as BANBAT-7 was participating in operation MONGOOSE in the central Mali. Total 3 peacekeepers were injured in the incident. On 02 April 2021, a complex attack took place on Chadian UN base at Mali. The militant attacked with mortar, small arms fire and vehicle born IED targeting peacekeepers. Total 24 civilians were killed and 34 peacekeepers were injured in the incident.

From the above discussion, it is clear that Bangladeshi Peacekeepers are facing life threatening challenges in Mali due to IED and IDF attack. The peacekeepers serving in Mali need a coverage of counter IED training and special equipment to protect them from such challenging situation.

Strategy of Bangladesh for the UN Mission

Constitutional Obligations: Bangladesh is one of the few countries that have recognized the UN Charter in its constitution. According to the article 25 of the constitution, Bangladesh is obligated to assist in peaceful settlement of international conflicts.¹³ Basing on these principles, Bangladesh supports oppressed people throughout the world under the UN to defend the right of every country liberally to control and develop its own social, economic and political system. Foreign Policy of Bangladesh has values and ethos to promote Bangladesh's image as a strong proponent of human rights, justice and socio-economic empowerment.

Policy of Bangladesh to Participate in the UN Mission: The Bangladeshi peacekeepers successfully participated in 54 UN missions (out of 71 UN missions) in 40 countries and earned the respect and gratitude of the people of the countries around the world. It has also improved Bangladesh's ties and understanding with the allies of the peace efforts which should be continued. Therefore, the peacekeepers of Bangladesh can never let the images and

name and fame of the country to go down. However, the peacekeepers must be equipped with right equipment to meet the challenges. This seems to be the most appropriate approach of Bangladesh.

Deployment of Female Engagement Team: Beside the male peacekeepers, in many occasions, female peacekeepers can be better utilized for the purpose of implementation of peace. They can easily handle female and children of host nation. When needed, Bangladesh complies with the requirement of the UN to fulfill the requirement of women peacekeepers participation. Bangladesh Army has incorporated Female Engagement Platoon in contingents. These female peacekeepers are doing commendable job in the UN Mission.

Preparedness of Bangladesh Army to Enhance Support to MINUSMA

Equipping the Contingents with Modern Gadgets: Bangladesh Army gives highest priority to equip the contingents of MINUSMA with modern gadgets. It includes unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), communication equipment and other self-sustainment, night vision devices, dust protective glass, camel pack etc. All the contingents are provided with drone which are capable of providing photographs and other details of the surroundings.

Provision of Mine Resistance Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles: Bangladesh Army has taken steps to buy and deploy MRAP vehicle with its own effort. The step of deploying MRAP vehicles through own arrangement by air transportation have created a very positive image at the UN Secretariat and also in the field missions. This symbolizes the involvement of Bangladesh for her commitment in providing support for world peace and security. The other TCCs are withdrawing their troops in the face of terrorist attack. On the contrary Bangladesh is sending the troops with appropriate modern equipment and gadgets.

Formulate Threat Based Training Module for MINUSMA: Operational environment in MINUSMA necessitates to formulate different training module for the contingents going to operate in Mali. In addition to pre-deployment training, scenario-based exercises are also to be conducted for MINUSMA contingents. This should mainly focus on convoy escorting, providing security at halt, search and the detection technique etc. All these training will help to gain confidence and also give scope for healing up the negative impact of the recent fatal incidents.

IED Awareness and CIED Training: Bangladesh Army gives highest priority on training for countering IED. Training is conducted in different training institutions like BIPSOT, OC&S and EC&S. In coordination with UNHQ, Bangladesh brings UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) team to train the peacekeepers before deployment in Mali. UNMAS team train the contingent

based on the experiences in Mali and other missions. In addition, Bangladesh also brings team from Germany to train the peacekeepers before deployment to Mali. It is worth mentioning that Bangladesh has established a fusion centre at Ordnance Centre and School (OC&S) to research the IED used by terrorists.

Stress Management: Psychologically there are different ways and means for stress management. Despite traditional motivation and counseling, professional person like a military psychologist can be detailed. Firstly, he can identify the source of stressor by preparing personality profile for all military personnel in the contingent. Secondly, after categorising stressors, he can conduct counseling and systematic empathic motivational session. Thirdly, he can conduct a job analysis to select appropriate person for a particular job. Lastly, he can conduct acceptance build up and coping up capability enrichment sessions.¹⁴ Thus, in the mission like MINUSMA where stress is high, this arrangement by Bangladesh Army will definitely help to accomplish the task properly.

Steps Taken by the Deployed Contingents

Operating in Specific AOR: BANBAT should take immediate measures to get its AOR defined through Sector and Force Headquarters. As effective tactical operation hinges on area orientation, familiarization, intelligence network and popular support, the issue of AOR assumes greater importance. If AOR is specified, the contingent can methodically enhance intelligent activities and can have deliberate monitoring mechanism within given resources.

Increased Military Intelligence Capability: While operating in an asymmetric environment, intelligence assumes to be a crucial requirement. A local interpreter can be a very useful source for building civil-military relationship with local people. Local government representatives and village chiefs often will be good sources for trusted information, if confidence can be built. Frequent communication, medical support and CIMIC items distribution can increase personal relationship between peacekeepers and locals. Thereby, all the real time information of unusual movement about suspected criminals may be attained. After analyzing this type of information, the operational team can modify their plan of movement and increase protection.

Fortification of the Accommodations: In MINUSMA, many of the peacekeepers were killed due to the shelling of indirect fire of mortar. The peacekeepers are targeted even when they are inside the camp and taking rest. The peacekeepers staying inside the camps are subjected to shelling/mortar fire and need to remain alert all the time. They need to take shelter whenever there is a possibility of attack. To avoid casualty and ensure protection of troops, Bangladesh is trying to prepare protected accommodations in coordination with the UN. This will instill a sense of security among the peacekeepers mind and will allow them to remain in strained free environment.

Conduct of CIMIC Activities: Few mandated tasks like protection of civilian of other group, escorting of rebel leader of one group etc. sometimes create dissatisfaction to locals or other groups. Contingents should take effort to pacify the community where Bangladeshi troops are deployed. Considering all those, adequate budget is also to be allotted to conduct CIMIC activities like free treatment camps, distribution of reading materials etc. so that Bangladeshi peacekeepers can win hearts and mind of the locals, political leaders and bureaucrats. CIMIC facilitates may enhance secured environment for the peacekeepers.

Conclusion

MINUSMA in Mali is the most complex and deadliest UN mission of the contemporary era. Complexity emanates from geostrategic, regional and transnational, realities, while deadliness emanates from on its asymmetric environment. Bangladeshi peacekeepers operating under such situation face enormous challenges in the asymmetric environment. In Mali, at present 1683 peacekeepers are deployed and performing their responsibilities amidst numerous challenges. IED, indirect fire by heavy mortar, complex attack during petrol and on super camps are almost every day's affairs in Mali. Bangladesh is concern about the security of its peacekeepers and trying best to equip them so that they can uphold the image of Bangladesh and feel secured all the time. Among others, peacekeeping is the most prominent event for Bangladesh which has earned very positive image around the world. It should be borne in mind that, Bangladeshi peacekeepers are contributing to establish peace in Mali as part of the constitutional commitment. Therefore, the contribution of peacekeepers should be valued, recognized, published and broadcasted accordingly to show appropriate tribute and honor to the deceased heroes and living legends of all the peacekeepers of Mali. Let there be peace in Mali and let all the Bangladeshi peacekeepers to be enlightened.

Recommendations

- a. Special Training on Counter IED is to be arranged prior to deployment and Scenario-Based Exercise to be conducted to grow confidence amongst all members of the contingent.
- b. Special attention may be given to provide modern C-IED equipment for search, detection and neutralization of IED including jammer.
- c. Level of Exploitation needs to improve by increasing the monitoring level of the teams. Frequent coordination and cooperation between different forces and with local security forces has to be done to enhance the security during any movement.
- d. While going outside the camp, locate all Vulnerable Points (VP) in the vicinity of the camps and enroot. Deploy search operation of VPs and use alternative routes to break the pattern.

e. Any convoy going out of super camp should be aware of spotters and any signs indicating the presence of an IED on the track. Also MPV ahead of the convoys has to be ensured and jammers should be taken to mitigate the risk of RCIEDs.

f. To support the peacekeepers deployed in Mali, all possible steps like allotting budget, providing modern equipment, ensuring Self-Sustainment etc. should be given highest priority.

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Brief Biography



Lieutenant Colonel Kudrat-E-Khuda, psc was commissioned on 29th November 1995 with 33 BMA Long Course. He is a Graduate of DSCSC. He served as Ammunition Technical Officer and Assistant Director of Ordnance Services in HQ 24 and 66 Infantry Division. He served in Overseas Operation Directorate, Army Headquarters as Grade II staff officer. He was an Instructor at Ordnance Centre & School and also served at various Ordnance units in different capacities. He served in Rapid Action Battalion and was in charge of Anti-terrorist cell. He was in deputation as Deputy Director at Bangladesh Ordnance Factory. He had undergone International IED Search Advisor Course in United Kingdom on search, detection and disposal procedure. He did Masters on Explosive Ordnance from Bangladesh University of Professionals. Presently, he is serving as AA&QMG at Ordnance Center & School.

UNIFIL MTF in Mediterranean: Experiences as a Peacekeeper

Lieutenant Commander M Jabedur Rahim

Introduction

Peacekeeping Operations are generally incorporated by the United Nations to create the conditions for lasting peace in the countries affected by conflict. There are certain differences between peace-building, peace-making and peace-enforcement operations. Peacekeepers deployed for peace-keeping operations, are mainly responsible for monitoring and observing peace processes in post-conflict areas and provide assistance for implementing the peace agreements which might have been signed. Those assistance might be in the form of measures for confidence-building, arrangements for power-sharing, support in electoral activities, strengthening the rule of law and development in economic and social aspects.

The United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon, in short, known as 'UNIFIL' is an UN-NATO peacekeeping mission, which was established on 19 March 1978. The Maritime Task Force (MTF) of UNIFIL was deployed in the Mediterranean sea from October 2006. The prime aim of MTF, UNIFIL was to support the Lebanese Armed Forces (Navy), known as LAF (Navy) in monitoring its territorial waters of Lebanon, securing the Lebanese coastline and preventing the unauthorized entry of arms by sea into Lebanon. Another important aspect of this mission is to help and train for building Lebanon's naval capabilities to patrol their own coast effectively, until their Naval and Security Forces are fully able to fulfil the maritime security tasks completely.

Bangladesh is one of the largest troops contributing country to UN peacekeeping operations in the world. Bangladesh first contributed her uniformed personnel to serve with this prestigious organization in 1988, to help for monitoring the armistice between Iran and Iraq. Over more than last three decades, the contributions continued from the brave men and women from Bangladesh Armed Forces in the mission areas with pride and honour. A group of qualified and trained officers and sailors are performing their duties as a peacekeeper and fulfilling the entire requirement by UN in the (TOD) area every year.

Establishment of UNIFIL

The first troops for UNIFIL were deployed in the mission area on 23 March 1978 were reassigned from other UN peacekeeping operations. Initially, the troops were assigned from United Nations Emergency Force, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force Zone. During that time, main function of UNIFIL was to provide humanitarian assistance.

Figure 1: The area of conflict in South Lebanon



Source: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/lebanon-the-shiite-dimension>

During the war between Lebanon and Israel in 2006, there were dozens of incidents where UN posts went through under fire. The then Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan mentioned in his report about the UNIFIL activities on 21 July 2006 that, some Hezbollah positions remained in close proximity to UN positions, posing a significant security risk to UN personnel and equipment.

UNIFIL was deployed in Southern part of Lebanon, situated south of the Litani River and they drew a Blue Bordering Line, which was the border between Israel and Lebanon. The activities of the UN force were concerned about monitoring military activities between Hezbollah and the Israeli Defence Forces. The main aim of UN was to reduce the tensions along the border. UNIFIL also performed one important role by clearing landmines in the area including giving assistance to the displaced persons and providing humanitarian assistance to civilians. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1701 was passed as a result of the 2006 Lebanon War. The mandate allowed up to 15,000 personnel in order to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces for deploying in Southern Lebanon to implement the Lebanese government's sovereignty.


The rules of engagement changed with the resolution and allowed the troops to open fire mainly in cases of self-defence and in order to protect civilians, UN personnel and facilities. The Security Council Resolution 1701, states that UNIFIL will be able to take all the necessary action in areas of

deployment of its forces and as it deems with its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind.

Establishment of UNIFIL MTF

The Maritime Task Force is mainly the naval component of the UNIFIL. After the Lebanon War in 2006, the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force (MTF) was established. The primary aim of MTF was to assist the Lebanese Naval Forces in preventing the smuggling of illegal shipments including armament shipments inside the country.


Figurer 2: Lebanon-Israel war in 2006



Source: <https://www.slideshare.net/MrG/lebanon-war-442692> ²

Total 15 countries around the world have contributed to the MTF mission so far. Those countries are Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Turkey. UNIFIL-MTF currently comprises with 6 (six) naval units and each of one unit from Bangladesh, Germany, Greece, Indonesia (including one helicopter) and Turkey. MTF has hailed a lot of ships and referred a good number of those vessels to the Lebanese authorities for further inspections since the start of its operations in 2006.

Figure 3: UNIFIL MTF deployment



Background of UNIFIL MTF

With the request of the Government of Lebanon under the mandate of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 (2006),³ Maritime Task Force was deployed in Lebanon. In the history of UN peacekeeping mission, it was the first Naval Task Force ever to take part. The deployment of MTF in 2006 prompted Israel to lift their naval blockade of Lebanon. After the conflict, an Interim Maritime Task Force was deployed from 15 October 2006 under UN and was initially led by Germany. On 29 February 2008, Germany handed over the command of the UNIFIL MTF to the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) which was led by Italy.


Under this arrangement EUROMARFOR - a Maritime Multinational Force formed by France, Italy, Portugal and Spain was formed in 1995 for the first time. The role of the force was to carry out naval, air and amphibious operations, under a United Nations mandate. The EUROMARFOR was having the command of UNIFIL MTF for one year, firstly under Italy (29 February - 31 August 2008) and then under France (1 September 2008 - 28 February 2009). On 24 February 2011, Brazil assumed the command of MTF and holding it since then.

Main Roles and Tasks of MTF

The primary aim of MTF is to assist the Lebanese Naval Forces in preventing the smuggling of illegal shipments including armament shipments inside the country including the followings:⁴

- a. Provide supports to the Lebanese Navy for monitoring their territorial waters
- b. Provide supports to the Lebanese Navy for securing the Lebanese coastline
- c. Preventing any kind of unauthorized or illegal entry of arms or related materiel by sea into Lebanon
- d. Provide help for enhancing Lebanon's Naval capabilities to patrol in the Lebanese coastal area effectively, until their Security Forces are fully capable

Figure 4: MTF organization



Source: BNS BIJOY archive for MTF, UNIFIL

All the units under MTF, UNIFIL also carry out two additional tasks while performing their main roles:

- a. Air surveillance over maritime and land territories of Lebanon for supporting the Lebanese authorities.
- b. Search and rescue operations when asked for, in close coordination with Lebanese Armed Forces (Navy).

Participation of Bangladesh Navy in UNIFIL MTF

Bangladesh Navy has been participating in UNIFIL MTF Mission from 2010. At first, one Bangladeshi Navy Frigate BNS OSMAN and one Large Patrol Craft (LPC) BNS MADHUMATI were deployed under UNIFIL MTF from 17 May 2010 to 14 June 2014. Then, another Frigate BNS ALI HAIDER and Large Patrol Craft (LPC) BNS NIRMUL were replaced those two ships and deployed from 14 June 2014 to December 2018. Thereafter, Corvette BNS BIJOY was deployed in the TOD area from 1 January 2018 to August 2020.

Presently Corvette BNS SHANGRAM is deployed to carry out the tour of duties in MTF area.

BNS BIJOY was deployed for UNIFIL MTF in 2018 and executed her tour of duties till August 2020. As a crew member of BNS BIJOY, I had great opportunity to perform my duties as a peacekeeper in UNIFIL and could achieve a lot of positive experiences. I had the opportunity to perform my duties from 18 July 2018 to 18 July 2019, as a member of Bangladesh Contingent-9 (BANCON-9) and as Deputy Electrical Engineer Officer onboard BNS BIJOY.

Deployment of BANCON-9

Bangladesh Navy has been participating in UNIFIL MTF Mission from 2010. It was started with the deployment of BNS OSMAN and BNS MADHUMATI as BANCON-1. Subsequently few more ships from Bangladesh Navy were deployed replacing the existing Ships from the TOD area. In this chronology, BNS BIJOY was deployed for UNIFIL MTF in 2018. Crew members of officers and sailors from different ships and establish of Bangladesh Navy for BANCON-9 were selected by Naval Headquarters and was deployed for their duties in July 2018 onboard BNS BIJOY.

BANCON-9 comprised of 15 officers and 95 sailors, a total of 110 personnel. BANCON-9 took over the duties for BNS BIJOY as well as mandates prescribed by UNIFIL MTF from BANCON-8 in July 2018. Initially a group of 30 personnel were selected as advanced team to take over the overall responsibilities from BANCON-8 on 07 July 2018. On 18 July 2018 the main team, consisting of 80 personnel joined onboard BNS BIJOY in Port Beirut, Lebanon.

Preparation Prior to Deployment

To carry out all duties and responsibilities successfully and smoothly, all members of BANCON-9 were provided with various types of pre-deployment training. The trainings were conducted as per requirement of the mission mandates, nature of tasks of the mission area. As the mission was designed to carry out by Navy ship, onboard training was also carried out in this regard.

Different types of training activities were carried out for sufficient period to train and to make confident for performing all the duties and responsibilities of the TOD area. Few of the main activities were:

- a. Personnel were trained from Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training (BIPSOT), a renowned training institute for providing UN Mission related training and necessary guidelines. The institute is governed by Bangladesh Army.
- b. Onboard theoretical and practical training was carried in a similar type of ship in Bangladesh, so that operation and maintenance for equipment of BNS BIJOY become easier.

- c. Organized training on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), POC, different Standard Operating Procedures followed in mission areas were organized and carried out.
- d. NBCD and damage control training, survival at sea training, first aid training and all necessary training to survive at sea was carried out accordingly.

Responsibilities of BANCON-9

Different types of missions are vested upon all the MTF units under UNIFIL. As a MTF unit, missions of BANCON-9 were:

- a. Maritime interdiction and surveillance operation in the area of tour of duties
- b. Co-operate and train Lebanese Armed Force (LAF) Navy personnel to enhance their capabilities

Figure 5: Maritime area of operation for MTF UNITS



Source: BNS BIJOY File archive


Tasks of BANCON-9

BANCON-9 was committed for fulfilling all the missions of MTF. To fulfil the missions, main tasks of BANCON-9 were:

- a. Establishing maritime control in the TOD area
- b. Securing Lebanese coastline by continuous patrol
- c. Monitoring territorial water of Lebanese border
- d. Preventing all sorts of unauthorized arms smuggling towards Lebanese territory

- e. Support and provide all necessary training to LAF Navy personnel for enhancing their capabilities
- f. Participating in different types of multi-national exercises among the MTF units
- g. Above all, ensuring all sorts of UN code of conducts

Figure 6: Maritime area of operations



Source: BNS BIJOY File archive

Different Duties Performed by BANCON-9

As a MTF unit onboard BNS BIJOY crew members of BANCON-9 performed all their duties with utmost sincerity and with standard professionalism. Followings were performed:

- a. Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) duties
- b. MIO Commander duties
- c. Anti Air Warfare Co-ordinator (AAWC) duties
- d. Surveillance on maritime military and air activities
- e. Individual onboard training activities, e.g. fire Figurehting and damage control (DC and FF) training, training on rules of engagement (ROE), first aid training, different types of emergency machinery breakdown onboard etc.
- f. Necessary training to LAF Navy personnel
- g. Search and rescue operation, as and when required

Different Exercises

During performing the duties at the area of TOD, BNS BIJOY has participated in different types of multi-national exercises with different Navy ships deployed as MTF units in Mediterranean under UNIFIL MTF. Mainly the exercises were:

- a. Gun firing exercise (GUNEX)
- b. Mailbag transfer or Replenishment at Sea (RAS)
- c. Towing exercise (TOWEX)
- d. Asymmetry Warfare exercise (ASWEX)
- e. Manoeuvring exercise (MANAVEX)
- f. Winching exercise (WINCHEX)
- g. Damage Control and Fire Fighting Exercise (DC & FF)
- h. Emergency medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)
- j. Search and Rescue exercise (SAREX)
- k. Boarding Exercise

Figure 7: Multinational exercises



Source: BNS BIJOY photo archive for BANCON-9

Training Conducted by UN Team

After deployment to mission area, UN team provided necessary training for all the crew members of BANCON-9. The trainings were held on different times onboard BNS BIJOY. The trainings were consisted of following topics:

- a. Conduct and Discipline Training (CDT)

- b. Training regarding HIV
- c. Lecture on Sexual Abuse and Exploitation (SEA) in mission area
- d. Lecture on UN rules and regulations

Training for LAF Navy

One of the very important tasks for every MTF unit was, to provide necessary support and training to LAF Navy personnel to enhance their capabilities. Few of the training activities were:

- a. Training on seamanship and upper deck activities
- b. Training on naval gun operation and firing
- c. Training on survival at sea
- d. Nuclear Biological and Chemical Defence (NBCD) including fire Fighting and damage control onboard ship
- e. Navigation and chart work training
- f. Training on operation of navigational aids onboard
- g. Boat handling from ship

Figure 8: Training to Lebanese Armed Forces (Navy) personnel



Source: BNS BIJOY photo archive for BANCON-9

Major Events

Few major inspections and evolutions were being carried out by expert UN team with regular interval to confirm the operability and readiness of every MTF unit. Major events were being carried out on different occasions. Those were:

COE Inspection: Contingent Owned Equipment or COE inspections were being carried to examine the effectiveness of all the machineries and equipment owned by the contingent and those are used for performing their duties. Two COE inspections were carried out during the tenure of BANCON-9. The first one was carried out in July 2018 and the final one was carried out in November 2018.

Evaluation: Evaluation by UN team were carried out twice to check overall operational performance, professional knowledge of crew members about their duties and responsibilities in the TOD area, knowledge on UN rules and regulations etc. The first evaluation was carried out on in October 2018 and the final evaluation for BANCON-9 was carried out in June 2019.

Humanitarian Assistance

Being a national citizen of Bangladesh, each crew member of BANCON-9 had the honour and dignity about their motherland. Though BANCON-9 was belonged to UNIFIL MTF, they felt their duties to help the personnel living in Lebanon from Bangladesh. Thus, with the help and co-ordination from Bangladesh Embassy of Lebanon in Beirut, BANCON-9 provided their hands for humanitarian assistance. The medical team of this contingent arranged free medical campaign for 03 times for day long medical suggestions, prescriptions and distributions of free medicine to Bangladeshi people residing in Lebanon.

Visit Program

During the tenure of BANCON-9, a good number of visit program were arranged. A few mentionable were:

- a. Visit of Principle Staff Officer, Armed Forces Division, Bangladesh
- b. Visit of Commander In Chief of Lebanese Armed Forces Navy
- c. Visit of MTF Commander along with Commanding Officers of other MTF Units
- d. Visit of children from local school as a Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) program

Visit in Other Ports

MTF units were permitted to stay in more two ports other than Beirut, Lebanon. The units are permitted to stay in Mersin port in Turkey and Limassol port in Cyprus. BANCON-9 had the opportunity to visit those ports twice. BNS BIJOY stayed there with all her crew members and all the members could achieve a lot of new experiences. During the stay in those ports, crew members could familiarize themselves with the culture of those two nations by visiting various places of those two countries.

Onboard Activities

Crew members of BANCON-9 had very busy time during their tenure in mission area. The ship has to remain at sea for 60% of the total month in every month. While at port most of the members remained busy for periodic maintenance job and preparation for next sea trip. However, to remain physically and mentally healthy few activities were being carried out occasionally to boost up the morale of everyone. Few of the activities were:

- a. Physical exercise in the morning within the port area
- b. Occasional indoor games onboard
- c. Occasional cultural program while ship is at underway
- d. Organized visit program for whole crew member in famous and beautiful places

Experiences

All the crew members of BANCON-9 performed their duties and responsibilities with utmost sincerity and dedication. All the members stayed far away from their homeland for contribution of world peace. Working under the direction of UN, specially under UNIFIL MTF and wearing blue helmet is always a job of prestige and pride. To fly the flag of Bangladesh and the ensign of Bangladesh Navy is our pride and honour as a member of Bangladesh Navy.

Working with foreign Navy and participating in various multi-national exercises. There was great scopes and opportunity for all the Bangladesh Navy personnel to share and exchange view for any exercise activities. In the area of TOD we have participated in the exercises with other MTF Unit Navy ships from Brazil, Germany, Greece, Indonesia and Turkey. Several visit programs arranged by BANCON-9 onboard BNS BIJOY could demonstrate the culture and operational capabilities of Bangladesh Navy. We could fly the National flag of Bangladesh very high in the water of Mediterranean in port of Beirut-Lebanon, Limassol – Cyprus and Mersin – Turkey.

Conclusion

UN Peacekeeping helps countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. We have unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy troops and police from around the world, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to address a range of mandates set by the UN Security Council and General Assembly.

Bangladesh is one of the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. The South Asian nation first deployed uniformed personnel to serve with the Organization in 1988 when they were deployed to help monitor the armistice between Iran and Iraq. Over the past three decades, the contributions of these brave men and women in the countries in which they serve have been immense.

Bangladesh Navy personnel have been participating in UN peacekeeping mission since 1993. So far, 6012 Officers and Sailors have participated in 30 UN peacekeeping missions with utmost sincerity and devotion. Bangladesh Navy is proud to be a member of elite maritime task force of UN since 2010. BNS BIJOY was deployed under UNIFIL MTF from 2018. As a member of BANCON-9 onboard BNS BIJOY and working under UN, wearing blue helmet always made us proud as we could contribute for world peace.

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Brief Biography



Lt Cdr M Jabedur Rahim, (L), BN was commissioned in the Electrical Branch on 01 December 2005. He completed his B. Sc in Electrical Engineering from MIST in 2010. He served in several Navy Ships as Electrical Officer. He did his Air Electrical Officer Specialization course from INS GARODA, India and Type Training on Dornier 228NG aircraft from Germany. He served in Naval Aviation as Air Electrical Officer and as OIC of MEA Squadron. He served as a Contingent Member of BANCON-9 deployed under UNIFIL- MTF in Lebanon. During the mission period he served as the Deputy Electrical Officer of BNS BIJOY. Presently, he is undergoing the Staff Course 2021-2022 at DSCSC, Mirpur, Dhaka.

Branding Bangladesh: UN Peacekeeping Operations in Perspective

Md. Jahan Shoieb, Research Fellow, BIIS

Introduction

Over the past years, Bangladesh has put itself as a leading torch-bearer of global Peacekeeping Operations. It has enshrined the image of the country to a great extent. This outstanding achievement of Bangladesh can help to brand the country on the global stage. Although nation or country branding is relatively a newer concept, in this age of globalization, the appeal of nation branding has been increasing rapidly among scholars as well as policymakers. It intends to assess, regain and continue to improve the image of a nation. Hence, the goal is to strengthen a particular country's strategic advantage with a view to achieving desired economic growth.

Bangladesh, a country of South Asia that achieved its independence fifty years back, has already become a major player in global peace in its short journey. The country's aspiration towards peace is enshrined in the constitution, "friendship to all and malice to none".¹ Another manifestation of Bangladesh's strive for global peace and security is being reflected in its continued contribution to the UN Peacekeeping Operations. Notably, the South Asian country first deployed its military personnel in 1988 to help monitor the armistice between two Middle Eastern countries, Iran and Iraq. Since then the country has been playing a leading role in the UN Peacekeeping Missions. The country is now ranked first with a total number of 6,608 peacekeepers. Notably, out of the 69 Peacekeeping Missions of the UN, Bangladesh has participated in 54 missions. So far, 1,76, 669 peacekeepers of Bangladesh have participated in various UN missions.² This is a testimony of Bangladesh's noble Endeavour in global peace and security. Bangladesh therefore has an enormous opportunity to capitalize its advantage to brand itself as a means of nation branding.

The term nation branding is comparatively a newer concept in the discourse of branding or marketing. However, in the last couple of decades, most countries have engaged in nation branding. And as a result, nation branding in today's world has a significant policy value.³ In this age of globalization, the term is gaining much attention from researchers as well as policymakers and becoming a popular area of study.⁴ In recent years, interests in the field of nation branding have increased exponentially. Scholars have found that brands that are deeply rooted within national heritage and culture, have greater prospects for becoming a synergic brand.⁵ Nowadays, nations are deploying increasing efforts to their country branding as it has positive linkages with trade, investment, and tourism.⁶ In 2005, Clay Risen wrote an article in New York Times where the author cited British brand consultant Simon Anholt

and summed up his thinking in this way: “just as companies have learned to live the brand, countries should consider their reputations carefully-because...in the interconnected world, that’s what the statecraft is all about”.⁷

Bangladesh’s active participation in the UN peacekeeping operations can portray a better image of Bangladesh. In fact, a country’s image is an important aspect of the marketing and branding of that particular country. Branding a country’s image is a holistic construct that can enhance the country’s image and accelerate trade and investments. Bangladesh is moving rapidly towards a high-value and knowledge-intensive society. Over the last decade, the economic growth of Bangladesh has averaged more than 6 per cent which is definitely lifting the per capita income of Bangladeshi people.⁸ To draw more foreign investments and enshrine the country’s image, Bangladesh can brand itself as a peace-loving country where its role in the UN Peacekeeping Operations can play a big role.

Hence, the objective of this paper is to view whether Bangladesh’s participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations can enshrine the country’s image and use it as a tool of nation branding. The research questions the paper & tries to find answers of the questions: why nation branding matter? Can Bangladesh brand itself through its participation in the UN Peacekeeping Operations? To find answers to the aforementioned questions, the paper is divided into five sections including introduction and conclusion. Section two conceptualizes nation branding. Section three elaborates Bangladesh’s contribution to the UN Peacekeeping operations. Section four elaborates on how Bangladesh can brand itself through UN peacekeeping operations. The fifth section concludes the paper. The paper is written based on secondary literature collected from various sources including academic journals, books, newspaper articles, government and non-government documents, magazines, issue briefs, policy papers, etc.

Conceptualizing Nation Branding

Different scholars defined nation branding in different ways. According to Caroline, Jessica, Annika and Marcel, “Nation branding represents a deliberate, collective effort by multiple constituencies to generate a viable representation of a geographical-political-economic-social entity”.⁹ Although in most of the cases, nation branding deals with national-level efforts, the concept and the technique also applies to places and regions as well.¹⁰ Some analysts opine Nation branding is “concerned with a country’s whole image on the international stage, covering political, economic and cultural dimensions”.¹¹ Fan (2010) defines the nation branding as “a process by which a nation’s images can be created or altered, monitored, evaluated and proactively managed in order to enhance the country’s reputation among a target international audience.”¹² As there are various perspectives on defining nation branding, a summary can be drawn as “Nation branding is a way of branding a particular country which is aimed to

elevate the country's image in the global level and it relates to that nation's people, identity, culture, governance, attitude and soft-power capacity".


Notably, nation branding by promoting a country's culture is sometimes taken by the government plan. For instance, to brand the country, the South Korean government adopted the "Brand Korea".¹³ To that end, the country for a long time has been actively involved in international affairs. In the early 20th century, the global community started to witness the fast growth of advertising. By that time, techniques were developed not only simply aiming at persuading customers to buy a particular product over a range of competing products. Rather, advertising techniques began to systematically produce distinct signs. In fact, these signs or brands came to add an immaterial value that identifies a particular organization or a product and that marks it as possessing a differential advantage customarily attached to a design, symbol, or name.

Usually, a nation means a large group of people with the same language and race¹⁴ while a country refers to an area of land inhabited by a particular nation. Although nation and country are used interchangeably in the literature, there is a subtle difference between branding of a nation and branding of a country. According to Olins and Hilderth (2011) "Unlike place brandings outward focus, national branding, at least from a political or cultural-critical perspective, is associated with nation building and characterized by an inward focus, where it is mostly perceived as a way to reconstitute nations both by means of ideology and praxis".¹⁵

There are different perspectives on nation branding. Nation branding can be analyzed from three perspectives, namely, the economic functionalist perspective, political perspective, and cultural-critical perspective. Most definitions of nation branding can be attributed to the economic-technical approach. Kaneva (2011) perceives that marketers and branding practitioners tend to dominate scholarly contributions which can be attributed to the technical-economic approach.¹⁶ This group of scholars perceives nation branding as primarily used as a strategic tool to boost a country's competitive advantage.¹⁷ Scholars who view nation branding from a political lens view it as a coordinated effort of a particular country's government to manage that country's image to promoting tourism, investments, and foreign relations.¹⁸ Existing literature on the field views nation branding, at worst, as a form of propaganda and at best, as a benign way of managing and building a reputation by promoting a country's history, culture, and geography.¹⁹ Aronczyk defines it as a "more progressive form of patriotism than its chauvinistic or antagonistic counterparts."²⁰ Researchers researching nation branding as a cultural tool perceive that nation branding tends to explore how branding and marketing influence the social sphere and how those customs and practices alter the popular perception of self as well as their national identity.²¹

The nation branding hexagon is a good way of understanding the nation branding. Simon Anholt (2005) through a hexagon, tries to show various measuring scales of nation branding.

Figure 1: Simon Anholt's Nation Branding Hexagon



Source: Simon Anholt, *Places: Identity, Image and Reputation*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010

The Nation Branding Index (NBI) of Anholt ranks a nation according to its brand value. Anholt considers predefined respondents' views from selective countries to present a score on six criteria of a nation: people, investment and immigration, export, culture, and heritage, governance and tourism. It assesses the appeal and authority of each nation's brand image through measuring six areas of state capacity, which combinedly frame a hexagon of nation branding.

Bangladesh's Aspiration to Peace and Its Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations: A Scope to Branding Bangladesh

Bangladesh, after its independence in 1971, faced multifaceted challenges in its journey. In the nine-month long liberation war, West Pakistani forces destroyed major infrastructures, roads, and highways of the country. The Central bank of the country was empty. And there was nothing left for the citizens of a newly independent country for their survival. Bangladesh was suddenly dragged into a squeezed condition from where the expectation of a prosperous country was bleak. Less than two and a half years later the people of Bangladesh had to face famine. In addition to that, the country was regularly

visited by cyclones and floods. Thus the newly independent country was internationally scorned with the then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger addressing it as a “Basket case”. Hence, image construction became an important aspect for Bangladesh.

However, in recent years, Bangladesh has shown a positive sign of development. The economy of the country has been steadily growing and the nation is spoken by some analysts and development institutions as a model of development.²² According to an IMF projection, the per capita income of Bangladeshi people is likely to overtake India's has focused attention on a nation that has risen like a phoenix from the ashes.²³ According to the World Bank, the country has shown a remarkable sign of progress in reducing poverty supported by sustained economic growth. The country has been able to reduce poverty from 43.8 percent in 1991 to 14.8 percent by 2016 based on the international poverty line of \$1.90 a day. In 2015, Bangladesh reached the status of a middle-income country. In 2018, the country fulfilled all the eligibility criteria for graduation from the UN's LDCs list for the first time and on the way to graduation in 2024.²⁴

It is clear that despite different challenges like structural constraints, political turmoil, and global volatility the economy of Bangladesh is maintaining macroeconomic stability and moving forward. Hence, for sustained economic growth and to draw more foreign investments, the country needs to show a positive image of her to the outside world. To that end, Bangladesh can represent itself as a peace-loving global actor as it is one of the key players of the UN Peacekeeping Operations. This unparalleled attribute of Bangladesh can undoubtedly give a positive image of Bangladesh and help to brand the country to the global stage as a peaceful global player. This can give confidence to the foreign investors and help construct a better image of Bangladesh from a war-ravaged country to a responsible and peaceful global actor.

It is high time to Branding Bangladesh. The countrymen of Bangladesh have a persistent grievance that the country is not duly portrayed in the international arena. In many narrations, the country is associated with political turmoil, natural calamities, corruption, and other negative attributes. Thus, no wonder, the resilience, and dedication of Bangladeshi people to enhance the country's bright reputation remain unnoticed. There is a tendency among the international community to compare Bangladesh with countries facing different types of difficulties completely overlooking the fact that Bangladesh in spite of its structural deficiencies and backwardness has made tremendous progress in fields that would make many developing countries jealous.²⁵ Therefore, branding Bangladesh with all its positive attributes will be a big stride in making a better image of Bangladesh. That branding initiative should be a comprehensive approach of the Bangladesh government driven by various


sectors. When all the sectors of government can share a common identity, then Bangladesh will be able to establish itself with a rejuvenated brand that the global community will recognize with due respect.

How Branding Bangladesh Can Be Successful Highlighting Bangladesh's Role in the UN Peacekeeping Operations?

Bangladesh, over the past years, has expressed its deep commitment to the peacebuilding and sustaining peace efforts of the UN. Recently, Bangladesh has regained the number one place in terms of sending peacekeepers. Bangladesh's contributions to peace-keeping missions can work to exercise Bangladesh's soft power. It can be attributed as a way of winning hearts and minds. In the long run, this can put Bangladesh in a distinct place and allow Bangladesh to place its nationals in vital positions in different international organizations. Hence, it can be an important aspect in branding Bangladesh. Therefore, it is an important task to find out the best possible way to successfully carry out the idea of branding Bangladesh highlighting Bangladesh's role in the UN Peacekeeping Operations. If we take into consideration the Hexagon of Anholt, it can be viewed that among the six criteria of nation branding, export, investment and immigration, people, culture and heritage, governance and tourism, Bangladesh's contribution to the UN Missions easily falls into it. This aspect is discussed in the following paragraphs. It has been proved that the people of Bangladesh are very much resilient, courageous, adaptive, and religiously tolerant. There is a good number of people who have taken the name and fame of the country to a new height. There are poets, politicians, novelists, philosophers, economists, Nobel laureates, filmmakers, talented entrepreneurs, sports personalities, students, and obviously the peacekeepers who have taken the pride and glory of the country to a distinct level. The enormous dedication, efforts, and sacrifices of the peacekeepers undoubtedly represent the peace-loving and courageous character of the Bangladeshi people. The indomitable spirit of Bangladeshi peacekeepers is a perfect example of a Bangladeshi brand. If the governance aspect of the country is taken into consideration, it can be added that good governance may help the country to improve its reputation, and guide the nation to be branded positively. In addition to people, the apathy towards global peace and security, a stable climate in the political environment of the country and introducing e-governance comprise it as a positive sign on the governance aspect.

As there are positive signs, Bangladesh needs to utilize its own strengths to brand Bangladesh. Nation branding is a complex task and therefore, academics and practitioners are working universally to sort out a universal process of nation branding. Different scholars have tried to sort out a guideline for nation branding. Hassan and Marhous sorted five steps to implement the nation branding strategy:

Figure 2: Steps to Implement the Nation Branding Strategy



Source: Salah Hassan and Abeer A. Mahrous, 'Nation Branding: The Strategic Imperative for Sustainable Market Competitiveness'

A more systematic way of the nation branding process has been formulated by F. Msele. Her guideline for a nation branding is as follows: 1) Assessing the perception of a particular country; 2) Forming an effective working group; 3) Identifying competitiveness of that nation; 4) Identifying target audience; 5) Defining and articulating a core message and also establish the brand identity; 6) Assessing preparedness for the nation branding, and 7) Measuring and monitoring the progress of nation branding.²⁶

Thus, Bangladesh needs to approach forward to brand the country. In the first step the country needs to assess the achievements and visions of the country. It should be kept in mind that Bangladesh has already graduated as a lower middle-income country and is heading towards a middle-income country with significant achievements in MDGs and SDGs. The country contains a very energetic population including brave and devoted peacekeepers. The next step is to form an effective working group consisting of relevant stakeholders. In this stage, the Prime Minister can take the lead role and Foreign Ministry should play the key role in highlighting the true character of Bangladesh. The process should be an inclusive one and there should be a core working group. The next

important task is to explore the country's competitiveness which is important to stimulate trade and investment and attract tourists. Identifying the target audience is the next big task to be completed. It has to be associated with predefined nation branding purposes.

The next task is to formulate the slogan or core theme for targeting the prospective audience. In this stage, it has to be kept in mind that how external audiences perceive the country matters in defining the identity.²⁷ A nation brand theme or slogan has to have a unique identity. As Bangladesh has become a key player in global peace and security, the nation branding theme may be coined as "Peaceful Bangladesh" or "Indomitable Bangladesh" which will also resemble the sacrifices of our peacekeepers in the noble job of peacekeeping. Finally, the relevant stakeholders should assess the preparedness and measure and monitor the progress of Bangladesh's nation branding. As Bangladesh has an aspiration of becoming a prosperous and developed country, it needs to concentrate more on unveiling the soft power potential of Bangladesh. Hence, branding Bangladesh highlighting the contribution of Bangladesh in UN Peacekeeping Operations can be a significant stride.

Conclusion

Bangladesh, since its independence in 1971, in a very short period of time has become an important and responsible global actor in preserving global peace and security. The resilient and vibrant population and their struggle for freedom and emancipation have proved that the country and its people will strive for peace and security for a long. The country is playing a leading role in the UN Peacekeeping Operations as it is now the leading peacekeeper contributor of the world. This unparalleled characteristic of Bangladesh has enshrined the image of Bangladesh which also may work as an important tool to 'Brand Bangladesh'.

Although nation branding is comparatively a newer concept, due to its appeal it has been a popular one to the academicians and policymakers. In this age of globalization and competitiveness, every nation aspires to brand itself. Hence, exploring new avenues in proactive branding is immensely important for any country. Nowadays, branding a country is more than a necessity. The Branding of a country like Bangladesh has suffered long due to its negative image and reputation. Thus, branding Bangladesh through its socio-economic achievements is vital to have a changed image. The government of Bangladesh has taken various measures to showcase its attainment at the global level. Sharing a common goal or identity by keeping a core message or theme in mind will help successfully branding Bangladesh. Keeping in mind the contributions of the peacekeepers, the theme or slogan of Branding Bangladesh can be articulated as "Peaceful Bangladesh" or "Indomitable Bangladesh". Thus, Bangladesh's apathy towards global peace and security and its contribution to the UNPKO can help the country in better branding.

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Brief Biography



Md. Jahan Shoieb joined Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) as a Research Officer in August 2012. He graduated from the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka. Later, he obtained his second Master's degree from the same discipline of Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, being awarded prestigious Australia Awards Endeavour Postgraduate (Masters) Scholarship 2016. He was also a visiting Research Fellow at Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences (YASS) where he conducted research on 'BCIM-EC and One Belt and One Road'. He has received a good number of awards and scholarships for his academic attainments. Now he is serving as a Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). As a researcher, he has authored a good number of articles and book chapters.

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- (1) P.K. Hitti, Islam A Way of Life, London, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 90.
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